Rice v. Rice

• Decision Date: 23 April 1884
• Citation: 19 N.W. 132,53 Mich. 432
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: RICE v. RICE.

19 N.W. 132

53 Mich. 432

RICE v. RICE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 23, 1884

Mere whims and delusions of the testator do not destroy his testamentary capacity, if he still retains control of his faculties so as to be able to make a sensible disposition of his property.

Where a will was offered for probate by testator's wife, held that evidence of a delusion on his part that his wife had misused him, was inadmissible upon the question whether she had exerted undue influence upon his mind.

The admissibility of various items of evidence considered.

Error to Kalamazoo.

Hawes & Shakespeare, for plaintiff.

Powers & Oxenford, for defendants.

COOLEY C.J.

This case involves the validity of the will of William H. Rice late of the county of Kalamazoo. A verdict against the will was set aside by this court at the April term, 1883. 50 Mich 448; S.C. 15 N.W. 545. The case has since been tried with the same result as before, and the proponent has again brought the case to this court. The objections to the will are--First, that the decedent was insane at the time of its execution and, second, that its execution was procured by undue influence brought to bear upon him by the proponent, who was his wife.

When the case was here before, it was shown that there was a finding by the probate court that the decedent was insane and incompetent to manage his property, made a little later in the day on which the will was executed; but the insanity did not appear to be alleged in the petition on which the judge made his order, and for that reason the question of insanity was said by this court not to have been before the judge for his decision. It is now shown, however, that the petition was erroneously given in the former record, and that in its allegations it was as broad as the findings of the probate court. The fact is immaterial, however, as the circuit judge instructed the jury that the testamentary capacity of Rice was not involved in or determined by the proceedings in the probate court. Such testimony as was given of insanity, tended to show not general insanity, but delusions on the part of Rice respecting the currency, political affairs, and his own candidacy for office. The most strange and gross of them was that his services were needed by the general government in the management of its financial affairs, and that he was likely to be made secretary of the treasury. Rice seems to have been a man of considerable prominence in his county, and the so-called delusions were not necessarily inconsistent with testamentary capacity, but indicated rather inordinate and ridiculous conceit than insanity. They did not at all enter into or affect the provisions of the will, which was a plain and sensible instrument, dividing the decedent's property among the members of his immediate family, and containing no provisions from which, as they read, insanity would be inferred or suspected. And the evidence tended to show that the provisions of the will were dictated by the decedent himself, in a perfectly rational manner, on the day it was drawn and executed.

Several witnesses called for the contestants, after testifying to the facts tending to prove the delusions which have been referred to, were allowed to give their opinions whether the decedent had capacity to make the will in question, or to dictate its terms. Perhaps the evidence was admissible in every instance; but it is impossible to read the record without being convinced that the opinions testified to were formed mainly, and in some cases probably exclusively, on the talk of the decedent which indicated the delusions referred to, and that the witnesses, in giving their answers, were, in some cases at least, under a mistake as to the effect of such delusions upon testamentary capacity. Mischief from such evidence is likely to result, unless carefully guarded against by the trial judge in his instructions; but it must of necessity be left to him to give the proper cautions.

When the case was here before we had occasion to comment upon what we deemed "most remarkable evidence" "of statements made by decedent that his wife made the advances in courtship, and that on one or more occasions she inflicted outrageous personal injury upon him after marriage. No attempt," it was then said, "was made to show that the decedent was really under delusion in respect to these matters, and the natural tendency of the evidence was to prejudice the jury against the proponent, by leading them to believe or to suspect that she was an unworthy person, and undeserving of her husband's bounty. But the existence of a delusion that his wife was unworthy of esteem, or was abusing him, would be a singular reason for setting aside...