Rice v. Simmons.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1947
• Docket Number: No. 499.,499.
• Parties: RICE v. SIMMONS.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

53 A.2d 587

RICE

v.SIMMONS.

No. 499.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

June 12, 1947.

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.

Action by Carlton L. Rice, trading as District Cab Company, against Harold A. Simmons, trading as National Motors, for damages resulting from motor vehicle collision. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Reversed with instructions to grant a new trial.

Philip Shinberg, of Washington, D. C. (Leon M. Shinberg and Joseph Levin, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

Cornelius H. Doherty, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.

CLAGETT, Associate Judge.

Plaintiff sued defendant, owner and operator of a used car sales business, for damage to plaintiff's taxicab. The damage resulted when the taxicab, which was legally parked near the corner of 11th and Monroe Streets, Northwest, was run into by an automobile owned by defendant and driven by one of his employees. It was admitted that the negligence of defendant's employee was the proximate cause of the collision, and the only dispute at the trial was the responsibility of the defendant for the negligence of his employee. The trial court, sitting without a jury, first made a general finding for plaintiff and assessed damages. This general finding was entered on the jacket of the case and also in the court's minutes and docket. Before judgment had been entered on the finding, defendant moved to set it aside and enter judgment for defendant. This motion was granted, and the case is here on appeal from a judgment for defendant.

We have concluded that the case must be disposed of on a question of procedure, but some consideration of the facts is necessary as a preliminary to reaching the procedural point.

Both parties rely upon the provisions of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility Act ¹ providing: ‘Whenever any motor vehicle * * * shall be operated * * * by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall, in case of accident, be deemed to be the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle, and the proof of the ownership of said motor vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that such person operated said motor vehicle with the consent of the owner.’

The testimony here centered largely around the circumstances surrounding the use of defendant's automobile by his employee, Robinson. Defendant himself did not testify, but the manager of his business, located at 3001 14th Street, Northwest, stated that Robinson was employed as a porter and general handy man, that at the time of the accident Robinson ‘had not been given permission’ to operate the striking vehicle, that Robinson was allowed to sleep in the basement of defendant's garage, and that the keys and tags for automobiles were kept in a cabinet in such building; that the day before the accident the witness and Robinson drove another automobile belonging to defendant into Washington from Philadelphia; that Robinson dropped the witness off at the latter's home in Silver Spring, Maryland, and that the witness instructed Robinson to drive the automobile to defendant's place of business and park it on the lot there by 7 p.m.; that Robinson was supposed to put the keys and tags of the automobile in the cabinet where they belonged; that Robinson had access to such cabinet.

Called as a witness for plaintiff in rebuttal, a police officer who investigated the accident testified that it occurred about 5 a.m., that the striking vehicle left the scene after the accident but that its number was obtained, that later the same morning he went to defendant's place of business and found the door locked; that at about 9 a.m. the manager arrived and opened the door, and they found Robinson asleep on a cot in the basement; that Robinson told him in the manager's presence that the car involved in the collision was the same as the one brought from Philadelphia the previous evening, that he had taken the automobile to defendant's lot the same evening and had then gone to bed in the basement of the building, that early the following morning he had taken the keys and a set of tags from the cabinet in which they were kept, and thereupon had driven the automobile until the collision occurred. Robinson, who did not testify at the trial, was arrested and charged with the unauthorized use of an automobile, but the Grand Jury ignored the charge.

The law with respect to the Financial Responsibility Act and the status of the common law prior to the enactment of the statute has been developed in a series of decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and in this court. ² These cases establish that the effect of the statute is simply to shift the burden of proof and to impose on the defendant-owner the affirmative duty of proving that the car at the time of the accident was not operated with his express or implied consent and that the presumption of consent continues until there is credible evidence to the contrary and ceases when there is uncontradicted proof that the automobile at the time of the accident was not being used with the owner's permission. If the presumption is overcome by uncontradicted proof, then a motion for a directed verdict for the defendant-owner will be granted. If, however, the evidence is contradictory, or reasonably subject to contradictory interpretations, the question of liability is for the trier of the facts.

Applying these principles to the present case, we believe that the evidence did not compel a finding for either party as a matter of law, but instead presented a factual question for the determination of the trial court.

Since it is clear, therefore, that the question presented to the trial court was one of fact rather than one of law, the procedural question arises as to whether that court had the power to order entry of judgment for the defendant after having made a finding for plaintiff, which finding had been formally entered in the court's minutes and docket. While this point has not been raised specifically by plaintiff, argued by either party, we believe it is implicit in the appeal and hence requires decision by us.

Under the Congressional mandate ³ the rules of practice in the Municipal Court generally follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ⁴ for United States district courts, but the rules with respect to entry of judgments in the Municipal Court differ materially from those in the federal practice. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in all actions tried by the court, without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law thereon ‘and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.’ By rule 58 it is required that ‘the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction.’ Rule 52(b) provides that upon motion of a party made not later than ten days ‘after entry of judgment’ the ‘court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.’ Thus, the first formal entry of the district court's decision is that of the judgment itself. Rule 59(a) provides that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court ‘may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of...