Richards' Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 16 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 8452,8452
• Citation: 297 P.2d 542,5 Utah 2d 106
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: d 106 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Gertrude Louise RICHARDS, deceased. Catherine R. HOWELL, Catherine S. Cress and Charles Richard Schneider, Respondents, v. Janet R. PARKER, Appellant, Walker Bank & Trust Co., Executor.

Page 542

297 P.2d 542

5 Utah 2d 106

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Gertrude Louise RICHARDS,

deceased.

Catherine R. HOWELL, Catherine S. Cress and Charles Richard

Schneider, Respondents, v. Janet R. PARKER, Appellant, Walker Bank & Trust Co., Executor.

No. 8452.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 16, 1956.

Gustin, Richards & Mattsson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

H. R. Waldo, Salt Lake City, White, Klute & White, Niles, Mich., Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

Ray, Rawlins, Jones & Henderson, Salt Lake City, for Walker Bank, executor.

CROCKETT, Justice.

Gertrude Louise Richards died in Salt Lake City on June 30, 1954, leaving an estate valued in excess of $330,000. By a will executed March 20, 1946, she made a number of minor bequests and devised the principal portion of her estate one-half to her sister, Mrs. Janet Parker, and the other half to her nieces, Mrs. Catherine Richards Howell and Mrs. Eleanor Richards Schneider, the children of her deceased brother. The will also provided that in the event Mrs. Schneider predeceased testatrix the Schneider children would succeed to the bequest of their mother. The latter died in 1953. By a purported codicil executed five days prior to her death, testatrix cancelled the bequests to Mrs. Howell and the Schneider children, giving them in lieu thereof only $10,000 to Mrs. Howell and $5,000 to each of the Schneiders; Mrs. Parker was named residuary legatee.

The will was admitted to probate without objection, but Mrs. Howell and the Schneider children (hereinafter called the contestants) objected to admission of the codicil. A jury found that at the time the codicil was executed testatrix lacked testamentary capacity. A judgment was entered in accordance with that finding. Mrs. Parker (the proponent) appeals from that verdict and judgment.

Appellant relies on two main points for reversal: First, that the jury was not properly instructed that the burden was upon the contestants to prove lack of testamentary capacity; second, that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict that testatrix lacked testamentary capacity.

Respondents do not question that the law as established in this jurisdiction is that the burden of showing lack of testamentary capacity was upon the contestants. ¹ The trial judge refused to give proponent's requested instruction to that effect, indicating thereon that it was 'given by implication.' The court submitted the case to the jury by giving them only three interrogatories and directing them to place an 'X' opposite the proposition with which they agreed.

'Proposition 1. Gertrude Louise Richards at the time of making the codicil dated June 25, 1954, was of sound and disposing mind. ( )

'Proposition 2. Gertrude Louise Richards at the time of making the codicil dated June 25, 1954, was not of sound and disposing mind. (X)

'Proposition 3. The evidence is so equally divided that the jurors cannot determine either Proposition 1 or Proposition 2. ( )'

Six of the eight jurors found in favor of Proposition 2.

The function of an instruction on burden of proof is to tell the jury how it should weigh the evidence. Where the evidence is so equally balanced that it is impossible to say on which side lies the greater probability of truth, or where the preponderance of the evidence is against the truth of a certain proposition, a verdict must be returned against the party who has the burden, because he has failed to show that his allegation is more convincing as to its truth, when weighed against the evidence opposed to it. ² Thus, in the instant case, if the jurors had agreed with Proposition 3, that the evidence was equally balanced, the judgment would have been in favor of proponent, for a testator is presumed competent until the contrary is shown by the preponderance of the evidence. ³ However, the jury, by finding in accordance with Proposition 2 over Proposition 3 necessarily rejected the contention that the evidence was evenly divided and indicated that they believed that the greater weight of evidence lay in favor of lack of capacity. It would seem to have been desirable to give the requested instruction for complete clarity of understanding by the jurors and certainly would not have been error to do so. Yet, a refusal to give an instruction cannot be the basis for reversal unless the jury was insufficiently advised of the issue they were to determine, or it appears that they would have been confused or misled to the prejudice of the person complaining thereof. ⁴ From the finding of the jurors, it seems clear that they believed that incompetency was proved by the greater weight of the evidence.

