Richard v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 57

Decision Date07 November 2017
Docket Number2:16–cv–00265–JAW
Citation296 F.Supp.3d 274
Parties Charlene RICHARD, Plaintiff, v. REGIONAL SCHOOL UNIT 57, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

Stacey D. Neumann, Richard L. O'Meara, Murray Plumb & Murray, Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.

Melissa A. Hewey, Portland, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Finding that a teacher at a school district made out a prima facie case of retaliation against the school district for her advocacy on behalf of disabled students, that the district sustained its burden of production to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse actions, and that the teacher proved that the district's proffered reason was pretextual, the Court rules in favor of the district in this retaliation claim because it concludes that the teacher failed to demonstrate that the true reason for the district's adverse actions was related to her advocacy.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2016, Charlene Richard, a teacher at Regional School District Unit 57 (RSU 57), filed suit against RSU 57 claiming that RSU 57 retaliated against her in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. , section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 79, section 4633 of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S. § 4633, and that it violated the Maine Whistleblower's Protection Act (MWPA). 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(A). Compl. (ECF No. 1). RSU 57 answered the Complaint on August 1, 2016, denying its essential allegations and raising nine affirmative defenses. Answer of Def. Regional Sch. Unit 57 (ECF No. 5). The original discovery period ended on December 20, 2016, Scheduling Order (ECF No. 7); it was extended once by agreement of the parties to January 20, 2017. Pl.'s Unopposed Mot. to Extend Disc. Deadline (ECF No. 10); Order (ECF No. 13). The Court held a final pretrial conference on April 10, 2017. Report of Final Pretrial Conf. and Order (ECF No. 26).

The Court held a five-day bench trial from May 22, 2017 through May 26, 2017. Min. Entries (ECF No. 33–38). Ms. Richard and RSU 57 filed simultaneous post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact on June 9, 2017. Pl.'s Post–Tr. Br. (ECF No. 45); Post Tr. Br. of Def. Regional Sch. Unit 57 (ECF No. 43); Def.'s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ECF No. 44) (DPFOF). The parties simultaneously filed responsive briefs on June 16, 2017. Pl.'s Post–Tr. Reply Br. (ECF No. 48); Post Tr. Reply Br. of Def. Regional Sch. Unit 57 (ECF No. 47) (RSU 57 Post Tr. Reply ).

II. SUMMARY OF LEGAL STANDARDS

Ms. Richard has brought claims under four different statutes; however, for each statute, the courts typically employ the same burden-shifting analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Delgado Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP , 856 F.3d 119, 133–34 (1st Cir. 2017) ; Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs. , 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2013) ("A retaliation claim under the ADA is analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework drawn from cases arising under Title VII"); Pippin v. Blvd. Motel Corp. , 835 F.3d 180, 183 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Walsh v. Town of Millinocket , 2011 ME 99, 28 A.3d 610, 616 ) (MWPA).1

There is some question as to whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial as opposed to summary judgment. Palmquist v. Shinseki , 689 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) (At trial, "the McDonnell Douglas framework, with its intricate web of presumptions and burdens, becomes an anachronism. The jury, unaided by any presumptions, must simply answer the question of whether the employee has carried the ultimate burden of proving retaliation") (internal citations omitted); Brady v. Cumberland Cnty. , 2015 ME 143, 126 A.3d 1145 ("Because this case reaches us on summary judgment, it does not present us with occasion to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting structure should still be treated as a useful analytic device at trial"). Even so, as the case has been tried before the Court and as the parties analyzed the case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court applied that analysis to this case.

Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Ms. Richard bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. To do so, she must prove that "(1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action." D.B. v. Esposito , 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). If Ms. Richard makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to RSU 57 to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for doing what it did. Delgado Echevarria , 856 F.3d at 134. If RSU 57 meets its burden of production, the burden shifts back to Ms. Richard "to show that the [articulated] reason was mere pretext." Id. (quoting Collazo–Rosado v. Univ. of P.R. , 765 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2014) (insertion in original)). Ms. Richard bears "the ultimate burden to create a plausible inference that the employer had a retaliatory motive." Id. (quoting Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners , 596 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) ).2

III. THE HEART OF THE CASE: THE DECEMBER 8, 2014 MEETING

The heart of this case concerns a December 8, 2014 meeting among Ms. Richard, RSU 57 Superintendent John Davis, Waterboro Elementary School (WES) Principal Christine Bertinet, Assistant Principal Melissa Roberts, and Clinton Nash, the local president of the Maine Educational Association, the teachers' union. During that year, Ms. Richard had been teaching a kindergarten class at WES and on Friday, December 5, 2014, Superintendent Davis called the meeting to discuss "concerns about [Ms. Richard's] classroom and the conduct of the 5 year olds in the room." Trial Ex. 36 at 1.

Although there are different perspectives about the meeting, the consensus was that Superintendent Davis became extremely angry with and accusatory of Ms. Richard. In Ms. Richard's words, Superintendent Davis was "serious, scary and angry." Mr. Nash described the meeting as "tense" and "fraught." He said that he became nervous at the meeting, even though he was not the subject of Superintendent Davis' attention. After the meeting, Ms. Richard testified that Principal Bertinet apologized for the way the meeting had gone, saying that she had never seen Superintendent Davis act that way. Ms. Richard said that Vice–Principal Roberts facetiously told Ms. Richard: "I almost peed my pants."

Specifically, Ms. Richard recalled that Superintendent Davis called her "pathetic", suggested that she had breached student confidentiality, told her that parents had been complaining about her for years, and that she, not the boys, was the problem. Ms. Richard asked Superintendent Davis to identify the parents who had complained about her, and Superintendent Davis did not respond. Ms. Richard said Superintendent Davis ended the meeting by telling her to "get back to class and teach."

The events that led to Ms. Richard's lawsuit flowed directly from the December 8, 2014 meeting. Following Superintendent Davis' berating of Ms. Richard, the RSU 57 administration focused intensely on Ms. Richard's performance as a teacher, ultimately transferring her from teaching kindergarten at WES to teaching first grade at Shapleigh Elementary School (SES) under an extremely constraining and strictly-enforced Corrective Action Plan. Ms. Richard buckled under intense administrative pressure, lost time, required counseling, and filed this lawsuit.

The nub of the question before the Court is what made Superintendent Davis so very irate with Ms. Richard at the December 8, 2014 meeting. Ms. Richard claims that it was the fact that she advocated for two students in her classroom, T.K. and L.P., who had suspected disabilities, as well as for other students in her classroom. RSU 57 contends that Superintendent Davis became justifiably irritated with Ms. Richard because she not only failed to appropriately manage her classroom, including these two students, but also attempted to shift the blame for her own teaching inadequacies to the administration for failing to supply adequate personnel for the classroom and that she blamed the boys themselves.

In this opinion, the Court sets out in detail its findings of fact that illuminate this critical issue. Following the December 8, 2014 meeting, the Court finds that Ms. Richard was a marked teacher. Taking the strong cue from Superintendent Davis, WES administration, specifically Principal Bertinet and Vice Principal Roberts, began micromanaging Ms. Richard's classroom, criticizing her asserted failures, and building a case for administrative sanction by reprimands.

Ms. Richard buckled under the intense pressure from WES administration and by early April, 2014, Ms. Richard lost considerable weight, vomited blood, and was required to take a leave of absence from teaching. The stress from the administration was so severe that in April 2015, Ms. Richard's physician, Dr. Christy Pulsifer, thought Ms. Richard was suffering from severe depression, and Ms. Richard was taken out of work on a medical basis at that time. In Dr. Pulsifer's words, Ms. Richard was "pretty much falling apart."

In response to Ms. Richard's difficulties, Superintendent Davis wrote her a letter dated April 15, 2015, informing her that when she returned to work, she would be reassigned to a different school, the Lyman School, and she would be working "in the kindergarten classroom supporting the current teacher." Id. 83. Ms. Richard was devastated by this letter. She thought she was being demoted to an education technician and reassigned as a punishment. In late April, 2015, Dr. Pulsifer diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder

caused by a stressful workplace.

Ms. Richard was able to return to work on January...

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