Rice v. Huff

• Decision Date: 30 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. A96A0682,A96A0682
• Citation: 221 Ga.App. 592,472 S.E.2d 140
• Parties: RICE v. HUFF et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 140

472 S.E.2d 140

221 Ga.App. 592

RICE v. HUFF et al.

No. A96A0682.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 30, 1996.

Hazleton & Sullivan, William L. Hazleton, Atlanta, for appellant.

Wood & Perry, Jere F. Wood, Jeffrey C. Hamling, Roswell, for appellees.

RUFFIN, Judge.

Sherry Rice sued Lamar Huff, Jr., individually and as an officer of Starship Enterprises of Atlanta. She claimed that while working for Starship on December 14, 1992, Huff falsely imprisoned her in his office for eight hours and attempted to sexually assault her. The trial court granted Huff summary judgment based on a release Rice signed. After examining the language of that release, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Prior to bringing this action, Rice filed a workers' compensation claim covering the December 14 incident, but the administrative law judge denied her benefits. Rather than appeal, she entered into a settlement with Starship through which she received $27,500 in exchange for the release in question. Rice released any further claim for workers' compensation benefits and agreed not to appeal the denial of benefits. The release also stated: "In further consideration for the payment of said sum ... SHERRY L. RICE[ ] does hereby release and forever discharge STARSHIP ENTERPRISES and COMPANION PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, their successors, executors, administrators, agents, employees, servants, and assigns, all other persons, firms, or corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable under the workers' compensation laws of Georgia, ... from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of whatsoever kind or nature and particularly with relation to or in consequence of the alleged injury sustained by [Rice] on or about 12/14/92."

The standard for a grant of summary judgment is found in Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 495(4), 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991). The moving party must "demonstrate by reference to evidence in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support at least one essential element of the non-moving party's case. In other words, summary judgment is appropriate when the court, viewing all the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, concludes that the evidence does not create a triable issue as to each essential element of the case." Id. Rice, like many other appellants and appellees before her, erroneously cites pre-Lau's standards. " 'On appeals from grants of summary judgment, it is this court's function to examine the record and determine whether the allegations of the pleadings have been pierced so that no genuine issue of material fact remains. Our review is de novo.' [Cit.]" Stinson v. Lumpkin Lumber Co., 217 Ga.App. 880, 882(1), 460 S.E.2d 846 (1995)(physical precedent only). Like other contracts, this release is interpreted by the court using the applicable rules of construction. Campos v. Williams, 217 Ga.App. 296, 298(3), 457 S.E.2d 243 (1995).

1. By its unambiguous language, the release in question covers Rice's allegations of intentional tort. " '[W]here the terms of a written [release] contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the [release] contract alone to find the intention of the parties.' [Cit.]" McDowell v. Lackey, 200 Ga.App. 506, 507(2), 408 S.E.2d 481 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 262 Ga. 185, 415 S.E.2d 902 (1992). This release covers "any and all claims, ... causes of action or suits of whatsoever kind or nature ... in consequence of the alleged injury sustained by [Rice] on or about 12/14/92." See Darby v. Mathis, 212 Ga.App. 444, 445(1), 441 S.E.2d 905 (1994). "The fact that the scope of the [release] is broad does not make [it] ambiguous...." Citadel Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 212 Ga.App. 875, 876(2), 443 S.E.2d 489 (1994).

Contrary to Rice's argument, the principle of ejusdem generis does not apply. That principle limits the interpretation of broad language in a series, such as "all other people," to the class of the defined terms preceding it, such as "employees, agents, and servants." Rice seeks to turn the concept on its head and would have the general term "all other persons ... who might be claimed to be liable under the workers' compensation laws of Georgia" to limit the foregoing specific terms "employees" and "agents." See generally Dept. of Ed. v. Kitchens, 193 Ga.App. 229, 231(2), 387 S.E.2d 579 (1989).

While the release does refer to the workers' compensation action, it does not limit itself to that claim or to those types of damages. See ...