Richard v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections

Decision Date31 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. WD 63832.,WD 63832.
Citation162 S.W.3d 35
PartiesWeldon RICHARD, Appellant, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Missouri Department of Natural Resources, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Randy Charles Alberhasky, Springfield, for appellant.

Peter A. Lyskowski, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before JAMES M. SMART, JR., P.J., JOSEPH M. ELLIS, and LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JJ.

JAMES M. SMART, JR., Judge.

Weldon Richard appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying his claim for workers' compensation. Mr. Richard, who was a prison inmate at the time of his injury, sought compensation for injuries sustained while working on a project for the Department of Natural Resources. The judgment is affirmed.

Statement of Facts

Appellant Weldon Richard was injured in a fall while trimming trees. In July 2001, Mr. Richard filed a claim for compensation for his injuries with the Division of Workers' Compensation. A hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) was held on June 11, 2003, and memoranda and additional evidence were submitted later that month. The evidence was as follows.

At the time of his injury, Mr. Richard was an inmate with the Department of Corrections (DOC), housed at Camp Hawthorn, a DOC facility. Camp Hawthorn is a work camp located on property owned by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). All work done by Camp Hawthorn inmates is for the DNR. In order to qualify for Camp Hawthorn, inmates must have a history of "adjustment" to corrections facilities, must have little time left to serve, must request to be assigned there, and must sign a document agreeing to work while there. Inmates working out of Camp Hawthorn do not compete with non-inmates for work, and they do not work side-by-side with non-inmate DNR employees doing the same things in the same capacity.

The inmates' physical custody is transferred to DNR supervisors during the workday until they are returned to the camp in the evening. Throughout, the DOC retains legal custody of the inmates. The DNR supervisors are responsible for instructing the inmates as to how to perform their work, and the inmates are expected to follow their directions in order to remain at Camp Hawthorn. The responsibility for the inmates' modest pay ($7.50 per day, or about $150.00 per month) is shared by the DOC and the DNR, and the pay is deposited directly into the inmate's account.

While at Camp Hawthorn, Mr. Richard worked nine to ten hours a day, five days a week—and sometimes on Saturday—in return for wages and the opportunity to live in a somewhat more pleasant and somewhat less restrictive environment. Mr. Richard's duties in winter included trimming trees and cutting logs. In the summer, he mowed, operated a weed eater, welded, and performed other handyman work.

Mr. Richard's actual injury occurred off of DOC premises, while he was working in the Lake of the Ozarks State Park, which is owned by the DNR. George Lombardi, the Director of the Division of Adult Institutions, testified that Camp Hawthorn is physically separate from the Lake of the Ozarks State Park and that the Park itself is not a state prison or penitentiary. Nevertheless, inmates housed at Camp Hawthorn are still considered incarcerated for all legal purposes even while they are working off the Camp's premises, such as at the State Park. They are still under the custody and control of the DOC and are "confined," in that they are not free to come and go as they please.

The perimeter of Camp Hawthorn is clearly marked with "out of bounds" signs, and the inmates are made aware of those signs and their meaning. According to Mr. Lombardi, an inmate who goes past an out of bounds sign is deemed an escapee, sought as an escapee, and prosecuted as such. Likewise, an inmate working off the Camp's premises is considered an escapee if he walks away from the job site. Camp Hawthorn conducts a count of inmates several times each day to ensure that all inmates are in custody.

Mr. Richard presented evidence that he is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the accident and post-traumatic spinal stenosis. On July 1, 2003, the ALJ denied Mr. Richard's claim for compensation on the basis that he was not engaged in employment covered by the Missouri's Worker's Compensation Law. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) affirmed the ALJ's decision on January 22, 2004. Mr. Richard appeals the Commission's judgment.

