Rice v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 March 2022
• Docket Number: 2:17-cv-1992-DCN
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: KAREN RICE, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Brian E. Rice, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

KAREN RICE, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Brian E. Rice, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 2:17-cv-1992-DCN

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

March 21, 2022

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The following matter is before the court on defendant United States of America's (the “government”) supplemental motion to dismiss, ECF No. 57. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Brian Rice (“Mr. Rice”), plaintiff Karen Rice's (“Mrs. Rice”) husband. Mr. Rice served in the military and received medical care from the Ralph H. Johnson Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center (the “VAMC”) in Charleston, South Carolina. During early summer of 2014, Mr. Rice sought treatment from the VAMC for depression. He had also been undergoing treatment for thyroid and prostate cancer, which contributed to his depression. In July 2014, doctors at the VAMC prescribed Celexa to treat Mr. Rice's depression. On August 13, 2014, Mr. Rice was still suffering from depression and returned to the VAMC, where his Celexa dosage was increased. Then, on September 1, 2014, Mr. Rice admitted himself to the VAMC because he was suicidal. He told his physicians that he was hallucinating, he could not

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sleep, and he wanted to shoot himself. A PHQ-9 screen was performed on Mr. Rice, and he scored a “20, ” which suggested severe depression.

On September 2, 2014, Mr. Rice had a psychiatric consult with Dr. Paul Everman, Jr. and Dr. Eric Brueckner. During this consult, Mr. Rice told the physicians that the Celexa was not helping with his depression, he worked in law enforcement and owned guns, and he wanted to shoot himself with one of his guns. Later that day, Mr. Rice was admitted for in-patient psychiatric hospitalization. He was diagnosed with “mood disorder unspecified, ” and the physicians believed that the Celexa may be the cause of Mr. Rice's suicidal thoughts. On September 3, 2014, Mr. Rice saw Drs. Everman and Brueckner again. Mrs. Rice alleges that on this day, Mr. Rice's treatment plan indicated that Mr. Rice's depression was “unstable, ” and his suicide risk was “severe.” ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶ 49. Mr. Rice told medical personnel that he wanted to go home. The doctors deemed Mr. Rice “not commitable, ” and Mr. Rice left the VAMC against medical advice. Id. ¶ 51. He was advised to follow up with a counselor.

On September 18, 2014, Mr. Rice sent an email to a nurse at the VAMC indicating that he was still depressed and was only sleeping 3 to 4 hours a night. Subsequently, on the evening of September 23, 2014, Mr. Rice was at home when Mrs. Rice and their daughter came home. Soon after they arrived, “for the first time in his life and completely out of the blue, ” Mr. Rice threatened Mrs. Rice with a gun. Id. ¶ 59. Mrs. Rice ran outside and called the police. When the police arrived, Mrs. Rice explained the situation, and police tried to convince Mr. Rice to come out of the house. Mr. Rice came outside at one point with his gun and started to shoot at the police, but the police did not fire back. Instead, they tried to convince Mr. Rice to surrender. At some

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point, Mr. Rice escaped the house and fled. When the police realized Mr. Rice had fled, they began looking for him. One of the officers found Mr. Rice and began talking to him, not realizing it was Mr. Rice. One he realized it was Mr. Rice, the police officer took cover. Police tried again to convince Mr. Rice to surrender, but Mr. Rice started shooting at the officer who found him. Despite the police's efforts to end the situation, Mr. Rice kept firing at the officers. Around midnight, a SWAT marksman shot and killed Mr. Rice, which Mrs. Rice characterizes as “suicide by cop.” Id. ¶ 72.

Mrs. Rice brought this case pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) on July 27, 2017, alleging medical negligence for wrongful death, medical negligence as a survivorship action, and loss of consortium. See generally id. Mrs. Rice also filed an affidavit by Dr. Stephen Price opining on the government's negligence, as required by South Carolina law in actions alleging professional negligence, SC Code. Ann. § 15-36-100(B), and death as a result of medical malpractice, id. § 15-79-125(A). The government filed a motion to dismiss on June 22, 2018. ECF No. 26. On March 25, 2019, this court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the complaint failed to sufficiently plead proximate cause (the “Order of Dismissal”). ECF No. 43. In so finding, the court relied on a “general rule” of South Carolina law providing that “suicide constitutes an intervening force which breaks the line of causation from the wrongful act to the death.” Id. at 7-8 (citing Watson v. Adams, 2015 WL 1486869, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2015) and Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, 48 S.E.2d 324 (S.C. 1948)).

Mrs. Rice noticed a timely appeal on March 29, 2019. On July 13, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated this court's Order of

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Dismissal. Rice v. United States, 2021 WL 2935344 (4th Cir. July 13, 2021). The Fourth Circuit explained,

After the district court issued its opinion, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, responding to a certified question from this court, clarified that there is no “general rule that suicide is an intervening act which breaks the chain of causation and categorically precludes recovery in wrongful death actions, ” explaining that South Carolina “courts . . . appl[y] traditional principles of proximate cause to individual factual situations when considering whether a personal representative has a valid claim for wrongful death from suicide.”

Id. at *1 (citing Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 853 S.E.2d 329, 331 (S.C. 2020), reh'g denied (Feb. 5, 2021)). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated this court's order and remanded to “consider the sufficiency of [Mrs.] Rice's complaint in light of Wickersham.” Id. On remand, the government moved for leave to file a supplemental memorandum on October 21, 2021. ECF 55. The court granted that motion on November 17, 2021, ECF No. 56, and the government filed its supplemental motion to dismiss on the same day, ECF No. 57. On December 1, 2021, Rice responded in opposition. ECF No. 58. As such, the supplemental motion to dismiss is now ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”). To be legally sufficient, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

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to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support his claim and would entitle him to relief. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court should accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir.1999); Mylan Labs., Inc., 7 F.3d at 1134. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

The government argues that the court should dismiss Mrs. Rice's complaint because the acts of the physicians at the VAMC were not a proximate cause of Mr. Rice's death, notwithstanding Wickersham's clarification that there is no general rule that suicide breaks that chain of causation to categorically preclude recovery in wrongful death actions. Upon consideration, the court finds dismissal inappropriate at this stage.

This court has construed Mrs. Rice's claim as a medical malpractice claim. ECF No. 46 at 3 (“Mrs. Rice pleaded her case as a ‘medical negligence' case, but at the hearing, the parties agreed that this case is a medical malpractice case.”). To state a cause of action for medical malpractice in South Carolina, the plaintiff must plead the following elements:

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(1) The presence of a doctor-patient relationship between the parties; (2) Recognized and generally accepted standards, practices, and procedures which are exercised by competent physicians in the same branch of medicine under similar circumstances; (3) The medical or health professional's negligence, deviating from generally accepted standards, practices, and procedures; (4) Such negligence being a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (5) An injury to the plaintiff.

Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps., 763 S.E.2d 200, 203 (S.C. 2014) (citations omitted). For suicide cases specifically, “health care professionals are subject to liability for failure to prevent suicide only when departure from the standards of their profession proximately causes their patient's suicide...