Richard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
Decision Date | 21 November 2011 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 10–3594 (RHK/FLN). |
Citation | 826 F.Supp.2d 1133 |
Parties | Richard and Patricia MARTIN, Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Brendan R. Tupa, Udoibok, Davis & Tupa, PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.
Tony R. Krall, Bjork T. Hill, Hanson Lulic & Krall, LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court sua sponte.
This action arises out of a fire at the home of Plaintiffs Richard and Patricia Martin on August 21, 2008. The Martins filed a claim with their insurer, Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”), which denied it. Seeking to recover the proceeds of their policy, the Martins commenced the instant action on August 17, 2010, invoking diversity jurisdiction. They asserted claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment and sought unspecified damages “in excess of” $75,000, plus costs, attorneys' fees, and statutory interest under Minnesota Statutes § 60A.0811. The Complaint also sought leave “to add additional claims that could not be brought initially,” such as “those provided by Minn.Stat. § 604.18.” 1
The parties proceeded with discovery and, on January 28, 2011, the Martins moved for leave to amend their Complaint to assert a bad-faith-denial claim. After full briefing, Magistrate Judge Noel denied that Motion on March 31, 2011, finding that the Martins had “fail[ed] to establish a prima facie showing that [State Farm] lacked a reasonable basis for denying the benefits of the insurance policy.” (Doc. No. 26 at 1.) The Martins did not object to that ruling.
On October 6, 2011, with discovery complete, State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing inter alia that the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over this action because the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement has not been satisfied. (See Doc. Nos. 45, 47.) In accordance with the well-settled principle that it is inappropriate to “reach a merits question when there is no Article III jurisdiction,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), the Court directed the parties to brief the jurisdictional issue and stayed the remainder of the summary-judgment Motion. ( See Doc. No. 49.) The parties complied with that directive and, having now reviewed their submissions, the Court agrees with State Farm that the amount-in-controversy requirement has not been satisfied here.
The Martins, as the parties invoking the Court's jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction. E.g., OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 347 (8th Cir.2007). Diversity jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). It is undisputed that the parties here are citizens of different states and, accordingly, only the amount in controversy is at issue.
To determine the amount in controversy, the Court must look to the claims asserted in the Complaint (breach of contract and unjust enrichment) and assess what damages the Martins could potentially recover on those claims. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir.2005).2 While the Complaint alleges that the Martins are entitled to recover more than $75,000 without further specifying the nature of their damages, “[g]enerally speaking, a complaint that alleges the jurisdictional amount in good faith will be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.” OnePoint, 486 F.3d at 348 (quoting Larkin v. Brown, 41 F.3d 387, 388 (8th Cir.1994)).
But where, as here, “the defendant challenges the plaintiff's allegations of the amount in controversy, ... the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884–85 (8th Cir.2002) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., James Neff Kramper Family P'ship v. IBP, Inc., 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.2005); State of Mo. ex rel. Pemiscot Cnty., Mo. v. W. Sur. Co., 51 F.3d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1995) (). Stated differently, “[o]nce jurisdiction is challenged, ‘if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a [legal] certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, ... the suit will be dismissed.’ ” Pemiscot Cnty., 51 F.3d at 173 (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938)). The term “proofs,” as used in St. Paul Mercury, means “summary-judgment-type evidence.” Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas. Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir.1995); accord, e.g., Pemiscot Cnty., 51 F.3d at 173–74 ( )(emphasis in original). At bottom, the question is whether the plaintiff's evidence shows to a “legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289, 58 S.Ct. 586; accord, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Universal Crop Prot. Alliance, LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.2010); James Neff Kramper, 393 F.3d at 831 ( ).
Here, the Martins assert they are entitled to damages for all personal property destroyed or damaged in the fire (Doc. No. 50 at 1), and the Court agrees this is the appropriate measure of damages for the claims asserted in the Complaint.3 The dispositive question, therefore, is whether the Martins have proffered sufficient “proofs” to permit a “fact finder [to] legally conclude” that their personal-property damages exceed $75,000. Kopp, 280 F.3d at 885. In the Court's view, the answer to that question is, “No.”
Notably, the Martins have proffered little evidence to support their assertion that their damages exceed the jurisdictional minimum. While they argue that they “have always maintained that they have claims for damages in excess of $75,000” (Doc. No. 50 at 1 (emphasis added)), they cannot rely on mere allegations or beliefs at this juncture. Pemiscot Cnty., 51 F.3d at 173–74. The issue, rather, is one of proof; they must submit evidence that would permit a jury to conclude they have suffered sufficient damages. James Neff Kramper, 393 F.3d at 833 (); Kopp, 280 F.3d at 885. And yet, they have proffered only two items in an attempt to satisfy their burden, neither of which is availing.
First, the Martins have each submitted an Affidavit “estimat[ing] that the value of [the] personal property items lost in the fire and unpaid for by State Farm exceed[s] $100,000.” Putting aside whether “estimates” are sufficient to discharge their burden at this stage, the Court need not—and will not—rely on these assertions, because they contradict answers the Martins previously provided in discovery. In particular, they itemized their alleged damages in their Rule 26(a) disclosures, attaching a 24–page document listing 715 items supposedly lost or damaged in the fire, along with each item's value. ( See Doc. No. 48 Ex. E.) The total value of those items, however, was only $71,643.27 ( id.),4 a calculation the Martins subsequently reaffirmed in their answers to State Farm's interrogatories. (Doc. No. 55 Ex. A.) The Court will not permit them to now rely on self-serving, contradictory Affidavits in an attempt to justify jurisdiction. See Frevert v. Ford Motor Co., 614 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir.2010) ( ); OnePoint, 486 F.3d at 349 () (emphasis added); see also Larkin, 41 F.3d at 389 ().5
Second, the Martins point to the Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss they filed with State Farm in September 2009. (Doc. No. 52 Ex. B.) Yet, that statement does not disclose any dollar amount for their claimed losses. In fact, in the space provided for the Martins to list the value of their damaged property, they simply wrote “per insurance allowance.” This tells the Court absolutely nothing about the damages the Martins allegedly have sustained.
To be sure, the Martins assert that they have been unable to prepare a full inventory of the items damaged or destroyed in the fire. (Doc. No. 50 at 3–4.) That assertion, of course, flies in the face of the detailed and specific itemization—on 24 pages and over 700 lines—of the items ostensibly damaged in the fire. But regardless, the Martins would be unable to recover at trial based on a “best guess” as to how much damage they sustained. See, e.g., U.S. Salt, Inc. v. Broken Arrow, Inc., Civ. No. 07–1988, 2008 WL 2277602, at *1 (Kyle, J.) (), aff'd, 563 F.3d 687 (8th Cir.2009). While the Martins were not required to prove with mathematical certainty that their damages exceed $75,000, Kopp, 280 F.3d at 885, they were required to show a sufficient amount in controversy based on what a fact finder could actually award under the evidence, id., and no damages can be recovered for “speculation or guess...
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