Rice v. Indiana State Police, IP-98-201-C-B/S.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. IP-98-201-C-B/S.,IP-98-201-C-B/S.
• Citation: 149 F.Supp.2d 573
• Parties: Jill RICE, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA STATE POLICE, Melvin J. Carraway, in his Capacity as the Superintendent of Indiana State Police Dismissed 5/1/98 (Deft named in Amended Complaint Files on 8/6/98), FGST. Mark Mitchell, in his Personal Capacity and his Official Capacity as a Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Major Robert Holland, in his Personal Capacity and his Capacity as a Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Dale Zachary, in his Personal Capacity and his Official Capacity as a Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Sgt. Chuck Coffin, in his Personal Capacity and his Official Capacity as Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

149 F.Supp.2d 573

Jill RICE, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA STATE POLICE, Melvin J. Carraway, in his Capacity as the Superintendent of Indiana State Police Dismissed 5/1/98 (Deft named in Amended Complaint Files on 8/6/98), FGST. Mark Mitchell, in his Personal Capacity and his Official Capacity as a Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Major Robert Holland, in his Personal Capacity and his Capacity as a Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Dale

Zachary, in his Personal Capacity and his Official Capacity as a Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Sgt. Chuck Coffin, in his Personal Capacity and his Official Capacity as Supervisor for Indiana State Police, Defendants.

No. IP-98-201-C-B/S.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

April 12, 2001.

Kay Beehler, Indianapolis, IN, Thomas Dakich, Baldwin & Dakich, Indianapolis, IN, Stephen Laudig, Laudig & George, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

David L. Steiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARKER, District Judge.

I. Introduction.

This is a disparate treatment sex discrimination case. The plaintiff, Jill Rice, alleges that her employer, the Indiana State Police (hereafter "ISP"), and, specifically, the individually-named defendants, treated her less favorably than similarly-situated male employees in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and her rights under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as made applicable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms. Rice, a sergeant with ISP, alleges that she was denied training and educational opportunities, denied favorable assignments, excluded from the chain of information, and, eventually, demoted, on the basis of her sex. She also implies that she was made the victim of retaliation for having complained to her superiors about the gender discrimination.

The case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Sgt. Rice has failed to provide legally sufficient evidence that she was the victim of discrimination or retaliation, defendants' motion must be GRANTED.

II. Statement of Facts.

The following facts are either undisputed or interpreted in a light reasonably most favorable to the plaintiff.

Jill Rice served as a Master Trooper for the Indiana State Police. Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (Hereafter "Pl. Response"), ¶ 1. In October 1995, she was promoted to Sergeant and assigned to the position of Intelligence Coordinator in the Criminal Intelligence Section. Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (hereafter "Def. SOMF") ¶ 1. Rice, a female, was one of three Coordinators. The other two, both males, were: Sgt. Ken Houck, Coordinator of Vehicle Theft and Odometer Fraud Investigations; and Chris Hunt, Coordinator of Child Pornography Investigations. Def. SOMF, ¶¶ 3-6. Sgt. Rice reported to First Sergeant Larry Turner and later to First Sergeant Mark Mitchell, who, in turn, reported to Lt. Chuck Coffin, who had been Commander of the Criminal Intelligence Section since 1993. Coffin Aff. ¶ 5; Mitchell Aff., ¶ 7; Def. Facts, ¶¶ 17, 32.

When Sgt. Rice was promoted to Intelligence Coordinator, Lt. Coffin explained the duties of the position to her. Def. Facts ¶ 16; Pl. Response, ¶ 16. According to Lt. Coffin's testimony, he explained to Sgt. Rice that her primary task would be to gather intelligence as assigned. He told her that the Intelligence Coordinator position required flexibility and that it involved receiving and analyzing intelligence information from a wide variety of sources and agencies and then coordinating the effective use of that information. Lt. Coffin testified that he told Sgt. Rice she should not view the Intelligence Coordinator position primarily as a field position. Def. Facts, ¶ 18, 19. Although Sgt. Rice denies that Lt. Coffin made these statements, she offers no references to the record to support her denials. She asserts that Lt. Coffin never told her that the Intelligence Coordinator position required flexibility, but that he did tell her that it would involve 70% field intelligence work. Pl. Response, ¶¶ 18, 20; Rice Aff.

