Rice v. Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case 1:20-cv-01293 (RDA/TCB) |
| Citation | 579 F.Supp.3d 786 |
| Parties | Richard RICE, Jr., Plaintiff, v. SCHOLASTIC BOOK FAIRS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Christopher Russell Rau, Law Offices of Christopher R. Rau, Fall Church, VA, for Plaintiff.
Ajente Kamalanathan, Jaclyn Lee Hamlin, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Washington, DC, for Defendant Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc.
Jennifer Lynn McGovern, Jennifer Lee Parrish, Parrish Snead Franklin Simpson, PLC, Fredericksburg, VA, for Defendants Stafford County School Board, Karen Duffy.
Rossie D. Alston, Jr., United States District Judge This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Stafford County School Board ("SCSB") and Karen Duffy's ("Duffy") Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 5, and Defendant Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc.’s ("Scholastic" and together with SCSB and Duffy, "Defendants") Partial Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 15. Considering the Motions together with their Memorandums in Support (Dkt. Nos. 6; 16); Plaintiff Richard Rice, Jr.’s ("Plaintiff") Memorandums in Opposition (Dkt. Nos. 8; 19); as well as Defendants’ Reply Briefs in Further Support of their Motions (Dkt. Nos. 9; 20), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff alleges two claims against Defendants. Against only Defendant Scholastic Book Fairs, Plaintiff alleges a claim for disparate treatment on the basis of his gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count I). Dkt. 1-1 at 15. Against all of the Defendants, Plaintiff alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986 for violating Plaintiff's First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights (Count II). Id. at 21.
On or about July 27, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he was employed as a Book Fair Field Representative for Scholastic. Id. ¶ 13. In his capacity as a Book Fair Field Representative for Scholastic, Plaintiff worked with Stafford County Public Schools librarians, who were employees of SCSB. Id. ¶ 23. According to Plaintiff, the individuals with whom he worked—both SCSB librarians and Scholastic employees—were "overwhelmingly female." Id. ¶¶ 16, 28.
In or about late August or early September of 2018, Plaintiff was assigned a new manager, Greg Ball ("Ball"). Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that Ball took an immediate dislike to him, criticizing his choice of clothes and facial hair style. Id. ¶ 17. According to Plaintiff, Ball also instructed Plaintiff that "it was not appropriate or ‘ok’ " for Plaintiff to "shake hands with, touch, much less hug, a given Library or Assistant Librarian," without maintaining, stating or enforcing such a restriction on Plaintiff's female colleagues. Id. ¶18. Plaintiff believes that Ball disliked him and criticized him because Plaintiff is a heterosexual male, whereas Plaintiff believes Ball is a homosexual male. Id. ¶¶ 16, 28.
Plaintiff alleges that in October of 2018, Defendant Duffy, then Defendant SCSB's Professional Learning and Instructional Design Lead, informed Ball by telephone that Plaintiff was "no longer welcomed in any school in Stafford County." Id. at 30. Plaintiff also alleges that Duffy concocted a false narrative of the occurrence of a county-wide meeting in which she claimed that several librarians had voiced concerns about Plaintiff's behavior when visiting schools. Id. ¶¶ 23, 49. Specifically, librarians were concerned that Plaintiff was "too pushy, too car salesman-like, too familiar and personal during conversations[,] and made them feel very uncomfortable." Id. at 30. In or about November of 2018, Ball telephoned Plaintiff and told him that Plaintiff was forbidden from entering any Stafford County school "for purposes of work, soliciting business, or otherwise, until further notice." Id. ¶ 19. On January 30, 2019, Ball filed a Corrective Action Form with Scholastic, detailing Ball's conversation with Defendant Duffy, and provided Plaintiff a copy. Id. at 30-31. The form indicated that Plaintiff had been relocated to a different "territory." Id. at 30.
At some point after being banned from Stafford County schools, Plaintiff was reassigned to Prince William County schools. Id. ¶ 34. On or about November 6, 2019, Scholastic terminated Plaintiff's employment, citing the circumstances described in the January 30, 2019 form as well as a more recent complaint "of a similar nature" from a female librarian in a Prince William County school. Id. According to Plaintiff, Scholastic refused to provide any further information about the Prince William County complaint. Id. Around December of 2019, Plaintiff "orally petitioned" SCSB at a school board meeting in an effort to "achieve the dissolution or withdrawal of his debarment from" SCSB's facilities. Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff alleges that no "meaningful statement or action" was taken as a result of his petition. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that the meeting of librarians never happened and that other reports of complaints in the January 30, 2019 form were either falsified or completely fabricated, as were those complaints made after the form was filed. Id. ¶¶ 32, 42, 49. Plaintiff also alleges that genuine complaints about similar behavior were ignored when made against female employees, specifically Sarah Smith. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. Moreover, according to Plaintiff, no female employee has been barred by SCSB or Scholastic from SCSB schools. Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff also believes that no other female SCSB or Scholastic employee has been "discipline[d] or fire[d,]" in the manner in which Plaintiff was disciplined and terminated. Id.
After filing a charge of discrimination against Defendant Scholastic with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Plaintiff received his right to sue letter. Dkt. 1-1 at 32-33. Plaintiff subsequently filed his Complaint in the Stafford County Circuit Court on February 4, 2020. See id.
This matter was removed to the Court from the Circuit Court for the County of Stafford on November 2, 2020. Dkt. 1. On November 12, 2020, SCSB and Duffy filed their Motion. Dkt. Nos. 5; 6. On December 3, 2020, Scholastic moved to partially dismiss the Complaint. Dkt. 16. Plaintiff opposes both Motions. Dkt. Nos. 8; 19.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move for dismissal when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Two principles govern the application of the Twombly pleading standard. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. "Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A plaintiff has failed to state a claim where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth two counts for relief. Dkt. 1-1 at 15, 18.
Neither of the pending Motions seek to dismiss Count One and thus the Court will not address the sufficiency of the pleadings as to that Count. Dkt. Nos. 6; 16.
In Count Two of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986, and his "constitutional rights." Dkt. 1-1, ¶¶ 46-67. More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that all Defendants violated his First Amendment Right to free speech (see, e.g., id. ¶ 47); his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection (see, e.g., id. ¶ 48); and his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (see, e.g., id. ¶ 51). Though not entirely clear, it seems that Plaintiff's theory is that not only did Defendants violate these rights from a constitutional perspective, but that in addition, each Defendant has also violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986. See, e.g., id. ¶ 56. Stated differently, it seems that Plaintiff uses §§ 1983 and 1986 as conduits for his constitutional claims, but Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, notwithstanding §§ 1983 and 1986. Analytically, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action predicated upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986, making a dismissal of both claims sufficient for dismissal of his constitutional claims.
Though advancing two separate motions, each of the Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts in support of the claims set forth in Count Two. See generally Dkt. Nos. 6; 16.2
Scholastic claims that it is immune to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim because it is a private entity. Dkt. 16 at 6-11. Plaintiff responds in his Opposition to Scholastic's Motion by providing four categories of cases where courts have found it fair to treat private entities as state actors and seeks to include the instant case in all of those categories. Dkt. 19 at 5-12. For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient for a finding that Scholastic may be fairly treated as the state.
Scholastic also maintains that Plaintiff's § 1985 claim fails because he did not cite § 1985 in his Complaint and because he has failed to meet the high pleading standards required by § 1985. Dkt. 16 at 12-14. For the reasons stated below, this Court agrees.
At first glance, Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Scholastic fail simply because Plaintiff is a...
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