Standard of Review

The Missouri Constitution, article V, section 18, provides for judicial review of the Commission's ruling to determine whether it is authorized by law and is "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." As a general rule, we review the findings of the Commission and not those of the ALJ. Higgins v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 140 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Mo.App.2004). When the Commission affirms or adopts the findings of the ALJ, however, we review the ALJ's decision and findings as adopted by the Commission. Id. We must affirm the Commission's final decision unless it acted without or beyond its power, the decision was procured by fraud, the facts found do not support the decision, or the decision is not supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record. § 287.495.1, RSMo 2000.1 Decisions of the Commission that are clearly interpretations or applications of law, rather than determinations of fact, are reviewed de novo without deference to the Commission's judgment. Ristau v. DMAPZ, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Mo. App.2004). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. Lakin v. Gen. Am. Mut. Holding Co., 55 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Mo. App.2001). This case involves the interpretation of a statute; consequently, our review is de novo.

Point on Appeal

Mr. Richard contends that the Commission erred in finding that he was an inmate "confined in" a state prison at the time of his injury and that he was accordingly specifically excluded from worker's compensation coverage pursuant to section 287.090.1(3). Mr. Richard claims that at the time of the accident he was not physically "confined" in a state prison facility. Rather, he argues, he was on a "work-release" program that placed him physically outside of the prison and in the Lake of the Ozarks State Park, where he was working for and in the custody of the Department of Natural Resources.

The issue before this court is a question of law, i.e., whether the claimant is exempt from the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law pursuant to section 287.090.1(3), adopted in 1987. That statute provides, in relevant part, that the Workers' Compensation Law Chapter shall not apply to:

Employment where the person employed is an inmate confined in a state prison, penitentiary or county or municipal jail ..., and the labor or services of such inmate ... are exclusively on behalf of the state, county or municipality having custody of said inmate.... Nothing in this subdivision is intended to exempt employment where the inmate... was hired by a state, county or municipal government agency after direct competition with persons who are not inmates ... and the compensation for the position of employment is not contingent upon or affected by the worker's status as an inmate[.]

§ 287.090.1(3) (emphasis added). Prior to 1987, the Workers' Compensation Law did not contain a provision specifically exempting prison inmates from coverage. However, prisoners were not generally considered "employees" for purposes of the workers' compensation law. See Porter v. Dep't of Corr., 876 S.W.2d 646, 647-48 (Mo.App.1994) (inmate working as a cook in prison); see also Bowman v. State, 763 S.W.2d 161 (Mo.App.1988) (juvenile in detention injured while working as a trash collector).

Here, the ALJ's award, which the Commission affirmed and adopted, denied Mr. Richard's claim because his injury was sustained while he was a prison inmate working exclusively on behalf of the State. The ALJ noted that "[s]ection 287.090.1(3) specifically exempts from the provisions of [the] law inmates confined in a state facility working exclusively for the State." The ALJ concluded that "[t]here is no question regarding Mr. Richard's status as an inmate, his confinement with the Department of Corrections or his work for a state agency." The ALJ also determined that the single exception contained within the statute (i.e., where an inmate has obtained work with a state agency after direct competition with a non-inmate and where the inmate's pay is not affected by his status as an inmate) did not apply in this case. Denying the claim on jurisdictional grounds, the ALJ did not render a decision on any other issues.2

Mr. Richard contends that this case turns on the meaning of the phrase "confined in," which appears in the inmate exemption statute. He observes that no court has interpreted the effect of that language as to a "work-release" inmate since the statutory provision was enacted by the legislature in 1987. In Porter v. Department of Corrections, 876 S.W.2d 646 (Mo.App.1994), this court denied the claim of an inmate who was injured while working as a cook within a prison. Because the prisoner's injury in that case had occurred prior to the enactment of the inmate exemption provision, the court determined that the provision did not apply. Id. at 647. The court denied the claim on the basis that the prisoner was not an "employee" under the workers' compensation law. Id. at 648.

Mr. Richard points out that his claim differs from Porter's because Porter was working within the prison at the time of his accident. Because Mr. Richard was working off the premises of any DOC facility or property when he was injured, he says he was not "confined in a state prison, penitentiary or county or municipal jail," as required by the statute.

Statutory Construction

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