Sgt. Rice attended three outside training seminars in 1996 and 1997. Def. Facts, ¶ 26. Sgt. Rice acknowledges that she attended a FinCEN/GATEWAY training program in July 1997. Pl. Response, ¶ 27. ISP says that Lt. Coffin asked Sgt. Rice to undergo internal training on various outside programs. Def. SOMF ¶ 9-12. According to Lt. Coffin, Sgt. Rice did not take the requested in-house training (except for a brief INTERPOL training session) and she "resisted" the assignment. Def. SOMF ¶ 11-13. ISP states that, because Sgt. Rice resisted the earlier in-house training, she was not sent to outside training with respect to the MACLOGEN, EPIC, INTERPOL, FinCEN, and GATEWAY programs. Def. Facts ¶ 29. In her opposition brief, Sgt. Rice denies that she resisted the assignments. Indeed, she claims that she volunteered for hostage negotiation training but was turned down. Pl. Response ¶¶ 28, 29. ISP claims that it decided whom to assign to various training programs based on funding and on the particular training needs of each employee. Def. Facts, ¶ 31. Sgt. Rice asserts that only males—Houck and Hunt—were assigned such training, thus implying that the reason Sgt. Rice was denied the training was that she is a woman. Pl. Response, ¶ 30, 31; Rice Aff.

Prior to her assignment in the Criminal Investigations Section, Sgt. Rice had worked as an investigator in ISP's Major Drug Section. Most of her work in the Major Drug section had been field investigations, where "independent action was expected." Def. Facts ¶ 35. ISP claims that, after Sgt. Rice was reassigned to Criminal Investigations, she had difficulty adjusting to work that was more office oriented. Def. Facts, ¶ 36. Although Sgt. Rice denies this assertion, her supervisor, First Sgt. Mitchell, counseled her in September, October, and November 1996 about clearing out-of-office details with her commanders.

Additionally, Lt. Coffin explained at a staff meeting in October 1996 that all staff, and not just Sgt. Rice, were expected to concentrate on office assignments rather than field assignments. Def. Facts, ¶ 37. Sgt. Rice denies that she had any trouble adjusting to the more sedentary nature of her job as a Coordinator. She also denies that she was counseled about clearing out-of-office details with her commander. Pl. Response, ¶ 37. However, ISP provides evidence to support its assertion, including a memorandum of January 31, 1996, in which Lt. Coffin detailed various problems with Sgt. Rice's performance, including her failure to clear out-of-office details with her commander and her need to focus more on in-office, rather than field, assignments. Lt Coffin concluded in that memorandum that Sgt. Rice did not comply with Division and Section policies. Similarly, a document dated February 18, 1997, purporting to be a Letter of Reprimand, indicates that Lt. Coffin counseled Sgt. Rice about repeatedly leaving her duty station without command approval. Coffin Aff., Ex. B. Much the same failure to report absences from duty station is noted in a memorandum of February 14, 1997. Def. Facts, ¶¶ 39, 40. The same conduct is noted in a memorandum of February 18. Def. Facts, ¶ 41. On February 5, 1997, Sgt. Rice also was reprimanded for accessing BMV information for her son, contrary to Department policy. Def. Facts, ¶ 42-43. Sgt. Rice does not dispute these latter assertions. Pl. Response, ¶¶ 41-43.

After a reorganization in 1997, ISP assigned supervisory responsibilities to the Vehicle Theft and Odometer Fraud Coordinator (occupied by Sgt. Houck) and the Child Pornography Coordinator (occupied by Hunt). No supervisory responsibilities were assigned to Sgt. Rice's position as Criminal Investigations Coordinator. ISP says that the Criminal Investigations Coordinator never had supervisory responsibilities. Def. Facts, ¶ 44, 45. Sgt. Rice disputes these assertions, saying that Child Pornography did not receive supervisory responsibilities, but that Sgt. Hunt was selected to attend supervisory training while she was not. Pl. Response ¶¶ 44, 45.

III. Analysis.

A. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998). A "material" fact is a fact that is potentially outcome determinative. S.D.Ind.L.R. 56.1(h) ("For purposes of summary judgment, a material fact is a potentially outcome determinative fact."). Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir.1997); Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). "Factual disputes are `material' only when they `might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Oest v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 612-613 (7th Cir.2001) 610 (7th Cir.2001), quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings" and point to evidence of a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "If the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably...