Rice v. Warden
Decision Date | 09 September 2015 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:14-cv-732 |
Parties | LIAL RICE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, PICKAWAY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Litkovitz, M.J.
Petitioner has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Doc. 15). It appears from the face of the petition that petitioner is challenging his 2014 conviction and one-year prison sentence imposed by the Butler County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas in Case No. CR2013-09-1450. (Id., at PAGEID#: 94; see also Doc. 27, at PAGEID#: 265). Petitioner has also filed numerous other pleadings, "objections" and notices, which are difficult to decipher and, for the most part, incomprehensible. (See Docs. 17, 18, 20, 24, 28, 29, 31, 32). Respondent has submitted the state court record and a return of writ responding to the petition. (Docs. 26-27). Respondent has also responded to some of petitioner's additional submissions. (Docs. 21, 25, 30). It appears from the record that thismatter is now ripe for final disposition of petitioner's claims challenging his conviction and sentence in Butler County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR2013-09-1450.2
In September 2013, the Butler County grand jury returned the indictment in Case No. CR2013-09-1450. (Doc. 26, Ex. 3). The indictment charged petitioner with two third-degree felony counts of tampering with records in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2913.42(A)(2), (B)(4). (Id.). The prosecuting attorney filed a "Bill of Particulars," which provided the following summary of the facts giving rise to the two charges:
(Id., Ex. 2, at PAGEID#: 226).
In January 2014, petitioner entered a guilty plea to a reduced fourth-degree felony charge in Count 1 of attempted tampering with records. (See id., Ex. 5; see also Doc. 27, at PAGEID#: 266). The written plea agreement that was executed by the parties and filed with the trial court on January 8, 2014 included the following additional terms of agreement: (Doc. 26, Ex. 5, at PAGEID#: 232). The agreement further provided that petitioner faced a maximum 18-month prison sentence and an "optional" 3-year term of post-release control for the attempted tampering with records offense. (Id., at PAGEID#: 231).
At the plea hearing held on January 7, 2014, the prosecuting attorney, defense counsel and petitioner clarified and confirmed their understanding of the terms of the parties' plea agreement as follows:
(Id., Plea Hearing Tr. 2, at PAGEID#: 241). The trial court then proceeded to conduct an in-depth colloquy with petitioner, which included the granting of additional time to petitioner to privately consult with his counsel, to ensure that petitioner was entering his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. (See id., Plea Hearing Tr. 2-14, at PAGEID#: 241-53). Following that colloquy, the trial court accepted petitioner's guilty plea, convicted petitioner of the reduced charge in Count 1 of attempted tampering with records, and scheduled a sentencing hearing for February 12, 2014. (Id., Ex. 5, at PAGEID#: 232; Plea Hearing Tr. 14, at PAGEID#: 253-54).
The sentencing hearing was held as scheduled on February 12, 2014. Thereafter, on February 14, 2014, the trial court issued a "Judgment Of Conviction Entry" sentencing petitioner to a 12-month prison term with credit for 116 days of time served and notifying petitioner that he was subject to an "optional" term of post-release control "up to a maximum of three (3) years." (Id., Ex. 1).
Respondent states in the return of writ that petitioner did not pursue an appeal from his conviction or sentence in the state courts. (Doc. 27, at PAGEID#: 267). On April 30, 2014, petitioner filed a pro se motion for judicial release with the trial court in Case No. CR2013-09-1450 and another Butler County case cited as "CR201394450."3 (Doc. 26, Ex. 6). The motion was denied without opinion on May 2, 2014. (Id., Ex. 7). Respondent states in the return of writ that petitioner did not pursue an appeal from that decision in the state courts. (Doc. 27, at PAGEID#: 268).
Petitioner commenced the instant habeas action in September 2014. (See Doc. 1). In his signed petition filed in compliance with orders issued September 23, 2014 and December 9, 2014 (see Docs. 2, 11), petitioner alleges the following grounds for relief, which are quoted verbatim from the petition:4
(Doc. 15. at PAGEID#: 98, 99, 101, 102).
In the return of writ filed in response to the petition, respondent contends that the petition is subject to dismissal for a number of reasons, including petitioner's failure to comply with Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; lack of subject matter jurisdiction over claims pertaining to prison conditions; petitioner's procedural default and waiver of his claims for relief; and petitioner's lack of entitlement to relief in light of his guilty plea that was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered. (See Doc. 27).
In his petition, petitioner has presented claims that are largely, if not completely. unintelligible and incomprehensible. As a threshold matter, as respondent has argued in the return of writ, the petition is subject to dismissal because petitioner has not stated a claim for relief that satisfies the pleading requirements for habeas petitions set forth in Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Habeas Rule 2(c) provides that the petition must "specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner" and "state the facts supporting each ground." See also Flood v. Phillips, 90 F.App'x 108, 113 (6th Cir. 2004). The rule is even "more demanding" than Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which requires in "ordinary civil proceedings" that the complaint "provide 'fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-56 (2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 860 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (). "'Notice' pleading is insufficient in the habeas context, as the petitioner is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error." Johnson v. Sheldon, No. 3:14cvl675, 2015 WL 3650695, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2015) (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977); Lloyd v. Van Natta, 296 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (citing Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)).
Dismissal under Habeas Rule 2(c) is appropriate in cases such as this where the petition and accompanying documents, as well as petitioner's additional pleadings and notices, contain "so many unintelligible and conclusory allegations and statements" that it is impossible for the Court to determine "the exact errors of fact or law" that have been raised for adjudication or even whether petitioner's stated grounds for relief pertain to anything that occurred in the challenged Butler County criminal...
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