Rice v. Shalala, 93-2442
| Decision Date | 02 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-2442,93-2442 |
| Citation | 19 F.3d 22 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Ruthann RICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Before CUDAHY, EASTERBROOK and MANION, Circuit Judges.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services denied Ruthann Rice's application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 416, 423. Rice sought judicial review, and the magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. We agree that the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence, Sample v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1138, 1141 (7th Cir.1993), and AFFIRM for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge.
This matter is before the court 1 on the Defendant's, Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary"), "Memorandum In Support Of The Secretary's Decision," filed on October 22, 1992. 2 The Plaintiff, Ruthann Rice ("Rice"), filed a response brief on February 1, 1993, and the Secretary filed a reply on February 22, 1993. On March 4, 1993, Rice filed a sur-reply. The court has now reviewed all the briefs and is prepared to rule. For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge finds that the Secretary's decision to deny Rice Disability Insurance benefits should be AFFIRMED.
On November 13, 1990, Rice filed an application for Disability Insurance ("DI") benefits. (Tr. 65) Rice claimed that she became disabled as of April 4, 1990, and described her disabling condition as "severe degenerative arthritis agravated [sic] by fibromyaliga." (Tr. 95) Rice reported in a November 4, 1990, Disability Report that after approximately an hour of activity her neck and back would become so painful that she would be forced to lie down. (Tr. 95) Rice's application for DI benefits was originally denied on December 21, 1990. (Tr. 69) Rice filed a request for reconsideration of her application on February 22, 1991, which was denied on March 15, 1991. (Tr. 71, 74) With this latter denial, Rice was sent notice that her claim had been independently reviewed by a physician and disability examiner employed by the government, both whom concluded that the denial of her claim was proper. Id.
On March 20, 1991, Rice filed a request for a hearing on the denial of her application for DI benefits. (Tr. 76) This request was granted and a hearing was held on December 19, 1991, before the Honorable Ann C. Grover, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 12, 27, 33) Rice appeared at the hearing and was represented by her attorney at that time, Wade Bosley. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Rice, John Rice (the claimant's husband), and Robert Barkhaus, a vocational expert ("VE").
Despite finding that Rice suffers from severe chronic pain syndrome in her back, neck and shoulder areas, the ALJ concluded that she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or equal to one found in the Listings. (Tr. 19) See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt.P., App. 1. The ALJ further found that Rice's ability to engage in the full range of light work was reduced by certain physical and non-exertional limitations. (Tr. 20) Nevertheless, the ALJ determined that since Rice retained the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") for light work, albeit not a full range of light work, she was not disabled within the terms of the Social Security Act. 3 (Tr. 20) The ALJ's determination that Rice could perform a substantial number of jobs, despite her limitations, is consistent with the VE's testimony at the hearing.
On May 21, 1992, the Appeals Council declined Rice's request to review the ALJ's decision, and the ALJ's ruling thereby became the final decision of the Secretary. (Tr. 4-5) Having exhausted all of her administrative remedies, Rice seeks the present judicial review.
Rice was born on April 21, 1940, and she was 51 years old on the date of the administrative hearing. (Tr. 36, 65) Rice stood 5' 1" tall and weighed 162 pounds. (Tr. 36) Rice testified at the hearing that her educational background included one year of college. Id. As a result of her alleged ailments, Rice testified that she had not worked since April 1990. (Tr. 37)
Rice stated that she was last employed as an inspector for Airfoil Textron Corp ("Airfoil"). Id. She was employed by Airfoil from September 1975 until the alleged onset of her disability in April 1990. (Tr. 85) Her last position with Airfoil required her to visually inspect jet engine blades for imperfections and involved lifting trays of engine blades weighing up to fifty pounds. (Tr. 38) Because the blades were located on the floor, she would have to bend over to pick them up.
Prior to that position, she was employed by Airfoil to use gauges to inspect the blades. (Tr. 38) This position required her to raise her arms and shoulders up. Id. This position also required her to lift trays weighing anywhere from fifteen to fifty pounds. (Tr. 39) Rice held that position for five years. Id. Finally, Rice characterized her very first job with Airfoil as a polisher or grinder. (Tr. 39) Rice testified that she would sit at a machine with a sandpaper belt and grind out "ridges and mill marks." Id. These positions represent Rice's employment history for the fifteen years prior to the onset of her alleged disability.
At the hearing, Rice stated that she stopped working because she was experiencing severe pain. (Tr. 41) She testified that she is constantly in pain but that sometimes it is tolerable. (Tr. 42) Rice described the pain as being on both sides of her neck and extending down the top part of the spine and across her shoulders. Id. In part, Rice's pain stems from chronic pain syndrome in her back, neck, and shoulders, as well as fibromyalgia. In addition, Rice has some disc bulging and osteophyte formations at C5-6 and C6-7. (Tr. 135-36, 139, 14, 145-46, 156) One medical report in the record stated that Rice's pain probably stems from moderately severe degenerative arthritis and disc disease. Rice also reports having bilateral suboccipital headaches for the past twenty-five years and a history of depression.
Rice has taken, and in some instances is still taking, various medications. Currently, Rice is taking 1200 milligrams of Ibuprofen 4, Cytotec 5 and Flexeril. 6 (Tr. 43) She used to take Voltaren but she can no longer afford it. 7 In addition, Rice testified that she takes Prozac to prevent her from being suicidal. 8 Several of her physicians opined that they believed her pain was not curable through surgery.
The dispute upon review centers on Rice's contentions that: (1) the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating her subjective complaints of pain, and (2) the ALJ failed to correctly apply Social Sec. Ruling 83-12. The Secretary argues that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
An applicant for disability insurance benefits must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months ..[.]" 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(i); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(3). It is not enough for the plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (7th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963). If an impairment is not found to be severe, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1520(c), 416.9209(c); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that she is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act on or before the date her insured status expired. Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 659 (7th Cir.1987); Owens v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 1276, 1280 (5th Cir.1985); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 390 (6th Cir.1984); Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir.1971). "The law requires that a claimant demonstrate her disability within the proscribed period of eligibility not prior to or subsequent to the dates in question." Jeralds, 445 F.2d at 39. Therefore, "any condition that had its onset or became disabling after plaintiff's insured status expired may not be used as a basis for entitlement to disability benefits." Couch v. Schweiker, 555 F.Supp. 651, 654 (N.D.Ind.1982).
The Secretary has adopted a five step sequential evaluation process to determine if a person is disabled. According to this process, the following questions are addressed in order:
(1) Is the claimant currently unemployed?
(2) Is the claimant's impairment severe?
(3) Does the impairment equal or exceed one of a list of specific impairments?
(4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?
(5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work in the national economy?
An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or on steps (3) and (5) to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer, at any point other than step (3), stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1520(b)-(f). See also, Stuckey v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 506 (7th Cir.1989); Guzman v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 273,...
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