Rice v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 26 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 226910.,226910.
• Citation: 651 N.W.2d 188,252 Mich. App. 25
• Parties: Charles A. RICE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, a/k/a ACIA, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and Ford Motor Company and Rouge Steel Company, Defendants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

651 N.W.2d 188

252 Mich. App. 25

Charles A. RICE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, a/k/a ACIA, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and Ford Motor Company and Rouge Steel Company, Defendants.

No. 226910.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 11, 2002, at Detroit.

Decided April 26, 2002.

Approved for Publication June 21, 2002, at 9:20 a.m Turner & Turner, P.C. (by Lee I. Turner and Charles J. Adams), Southfield, for plaintiff.

Schoolmaster, Horn, Killeen, Siefer & Arene (by John P. Reilly)(John A. Lydick, of Counsel), Detroit, for Auto Club Ins. Ass'n.

Before: WHITBECK, C.J., and WILDER and ZAHRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) appeals as of right the trial court's judgment awarding plaintiff, Charles Rice, $64,217.65 in no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) benefits after the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Rice cross appeals as of right, challenging the trial court's decision to deny him attorney fees under M.C.L. § 500.3148(1). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for judgment to be entered in favor of ACIA.

I. Basic Facts And Procedural History

Defendant Ford Motor Company employed Rice, who drove Ford's fuel truck to supply diesel fuel to other equipment. One of the pieces of equipment that Rice fueled was Rouge Steel Company's Klein steel hauler, a large, motorized machine, mounted on wheels, that carries 350 tons of molten metal and a one-hundred-ton ladle. The Klein steel hauler operator uses the machine to transport full and empty ladles between buildings within the work area, never on a highway.

As on other days, Rice had to fuel the Klein steel hauler on March 19, 1997. Rice approached the Klein steel hauler with the fueling truck. Rice and the Klein steel hauler operator flashed their lights at each other to indicate that they were ready to proceed with fueling. Rice set the parking brake on the fuel truck, stepped out of the vehicle, and removed a ladder from the J-hooks. He took the ladder to the Klein steel hauler, where he rested it near the fuel tank. Rice turned on the fuel pump and removed the hose from the fueling truck. At this time, the fuel truck was running in order to operate the pump for the fuel. Rice ascended the ladder with the hose, unscrewed the cap for the fueling port, inserted the hose in the fueling port, and began distributing the diesel fuel with the handle regulator. As Rice described it, the fuel system has a "little catch where you set the thing," similar to the latch setting at some gas stations. Ordinarily, the Klein steel hauler fueling process took about twenty to thirty minutes.

As Rice was "putting the fuel cap down, getting ready to screw the fuel cap on," he saw the headlights of the Klein steel hauler come on and heard the engine "rev up." The last thing Rice remembered before he awoke on the ground was having his right hand on the fuel cap on the tank and his left hand holding the hose onto the bar of the ladder. Rice, who did not remember falling, regained consciousness to discover that the Klein steel hauler was gone. The Klein steel hauler operator ran toward Rice and apologized, explaining that he had fallen asleep and forgotten that Rice was fueling the machine. Rice received worker's compensation benefits for his serious physical injuries.

Rice then sued to recover no-fault PIP benefits from Rouge Steel, Ford, and ACIA, the no-fault insurer for Rice's personal automobile. The three defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), raising several statutory arguments. Defendants first claimed that Rice did not sustain an accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle as required in M.C.L. § 500.3105(1). Second, they claimed that the way Rice used the Klein steel hauler was unrelated to the vehicle's transportational function because the parked fueling truck was operating merely as a fueling station. Consequently, the parked vehicle exceptions in M.C.L. § 500.3106 that might otherwise allow coverage did not apply because Rice's injury did not come as a direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the fueling truck and no loading or unloading was taking place. Finally, they claimed that Rice could not recover under M.C.L. § 500.3106(2) because he was entitled to worker's compensation benefits and there was no evidence that "another vehicle" was involved in the accident.

The trial court denied defendants' motion, concluding that whether Rice was in contact with a permanently attached hose and was engaged in unloading remained material and disputed. The trial court also reasoned that the Klein steel hauler could be considered a "vehicle" within the meaning of M.C.L. § 500.3106(2)(b), which meant that receiving worker's compensation did not prevent Rice from receiving no-fault PIP benefits. Subsequently, the parties stipulated the dismissal of Rouge Steel and Ford as parties.

Rice also moved for summary disposition, though under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), essentially making the same arguments he had asserted in response to defendants' motion for summary disposition: the fuel truck was a motor vehicle being used as a motor vehicle because refueling is inherently related to all vehicles' transportational function; the circumstances in this case fit within M.C.L. § 500.3106(1)(b) because he was in direct contact with equipment permanently mounted to a motor vehicle at the time of the accident; or the circumstances in this case fell within M.C.L. § 500.3106(2)(a) because he was in the process of unloading a motor vehicle at the time of the accident. Further, Rice claimed that receiving worker's compensation benefits did not bar the instant lawsuit because of language in M.C.L. § 500.3106(2)(a). The trial court granted Rice's motion, determining that there was no genuine dispute concerning whether "plaintiff was involved in the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle including unloading and in connection with another vehicle being the Klein." Having stipulated with regard to the facts, the parties then agreed to allow the trial court to decide the amount of the judgment. The trial court entered a judgment for Rice in the total amount of $64,217.65, but denied Rice's request for attorney fees pursuant to M.C.L. § 500.3148(1).

II. Summary Disposition

A. Standard Of Review

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary disposition.¹ This standard of review is also particularly relevant because we must construe and apply a number of statutes to resolve whether the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary disposition.²

B. Legal Standards

In ruling on Rice's motion for summary disposition, the trial court cited both MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). In fact, the trial court's statements on the record at the hearing on the motion for summary disposition make clear that it actually granted Rice's motion pursuant to subrule C(10). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual underpinnings of a claim other than an amount of damages, and the deciding court considers all the evidence, affidavits, pleadings, admissions, and other information available in the record.³ The deciding court must look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, who must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt.⁴ Only if there is no factual dispute, making the moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law, would summary disposition be appropriate.⁵ However, the nonmoving party must present more than mere allegations in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute, making trial necessary.⁶

The process of applying a statute intersects with this legal standard for summary disposition at the point where the trial court considers whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In other words, the trial court must understand what the law is in order to determine which party is entitled to judgment when there is a settled factual record.⁷ These rules of interpretation and application are well-known:

A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting the provision.... The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted and courts must apply the statute as written.⁸

As the Supreme Court in Macomb Co. Prosecutor v. Murphy⁹ stated:

In considering a question of statutory construction, this Court begins by examining the language of the statute. We read the statutory language in context to determine whether ambiguity exists. If the language is unambiguous, judicial construction is precluded. We enforce an unambiguous statute as written. Where ambiguity exists, however, this Court seeks to effectuate the Legislature's intent through a reasonable construction, considering the purposes of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished.¹⁰

Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used.¹¹ Further, the language must be applied as written.¹² Accordingly, we apply these rules to the sections of the no-fault statutes at issue in this case in order to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the facts left no material dispute concerning whether Rice was entitled to no-fault PIP benefits.

C. No-Fault PIP Benefits Generally

Like most statutory schemes regarding insurance, the no-fault provision dealing with PIP benefits is somewhat complex. The starting point for any analysis is M.C.L. § 500.3105(1), which...