Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Com'rs of Anne Arundel County

• Court: Maryland Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; PRESCOTT
• Citation: Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Com'rs of Anne Arundel County, 196 A.2d 621, 233 Md. 249 (Md. 1963)
• Decision Date: 18 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 136,136
• Parties: RICHARDS FURNITURE CORPORATION v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY et al.

Page 249

233 Md. 249

196 A.2d 621

RICHARDS FURNITURE CORPORATION v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY et al.

No. 136.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 18, 1963.

Opinion Jan. 8, 1964.

C. Edward Hartman, II, Annapolis (John W. Hessian, Jr., Towson, on the brief), for appellant.

Loring E. Hawes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Jerome F. Connell, Sp. Asst. Sol., Glen Burnie (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Henry J. Tarantino, County Sol. for Anne Arundel County, Annapolis, on the brief), for appellees.

Before HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT, MARBURY and SYBERT, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

For reasons to be stated in an opinion to be hereafter filed, it is, this 18th day of December, 1963, ORDERED by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that the decree appealed from in the above entitled case be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.

OPINION

PRESCOTT, Judge.

We, heretofore, decided this case by a per curiam order. We now state our reasons for the decision.

The appellant challenges the validity of an Act of the General Assembly, set forth below. It has literally 'thrown the book' at the Act. It states nine separate questions to be answered, with the eighth subdivided into three questions and the ninth into six. In the early case of Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, which dealt with constitutional questions, the opinion occupies ninety-eight pages of the reports. The questions here posed present, we think, no serious difficulty; hence this opinion should be considerably shorter.

The appellant, Richards Furniture Corporation (Richards), filed a bill in equity, praying declaratory and injunctive relief to declare unconstitutional the provisions of Code (1957), Article 27, § 521(b), as amended by Chapter 13 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1962 (Special Session), (hereafter referred to as 'the Act' or 'the Bill'), and to enjoin enforcement thereof by the appellees, law enforcement officials of Anne Arundel County. In the alternative, it sought a declaration that the Act did not apply to its particular business. From a decision holding that the Act was valid and that appellant's business came within its provisions, this appeal resulted.

Richards, a Maryland Corporation, rents space and sells furniture in a large building built and owned by the Ritchie Highway Farmers Market, Inc. (Market), known as and called the Ritchie Highway Farmers Market. The building is approximately 643 feet long while its width varies from 107 to 172 feet depending upon the shapes of its various departments. Space is leased to some thirty-four merchants. The store building is set up with two separate, parallel, pedestrian aisles running from one side of the building to the other, dividing it into three areas. Each tenant leases a designated area fronting on one or both aisles and his space is partitioned off by high walls on the sides. Access to each shop is gained from an entrance off one of the aisles. In this respect, Richards' store is slightly different in that it is fully partitioned off from the aisles by a ceiling-high masonry wall with conventional doors, and it has an independent outside entrance for customers.

The evidence indicates that the Market building, in its entirety, is open for business on Wednesdays and Thursdays from 4:00 to 10:00 p. m.; Fridays and Saturdays from 10:00 a. m. to 10:00 p. m.; and on Sundays from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p. m. The evidence further reveals that approximately 30,000 automobiles visit the Market each week, of which one-third of the total arrive every Sunday. In short, about one-third of the weekly business is transacted on Sundays. Not only does the Market, by its advertisements, hold itself out as the sole and responsible owner of the Market, containing a number of shops and selling a variety of goods, but it exercises a great deal of control over the merchants who occupy space within the Market building. These controls over the individual merchants include, among other things, the selection and pricing of products to be sold, the methods of merchandising these products, the advertising which can be done, the hours of business that the individual merchants may be open, the hours that they must close, the selection and behavior of their personnel, and the reimbursement of monies to purchasers of products. It is also significant that the occupants of the entire building are accommodated by one large parking lot, which is owned and operated by the Market. It also hires special police to control the traffic, and the conduct of individuals on the parking lot area and throughout the entire market building. The testimony also showed that it is the generally accepted practice of the Market to have no more than one merchandiser of a particular class of products occupying space within its building; Richards is the only furniture department therein. And although the building is called the Ritchie Highway Farmers Market, little, if any, actual farm produce is sold therein.

