Richard v. Guillot
| Decision Date | 26 December 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 9127,9127 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
| Parties | James RICHARD v. Landry GUILLOT d/b/a L & L Trucking Company. |
Carl A. Guidry, DeBlieux, Guidry & Lowe, baton Rouge, for appellant.
Richard E. Lee, Holt, Wagner & Lee, Pineville, for appellee.
Before SARTAIN, BLANCHE and EVERETT, JJ.
Plaintiff, James Richard, was employed by Landry Guillot, d/b/a L & L Trucking Company as a tractor driver, log cutter and measurer. On July 14, 1971, while in the course and scope of his employment, Richard was carrying a power saw and fell to the ground, injuring his back. As a result of this injury he has asked for an award of full compensation benefits, contending that at the time of trial he was totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The defendant's workmen's compensation insurer, Rockwood Insurance Company, paid benefits to plaintiff through October 4, 1971, for a total of $637 but thereafter discontinued payments. Plaintiff contends that the refusal to pay further compensation benefits was arbitrary, capricious and without probable cause, inasmuch as defendant had been notified and had clear medical evidence that plaintiff was still incapacitated as a result of his injuries at the time payments were discontinued. Plaintiff also seeks penalties and attorney's fees for the arbitrary refusal to continue compensation benefits.
The trial judge rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for compensation benefits up to the date of trial but denied further compensation benefits as well as his claim for penalties and attorney's fees. From this judgment plaintiff has appealed, assigning as error the trial court's failure (1) to allow plaintiff full compensation benefits, (2) to award plaintiff penalties and attorney's fees, and (3) to admit into evidence a medical report of a doctor who did not appear at trial to testify and for holding a presumption against the plaintiff for his failure to call certain doctors as witnesses.
The trial judge stated following reasons for awarding plaintiff compensation to the date of trial:
The court further stated:
'I gave compensation to the date of the trial because medical testimony was not convincing and did not establish extent of disability.' (Opinion, p. 1)
In the first place, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove his claim for compensation by a preponderance of the evidence, and if the testimony is not convincing to establish the extent of disability, then plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of proof required by law. Joseph v. Aetna Insurance Company, 183 So.2d 762 (La.App.1st Cir. 1966).
We next consider plaintiff's proof. The only evidence in the record to substantiate plaintiff's claim that he was disabled at the time of trial on February 28, 1972, came from plaintiff. In answer to a question from his counsel, he simply stated that he could not do the same type of work then that he was doing at the time of his injury. There is no medical evidence to substantiate this statement. The only physician who testified for plaintiff was Dr. Thomas M. Beamon, a general practitioner, and of his testimony the court remarked:
With our concurrence in the foregoing observation by the trial judge of the doctor's testimony, the plaintiff's testimony stands alone to prove the extent of his disability.
In many cases we have relied on the plaintiff's testimony alone to establish the occurrence of the accident. Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Company, 25 So.2d 104 (La.App.1st Cir. 1946); Wherland v. Crowell Long Leaf Lumber Company, 26 So.2d 712 (La.App.1st Cir. 1946); Cascio v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 32 So.2d 66 (La.App.1st Cir. 1947); O'Connor v. American Automobile Insurance Company, 32 So.2d 624 (La.App.1st Cir. 1947). However, we have found no case where a plaintiff's testimony standing alone is sufficient to establish the nature and extent of disability. Such proof usually depends on medical testimony, even though it is well known that medicine is an inexact science and diagnosis and extent of disability occasioned by an injury to the back greatly depend on the subjective complaints made to the treating physician who makes such diagnosis on his impression of the patient's sincerity. Lay witnesses have been permitted to testify as to disability when medical evidence is in conflict and excluded where there is no conflict. See Powell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 80 So.2d 902 (La.App.2nd Cir. 1955); Davis v. Clyburn, 109 So.2d 126 (La.App.Orl.Cir. 1959); Guillory v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 237 La. 374, 111 So.2d 314 (1959); Cambre v. Hanover Insurance Company, 236 So.2d 318 (La.App.4th Cir. 1970). Thus, our courts have recognized that medical evidence is the best evidence of the nature and extent of one's injuries. Accordingly, the testimony of plaintiff without the support of medical evidence is insufficient to carry the burden of proving his disability and the extent thereof by a preponderance of the evidence.
The foregoing considered, we find that the trial judge committed error in awarding plaintiff compensation to the date of trial.
The plaintiff had consulted and was examined by an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Allen Jackson, and a neurosurgeon, Dr. Robert C. Leaver, but neither were called to testify in his behalf. As a result of this failure, the trial judge stated that he presumed the testimony of these specialists would have been adverse to plaintiff. We are of the opinion that he was correct in applying this unfavorable presumption to plaintiff in the absence of any satisfactory reason to explain his failure to call these witnesses. Blue v. Kinney Company, 256 So.2d 145 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1972), writ refused, 260 La. 1119, 258 So.2d 375; McZeal v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 252 So.2d 144 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1971); Scroggins v . Fishing Tools, Inc., 236 So.2d 505 (La.App.4th Cir. 1970).
In order to overcome the presumption of having failed to call Dr. Jackson, plaintiff...
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