Rich v. Chamberlain
| Decision Date | 19 March 1895 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | RICH, Governor, v. CHAMBERLAIN, WARDEN. |
Application upon the relation of John T. Rich, governor, against William Chamberlain, warden of state prison, for a writ of mandamus to compel defendant to transfer a convict from the state prison to the house of correction, in pursuance of the order of relator. Writ allowed.
Fred A. Maynard, Atty. Gen., for relator.
Thomas A. Wilson, for respondent.
Act 118 of the Public Acts of 1893 is an act entitled "An act to revise and consolidate the laws relative to the three prisons known as the state prison at Jackson, the branch of the state prison at Marquette, and the house of correction at Ionia." A board of control was provided for each consisting of three members, to be appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate, of which board the governor is ex officio a member. These boards were authorized to make general rules for the government of their respective prisons. Section 28 of this law authorizes the governor to order the transfer of prisoners from one to another of these prisons, upon the recommendation of the state board of pardons. Upon such recommendation, the governor issued his order and warrant, as provided in the law under discussion, for the transfer and removal of one William K. Stevenson, a convict, from the state prison to the house of correction. The warden of the state prison refused compliance, and these proceedings were instituted by the governor to compel it.
The warden returns that his refusal was in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the board of control of the prison directing him not to obey the command of the governor, for reasons therein set forth. A copy of this resolution, signed by two of the appointed members, is attached to the answer of the warden. The authority for transferring prisoners is found in section 28, Act 118, Laws 1893.
It is contended that the transfer is a judicial act, and can only be performed by an officer clothed with judicial powers; that the determination of the circuit judge as to the prison in which the convict should be confined is a judicial determination; and that the prisoner has a right to remain in such prison for the period of his imprisonment; or, at all events, that he cannot be summarily removed without a hearing. It is said that the law discriminates between the prisons; that certain offenders cannot be sentenced to the state prison; and that the worst criminals cannot be sentenced to the house of correction, which is said to be designed for the less hardened class of criminals. The legislature has full authority to provide prisons, and to determine where prisoners may be sent; and the courts have no discretion as to the place to which criminals may be sentenced except as the legislature gives it. Such discretion is lodged with the circuit judges, and they act judicially in its exercise. But this doctrine is a qualified one, or rather the order of the judge is qualified by the law and such rules and regulations of the prisons as may have been lawfully adopted. Every sentence is subject to these, although it does not mention them. The law requires every person convicted of murder in the first degree to be sentenced to solitary confinement and hard labor for life. Yet, under the law and prison rules, such prisoners are taken from their solitary confinement after a short time, and are allowed to work with other convicts.
Again, all sentences direct that the prisoners be confined in the state prison; but, under the law, they may be hired to do work outside of the walls, in factories or mines or upon the highways, different states having different rules. The sentence is always imposed and received under and interpreted by the law to which it is subject. The judge and the prisoner act with the knowledge of this fact, and must be presumed to understand that, while the judge may or may not sentence a prisoner to one or another institution, there is an existing law under which he may be lawfully transferred. The sentence impliedly subject him to this when, in the discretion of the proper executive officer or board, crowded prisons or any other reasons require or make it advisable. We need not determine whether this would be applicable to cases of sentence before the law providing for transfer took effect. The judicial act is fully performed by the sentence, which, though in form absolute, involves conditions imposed by law by which the prisoner's rights are limited and to which they are subject; and while the court may not, in terms, sentence certain classes of offenders to one or the other of the prisons, the sentence construed by the law is to the designated prison, but subject to transfer in accordance to law.
It was urged at the hearing that section 28 was defective, and did not make the necessary provision to protect the rights of convicts; that there is no requirement to transfer his personal effects from one prison to the other; and that no method is provided by which it can be determined whether or not he was entitled to what is called "good time" at the time of the transfer. Doubtless, these are the subjects of rules made by the boards of control, but, if not, the former is of little importance, while, as to the latter, the prisoner might be amply protected by a presumption of good behavior, unless the contrary should appear. The action of the governor, under this statute, must be based upon a recommendation of the advisory board of pardons, and, if such board has no legal existence, its recommendation would be of no validity, and could not be a substantial basis of action by the governor. This board was established in 1889, and a new act was passed in 1893, under which the present board exists. The board consists of four members, appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The board may appoint a clerk, may hold sessions when and where occasion may require, send for persons and papers, and administer oaths. Its duties are to investigate the cases of convicts, confined in the various prisons, who may petition for pardons or for license to go at large, and to report to the governor the results of investigations, with such recommendations as, in the judgment of its members, shall seem expedient, either in respect to pardons or commutations, or refusal of pardon or commutation. The act provides, further, "that upon receiving the result of any such examination, together with the recommendations aforesaid, the governor may, at his discretion, upon such conditions with such restrictions, and under such limitations as he may deem proper, grant the desired pardon, or commutation." Const. art. 5, � 11, provides that This section of the constitution, in express terms, lodges the pardoning power with the governor, and with it the co-ordinate branches of government have nothing to do, except as the legislature may by law provide how applications may be made, and is entitled to a report of action taken. People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 28, 19 N.W. 571; People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 498, 29 N.W. 80; People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 251, 50 N.W. 310; U.S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. The power conferred by this section of the constitution is practically unrestricted, and the exercise of executive clemency is a matter of discretion, subject, perhaps, to the remedy by impeachment in case of flagrant abuse. It cannot, however, be treated as a privilege. It is as much an official duty as any other act. It is lodged in the governor, not for the benefit of the convict only, but for the welfare of the people, who may properly insist upon the performance of that duty by him, if a pardon is to be granted. Opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in U.S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 160. Lord Coke defines "pardon" as "a work of mercy, whereby the king, either before or after conviction, forgiveth any offense," etc. 3 Inst. 233. See, also, 1 Bish. Cr. Law, � 898.
There are many reasons why a power of this kind should be confided to the highest executive officer. It involves a wide discretion. The proceedings upon the trial may be reviewed. New evidence may be taken upon which to rest the pardon, thus, in effect, granting a new trial. It may be ex parte, after the witnesses have disappeared or are dead. It may and often is based upon an alleged reform of an offender. Youth or age may furnish an excuse for its exercise. Petitions which a good-natured public sign without reading, and importunities of interested persons and friends, may be expected wherever there is hope of success. It is therefore of the highest importance to the public that this power should be carefully exercised, and that the fullest responsibility should rest upon the person to whom it is confided. The office of governor seems to be generally considered...
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