The Act complained of reads as follows:

'In Anne Arundel County, in addition to the articles of merchandise herein before mentioned, retailers may sell, barter, deal in, and deliver on Sunday the following articles of merchandise [many articles of merchandise, not relevant here]; provided, however, that nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prevent the operation of any retail establishment on Sunday, the operation of which does not entail the employment of more than one person, not including the owner or proprietor. Every market or department store in which stalls or departments are rented or concessions given to individual merchants or vendors shall be considered as one establishment and each stall or department thereof is not a separate establishment.'

(The italicised portion above was added by the amendment of 1962.)

I, II, III, IV, V

We shall consider the first five of appellant's contentions under this heading. It asserts that the Maryland Constitution prohibits a special session of the General Assembly from enacting 'a non-emergency local bill,' citing Article II, Section 16, and Article III, Sections 14, 15 and 27, thereof. It admits finding no Maryland decision to this effect and that the Constitution does not explicitly state any such prohibition, but argues the above sections implicitly do so. We do not find it necessary to set forth the sections in detail. The Maryland Constitution is not a grant of powers to the General Assembly, but a statement of limitations on its otherwise plenary powers. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 439, 186 A.2d 656.

A careful reading of the Constitution reveals that the only constitutional limitations on extraordinary, or special, sessions are: (1) that the session be convened by a proclamation of the Governor (formerly this was not required); (2) the session shall last no longer than thirty days; and (3) no additional compensation, except mileage and other allowances provided by law, shall be allowed members for such sessions. Section 15 provides that the General Assembly, once properly convened, shall be the sole judge of how long 'the public interest may require' within certain limitations) it to continue in session. There can be little doubt that, at a special session, the public interest requires the Legislature to remain in session, within the thirty-day limit, as long as any necessary and proper legislation is under consideration and before it. Cf. Article III, Section 56.

We find no express nor implied provision in the Constitution preventing the passage of a 'non-emergency local bill' at a special session. It is generally held that in the absence of constitutional limitation, the legislative power of a Legislature, when convened in extraordinary session, is as broad as its powers in its regular sessions. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 46; State v. Majors, 16 Kan. 440; Woessner v. Bullock, 176 Ind. 166, 93 N.E. 1057; State v. Fair, 35 Wash. 127, 76 P. 731; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82. We, therefore, hold that the General Assembly was not prohibited from passing the Act because it was a non-emergency local bill.

What we have said above also nearly answers the next four of appellant's contentions. However, we shall add a few further comments concerning them.

The appellant next attacks the Act on the ground that it was not within the Governor's proclamation. The Constitution of Maryland grants no authority to the Governor to limit, by his proclamation, the powers of the Legislature. In the absence of such a restrictive provision, the authorities hold, as stated above, that the powers of the Legislature at a special session are as broad as at its general ones. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 10; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, supra; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.), 222; Morford v. Unger, supra; State v. Fair, supra. (These two cases deal specifically with the question under immediate consideration.) For cases where state constitutional provisions limited legislation to that in the Governors' proclamations, see those cited under C.J.S. and Am.Jur., ibid

Appellant also claims it 'was denied its constitutional rights because of a lack of notice of the intended legislation.' It does not state the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated, nor does it cite any case in support of this contention. It cites one or more cases which deal with the title requirements of Article III, Section 29, and seems to argue from certain language in the opinions of cases decided thereunder (which deal with titles) that 'notice' of proposed legislation must be given to each citizen and corporation affected by it. Unless the Constitution so provides, due process does not require that notice and hearing be provided in order to validate legislation. 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rd ed.) § 1012, p. 159; note, 28 Col.L.Rev. 619. There is no provision for such notice in the Maryland Constitution. We may note, however, that 'notice' is...