Richard T., In re

• Decision Date: 04 December 1985
• Citation: Richard T., In re, 220 Cal.Rptr. 573, 175 Cal.App.3d 248 (Cal. App. 1985)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the Matter of RICHARD T., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Petitioner and Respondent, v. RICHARD T., a Minor, Appellant. B007361.

Page 573

220 Cal.Rptr. 573

175 Cal.App.3d 248

In the Matter of RICHARD T., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court LawThe PEOPLE, Petitioner and Respondent, v.RICHARD T., a Minor, Appellant.

B007361.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Dec. 4, 1985.

[175 Cal.App.3d 249] Linda F. England, Irvine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Katz, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Ruby A. Theophile, Deputy Atty. Gen., for petitioner and respondent.

THOMPSON, Associate Justice.

Minor, Richard T., appeals from the adjudication of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the juvenile court(Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602) for auto burglary (Pen.Code, § 459).Minor contends that his admissions during a Gladys R. ¹ interview were obtained in violation of his Miranda ² rights and that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting them into evidence.For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the order adjudicating him a ward and committing him to Camp Community Placement.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 17, 1984, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Lawrence Haywood(victim) left his pickup truck in a driveway behind an apartment building.Before going inside his apartment, victim placed his tool box under the truck seat, closed the windows, locked the doors and removed the doors' lock buttons.The vent window on the driver's side had a broken lock.

An eye witness heard a car door slam and saw minor by the truck with a tool box in his hand.The witness' sister told the victim what the witness had seen.Victim then went and saw that the truck's driver's window was open and that the tool box was missing.Victim, who the day before had warned minor to stay away from the truck, went to minor's house and inquired about his tool box.Minor denied having it, but claimed someone else did and led victim to a house down the alley, yelled through the fence and then stated that the guy must not be home.

Victim complained to the police; an officer went to minor's home and was allowed by minor's mother to search the house.Minor told his mother that he did not have the tool box but said that it was "around."Minor's mother's friend found the tool box in a pigeon coop in minor's back yard; minor's mother returned it to victim.

Eleven days later, on March 28, 1984, an officer went to minor's home and arrested minor for auto burglary.Minor was advised of his Miranda rights, and after agreeing to waive those rights, confessed that he broke into the pickup truck and removed the tool box.

On April 11, 1984, fifteen days after minor had been arrested but prior to arraignment, Officer Bowman went to minor's home to conduct a Gladys R. interview.Minor was not readvised of his Miranda rights.In the presence of minor's mother and with her consent, minor responded to questions, admitting that he had been taught that it was wrong to steal and to break into cars.His mother also responded to questions, stating that she had taught minor that it was wrong to steal and break into cars.

At the adjudication hearing, minor's Gladys R. interview statements were admitted over minor's hearsay objection.Immediately thereafter and just before his mother's statements were admitted, minor raised a Miranda violation objection.³The trial court, after listening to arguments of both counsel, overruled the objection, stating that the interview statements were not being used against minor, but only to establish whether minor knew the wrongfulness of his conduct.

Minor testified in his defense and admitted taking the tool box, but denied opening the vent window and sticking his arm inside to roll down the driver's window.Minor claimed that the driver's window had been left open.

The trial court adjudicated minor guilty of committing second degree auto burglary.

DISCUSSION

The Miranda requirement attaches upon a "custodial interrogation" of a suspect by the police.(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602;People v. Turner(1984)37 Cal.3d 302, 316-317, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669.)An "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda includes not only express questioning, but also "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.[Fns. omitted.]"(Rhode Island v. Innis(1980)446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.)An "incriminating response" under Miranda is any inculpatory or exculpatory response, without regard to the degree of incrimination, that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.(Id., at p. 301, fn. 5, 100 S.Ct. at p. 1690, fn. 5.)"The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination."(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 476, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1629.)

Minor contends that the court erred in admitting his Gladys R. interview statements, because they were obtained during a custodial interrogation without the benefit of a Miranda warning.Minor claims that because the presumption that children under the age of 14 are incapable of committing crimes "in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness"(Pen.Code § 26, subd.One) applies to section 602 juvenile wardship proceedings (In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 867, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127), and because the prosecution bears the burden of proving minor's capacity to commit the offense charged as the basis for the wardship proceeding, the instant Gladys R. interview was an "interrogation" designed to elicit "incriminating" responses under Miranda standards.

The People argue that the Gladys R. interview was not an interrogation under Miranda standards because it did not elicit incriminating evidence concerning the commission of the auto burglary.The People contend that because minor's capacity to commit a crime is not an element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Clyde H.(1979)92 Cal.App.3d 338, 343, 154 Cal.Rptr. 727.), minor's statements were not incriminating under Miranda standards because they were admitted for the "limited purpose" of showing "clear proof" of his capacity to commit the auto burglary.We are not persuaded.

As a matter of constitutional due process, all facts necessary to prove the crime charged as a basis for a juvenile wardship proceeding must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.(In re Winship(1970)397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.)Welfare and Institutions Code section 701 was amended in 1971 to provide that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt ... must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section 602...."This amendment appears to demonstrate a "legislative intent that the 'clear proof'standard of Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, means proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the minor's capacity to commit the crime supporting the wardship adjudication under section 602."(In re Michael B.(1983)149 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1087, fn. 6, 197 Cal.Rptr. 379.)We conclude that as a matter of constitutional due process (seeIn re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1072)the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt minor's capacity to commit the crime charged as the basis for the section 602 wardship proceeding.

We do not agree with the reasoning in In re Clyde H. that because the Legislature may constitutionally require an adult criminal defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, it may constitutionally set forth by statute the standard by which a minor of a given age shall be found capable of committing a crime.(In re Clyde H., supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 343, 154 Cal.Rptr. 727.)Whereas a criminal defendant is presumed to be sane and the burden of proving insanity may be constitutionally placed on the defendant, a child under the age of 14 is presumed to be incapable of committing a crime and the burden of proving otherwise is on the prosecution."If In re Clyde H. is correct in holding that legal capacity need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution is relieved in part of its constitutional duty to prove each fact necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."(In re Michael B., supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 1087, fn. 6, 197 Cal.Rptr. 379.)

The existence of at least two factual questions preclude us from determining whether minor's...