In considering the sufficiency of the evidence it is meet to first treat certain issues relating to its admissibility. A factual background is required: Testatrix was 78 years of age. She had been confined to a hospital from May 21, 1954 to the date of her death for treatment of uncontrolled diabetes. The disease was never brought under control during her stay in the hospital, and she fluctuated between diabetic coma and insulin shock. Her condition was aggravated by hardening of the arteries; a grossly enlarged heart that resulted in heart failure; she had fluid in the lungs and a shortness of breath that necessitated administration of oxygen during her stay in the hospital; suffered from a marked mineral deficiency, was debilitated by frequent nausea and vomiting and was incontinent. It was necessary to supply her food and liquid needs intravenously. Her condition continued to deteriorate during her confinement and until her death on the 30th of June.

Proponent assigns as error the admission of the hospital records, claiming that they were incompetent because hearsay. This same issue was presented in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. ⁵ In that case, although we affirmed the refusal of the trial court to admit the entire record because no proper foundation had been laid, we observed:

'Before such records can be admitted in the absence of statute, the offering party must show the necessity of admitting the records without requiring the person or several persons who made the records to testify. He must then show the custody from which the records were taken and that they were prepared in the due course of hospital work.'

In the instant case there was adequate foundation from which the trial judge could find the records credible, reliable and hence, admissible. The medical records librarian testified that she was the custodian of the records, and that although she did not make the entries herself, she was familiar with them and that they were prepared in the ordinary course of hospital business. ⁶ An intern assigned to take care of testatrix supplemented her testimony, explaining both the nature and the regularity of the keeping of such records.

Both the Clayton case, supra, and State v. Davie, ⁷ which relied upon it, indicate our approval of modification of the old 'shop book' rule. In the Davie case we approved the admission of records shown to have been kept in the regular course of business. Implicit from the holding of the Clayton case and the authorities there relied upon is that the regularity and routine of entering the medical data required by hospital records carry with them sufficient guarantees of credibility to render them worthy of consideration. There is an additional reason, although it is not necessarily controlling, why hospital records should be regarded as sufficiently trustworthy to be received in evidence: These records are relied upon for the treatment of patients and the preservation of human life. Any motive for falsifying them by doctors or the staff appears to be lacking. And further, the law now requires that such records be kept and any false or fraudulent entry therein is made a crime. ⁸ In such circumstances, and considering the unfortunate consequences that a contrary ruling would have on both hospital and judicial administration were every entrant to be called to explain his notations, we hold that the hospital records were properly admitted.

Another problem respecting the admission of evidence relates to questions put to Dr. Currier, a psychiatrist, who testified concerning testatrix' mental competency. He never saw her and his testimony, therefore, was necessarily based on hypothetical questions. The proponent argues that the doctor was permitted to base his testimony upon abstractions and conjectures which had no basis in evidence, particularly, that he used the opinions, inferences and conclusions of others set out in the hospital records. Our decision that such records were properly admitted largely disposes of the proponent's claim that the question consisted of abstractions and conjecture. It appears that the hypothetical question was not an unfair summary of the condition of testatrix as reflected by the hospital records supplemented by the testimony of the physicians who attended her. Concededly there was dispute as to whether some of these conditions actually existed, but this court has long recognized that where the facts are in dispute, hypothetical questions may be framed either upon all the facts of the case, or upon facts which fairly represent the theory of the party producing the expert. ⁹

The remaining claim of error in regard to the admission of evidence is that Dr. Currier, the psychiatrist, was permitted to state that the deceased suffered from a mental 'senility,' and to assume as part of his hypothesis that the testatrix was 'senile,' when there was no basis in the evidence therefor. There was foundation for this hypothesis both from the hospital records and from the testimony of Dr. Copeland, the intern who made the diagnosis when testatrix was admitted the hospital. The difficulty arises because Dr. Copeland explained that

'* * * 'senility' * * * has a connotation of both physical and mental senility. In this regard I meant to imply...