Richard M., In re

• Decision Date: 14 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. B030507,B030507
• Citation: 252 Cal.Rptr. 36,205 Cal.App.3d 7
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re RICHARD M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD M., a Minor, Defendant and Appellant. Crim.

Page 36

252 Cal.Rptr. 36

205 Cal.App.3d 7

In re RICHARD M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court LawThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.RICHARD M., a Minor, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. No. B030507.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

Sept. 14, 1988.

As Modified Oct. 14, 1988.

Certified for Partial Publication ^*

[205 Cal.App.3d 10] Scott T. Carss, San Jose, California Appellate Project, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Wendelin Pollack, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., John A. O'Sullivan, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

GILBERT, Associate Justice.

Richard M., a minor, escaped from a county youth center.He entered his father's and stepmother's locked apartment, by force and without their consent, with the intent to take food, a folding mattress and a sleeping bag.We hold here that this constitutes burglary.

An amended supplemental petition alleged Richard M. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) because, among other things, he committed two counts of burglary (Pen.Code, § 459).The petition also alleged his escape from the county facility.(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 871, subd. (a).)

At one hearing, Richard admitted the escape.At a later hearing, on the amended supplemental petition, Richard stipulated he forcibly entered the apartment without consent and took items from his parents' apartment.

FACTS

Richard lived with his natural mother in Utah until October 1986.At that time, he moved into his father's and stepmother's apartment.He lived there until April 7, 1987, at which time he was declared a ward of the court and committed to the Colston Youth Center for 180 days after admitting he committed burglary.

On June 6, 1987, Richard escaped from the youth facility and called his stepmother.She urged Richard to turn himself in to the authorities.She told him he could not stay in the apartment and that he was not welcome there.Some of Richard's possessions were stored in their garage.Richard asked if he could have his bike.She refused his request.

After seeing him in the neighborhood, his stepmother called the police, knowing he would be arrested if they located him.

On July 13, and July 15, 1987, Richard entered the locked apartment and took food, a sleeping bag and a folding mattress which belonged to his stepmother.

The court sustained the petition on the two burglary counts.

DISCUSSION

Richard contends there is insufficient evidence to support the inference he had intent to steal upon entry.He argues he took the items in the exercise of his possessory right, based on the parental duty to furnish one's child with the necessities of life.(SeePen.Code, § 270;Welf. & Inst. Code, § 903, subd. (a);Civ.Code, §§ 196,242.)[[ ]]We find no merit to these contentions and affirm the judgment and the disposition in this matter.

Burglary is the entry into a building with larcenous intent.(People v. Ravenscroft(1988)198 Cal.App.3d 639, 642, 243 Cal.Rptr. 827.)Richard questions whether there is substantial evidence to show he had the requisite specific intent to commit theft.Penal Code section 490a provides as follows: "Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word 'theft' were substituted therefor."

Such intent is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances revealed by the evidence; it is rarely directly provable.(People v. Matson(1974)13 Cal.3d 35, 41, 117 Cal.Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752.)Richard argues his motive was only to be more comfortable, and therefore he did not intend to steal.

On appeal we are not concerned with whether the evidence might have supported an inference that he held another conceivable intent.(People v. Earl(1973)29 Cal.App.3d 894, 898, 105 Cal.Rptr. 831, overruled on other grounds inPeople v. Duran(1976)16 Cal.3d 282, 292, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.)Instead, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume the existence of facts the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment.(People v. Johnson(1980)26 Cal.3d 557, 576-578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.)When that evidence justifies a reasonable inference of the felonious intent required, supra, the verdict may not be disturbed on appeal.(People v. Matson, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 41, 117 Cal.Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752.)

Here it is stipulated that Richard forcibly entered his father's and stepmother's apartment, without consent, and took the items.He admits he intended to take these items.His stepmother told him he could not stay at the apartment and told him he should turn himself in.She refused his request to permit him to pick up any items of his, which were packed in the garage.Nonetheless, on two separate occasions he broke into the locked apartment and took items which did not belong to him.Sheriff's deputies recovered a box of nails, a hand saw, a hammer, a flashlight and a wallet in the treehouse where they found him.That he did not take such items as stereo equipment does not negate his intent to steal the items he took.Personal gain is not an element of this crime.(People v. Green(1980)27 Cal.3d 1, 57-58, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, overruled on other grounds inPeople v. Hall(1986)41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.)These facts provide substantial evidence of the requisite intent to commit burglary.

Claim of right

Richard asserts he had a possessory claim of right in the particular items he took because his parents had a statutory duty to provide him with the necessaries of life, such as food, clothing and shelter.(SeePen.Code, § 270;Welf. & Inst.Code, § 903, subd. (a).)He contends he lacked the felonious intent essential to the crime of burglary because he held a reasonable belief he had such a claim of right.Proof of a bona fide belief, even if mistakenly held, that one has such a claim to property taken, negates the required element of felonious intent.(SeePeople v. Butler(1967)65 Cal.2d 569, 572-573, 55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703.)

Here, Richard's stepmother told him that his belongings were not within the apartment, that he could not stay there and that he was not welcome to come to the apartment.He knew he was a fugitive from his court-ordered residence at the youth center.His stepmother urged him to turn himself in.At the hearing he admitted his escape and the forcible entry without consent.The evidence does not show he had a reasonable, bona fide belief he had a right to take any items from the apartment.

His reliance on Welfare and Institutions Code sections 903, subdivision (a), and300, subdivision (b), andPenal Code section 270, is misplaced.Statutory authority supports the proposition that parents owe their children a duty to provide them the necessities of life.(SeeCiv.Code, §§ 196,242.)This duty, in the form of financial reimbursement, is not relieved while a governmental entity is supporting the child under incarceration.(Civ.Code, § 208;and seeWelf. & Inst.Code, § 903, subd. (a).)The existence of this duty, however, does not support Richard's assertion that he entered the apartment without the intent to steal because he had a claim of right to the items he took.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 903, subdivision (a), specifically provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] parent of a minor ... shall be liable for the reasonable costs of support of the minor while the minor is ... committed to, any ... place pursuant to an order of the juvenile court."(Emphasis added.)Section 903, subdivision (c) states that the intent of the statutes concerning support for wards of the court, such as Richard, is to "protect the fiscal integrity of the county, ..." and to protect against the imposition of liability for excessive charges.Section 903 requires counties to specifically itemize their charges for such items as food and clothing which comprise the costs of their support of their wards.There is nothing in this statute which suggests that a parent of a fugitive, committed ward of the court has any duty to provide the actual items themselves which might support such a claim of right.Section 903 merely provides a means by which the government may obtain financial reimbursement from parents for necessities provided their child under its care, control and custody.

Richard's reliance on Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), is even further afield.It states, in pertinent part: "Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: ... (b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of life, or who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode...."When Richard committed this crime, he was already a ward of the court under court-ordered placement which provided him the necessities of life.¹

Penal Code section 270, read in isolation, might appear to provide some support for the "claim of right" argument.But, read in the context of the statutes with which it appears, and as it has been construed by the courts, it provides no basis to support Richard's assertion of a claim of right to the items he took.

Penal Code section 270 states, in pertinent part: "If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter ... or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor...."This section continues by stating that it "shall not be construed so as to relieve such parent from the criminal liability defined herein for such omission merely...