Rice v. Olson

• Decision Date: 07 January 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:13-CV-10060
• Parties: TOMMIE RICE, Petitioner, v. KATHLEEN OLSON, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

TOMMIE RICE, Petitioner, v. KATHLEEN OLSON, Respondent.

Case No. 2:13-CV-10060

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

January 7, 2016

HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Tommie Rice, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Ojibway Correctional Facility in Marenisco, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges his conviction for manslaughter, M.C.L.A. 750.321 and felony-firearm, M.C.L.A. 750.227b. For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and felony-firearm for a shooting incident that took place in Detroit, Michigan on May 25, 2009.

The first time that petitioner's case was scheduled for trial, the charges were dismissed because the prosecution witnesses failed to appear. (Tr. 2/2/10, p. 5). The complaint was re-issued and petitioner was re-charged with the crime. Following a preliminary examination on January 26, 2010, petitioner was bound over for trial.

Petitioner was scheduled to go to trial on April 29, 2010. The trial was stayed while the prosecutor filed an interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial judge's decision to suppress a witness' identification of petitioner. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the judge's ruling. People v. Rice, No. 298406 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug. 4, 2010).

Petitioner's trial began on November 15, 2010. Following the selection of the jury, petitioner pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter and to the felony-firearm charge, in exchange for dismissal of the two first-degree murder charges and the assault with intent to murder charge. The parties agreed that petitioner would receive a sentence of seven to fifteen years on the manslaughter charge. The judge advised petitioner of the rights to a trial that he would be giving up by pleading guilty. Petitioner was also informed that he waived his appeal of right by pleading guilty. Petitioner acknowledged that he had not been threatened or coerced into pleading guilty. Petitioner admitted that there had been no promises, other than those disclosed on the record, to induce his plea. Petitioner made out a factual basis for the plea by admitting that he shot the victim in the leg with a .38 caliber gun and that the victim died as a result. (Tr. 11/16/10, pp. 34-40).

Petitioner was sentenced on December 16, 2010 to seven to fifteen years in prison on the manslaughter conviction and an additional two year sentence on the felony-firearm conviction. (Tr. 12/16/10, p. 12).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal although the case was remanded to the trial court to correct any errors in the pre-sentence investigation report. People v. Rice, No. 307446 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 13, 2012); lv. den. 492 Mich. 854; 817 N.W. 2d 102 (2012).

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was held the petition in abeyance so that petitioner could return to the state courts to exhaust additional claims. Rice v. Berghuis, No. 2:13-CV-10060, 2014 WL 2533837 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2014).

Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment, which was denied. People v. Rice, No. 10-000954-01-FC (Third Circuit Court of Michigan-Criminal Division, May 7, 2014). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Rice, No. 322161 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug. 22, 2014); lv. den. 497 Mich. 1027, 863 N.W.2d 52 (2015); reconsideration den. 498 Mich. 876, 868 N.W.2d 617 (2015).

On July 23, 2015, the Court reopened the case, amended the caption, and permitted petitioner to file an amended petition. In his original and amended petitions, petitioner seeks relief on the following grounds:

I. Under the 14th Amendment Due Process requires Plea withdrawal.

II. The court should remand for correction of Pre-sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) and for resentencing.

III. The magistrate review as to probable cause to bind-over naming defendant was influenced by the fact prosecutor previously filed a Felony Information prior to arraignment.

IV. Defendant M[r]. Rice was illegally arraigned. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction where no proper Felony Complaint was filed at or before arraignment, pursuant to MCR 6.104(D).

V. A violation of MCR 6.110(F) under the 14th Amendment Due Process of law warrants a dismissal in its entirety.

VI. The magistrate abused his discretion wrongfully binding over defendant on insufficient evidence.

VII. Appellate counsel failed to perform to an objective standard, and provided ineffective assistance during the appellate stage.

VIII. Trial Defense counsel failed to perform to an objective standard and provide effective assistance during trial perperation [sic] and lacked diligency [sic] prior to trial.

IX. [Rice] was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel: trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness where trial counsel's lack of performance prejudice[d] the defense during the criminal proceedings.

X. Mr. Rice is entitled to plea withdrawal on a non-frivolous claim of actual innocence.

XI. [Rice] has newly discovered evidence that support[s] [a] nonfrivolous claim of actual innocence.¹

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an errorwell understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's application for leave to appeal on petitioner's direct appeal in a form order "for lack of merit in the grounds presented." The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied the petitioner leave to appeal in a standard form order without any extended discussion. Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, as would warrant federal habeas relief, does not require that there be an opinion from the state court that explains the state court's reasoning. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Id. In fact, when a habeas petitioner has presented a federal claim to a state court and that state court has denied relief, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 99. That presumption may be overcome only when there is a reason to think that some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely. Id. at 99-100.

In the present case, the AEDPA deferential standard of review applies to petitioner's case where the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's appeal "for lack of merit in the grounds presented" and the Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied leave to appeal in a standard form order, because these ordersamounted to a decision on the merits. See Werth v. Bell, 692 F. 3d 486, 492-94 (6th Cir. 2012).

III. Discussion

A. Claims # 1 and # 10. The plea withdrawal claims.

Petitioner seeks to...