Richards v. Brown

• Decision Date: 13 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20090980.,20090980.
• Citation: 704 Utah Adv. Rep. 39,274 P.3d 911,2012 UT 14
• Parties: Steve RICHARDS, Respondent, v. Diana BROWN, Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

2012 UT 14

274 P.3d 911

704 Utah Adv. Rep. 39

Steve RICHARDS, Respondent,

v.Diana BROWN, Petitioner.

No. 20090980.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 13, 2012.

Suzanne Marelius, Tracey M. Watson, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Tineke Van Dijk, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Justice NEHRING, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Steve Richards sued his former domestic partner, Diana Brown. He sought to have the relationship declared to be an unsolemnized marriage pursuant to Utah law. Ms. Brown opposed the suit and won when the trial court ruled that Mr. Richards' quest for a statutory marriage was too late. This ruling did not, however, end the case. Mr. Richards also sought to recover money that he alleged that he contributed to the joint obligations of the pair. After trial, the court ruled that Ms. Brown had been unjustly enriched by Mr. Richards' money and awarded him a money judgment. Ms. Brown paid the judgment and did not appeal. Mr. Richards did appeal. He seeks to have this court reverse the district court's dismissal of his unsolemnized marriage claim. Ms. Brown seeks to dispatch Mr. Richards' appeal by insisting that Mr. Richards' right to appeal ended when he accepted money from Ms. Brown to resolve his unjust enrichment claim.

¶ 2 The court of appeals rejected Ms. Brown's argument because an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment had not been placed in the record as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58B. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment against Mr. Richards on his unsolemnized marriage claim. We affirm the court of appeals' holding that Mr. Richards did not waive his right to appeal, though we do so on other grounds. We also affirm the court of appeals' construction of Utah Code section 30–1–4.5.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Steve Richards and Diana Brown were involved in an intimate relationship. They began living together in Ms. Brown's home in May 1995. Though Mr. Richards proposed marriage several times, Ms. Brown never accepted the marriage proposal and the two were never formally married. They did, however, have one child together, born in 1996, and they held themselves out as husband and wife. While they lived together, they shared many living expenses, and Mr. Richards contributed to the mortgage on Ms. Brown's home.

¶ 4 Approximately six years into the relationship, Mr. Richards and Ms. Brown ceased all sexual relations and moved into separate bedrooms within the home. Four years later, in August or September 2005, Mr. Richards moved out of Ms. Brown's home and into a nearby apartment. In October 2005, the parties participated in mediation to resolve custody issues. They also scheduled mediation to discuss property distribution, but Ms. Brown canceled the mediation before it occurred. Despite their separation, the parties continued to socialize through December 2005, and they celebrated birthdays, Thanksgiving, and Christmas as a family. Mr. Richards testified that by early 2006 he realized that reconciliation was not possible.

¶ 5 In December 2006, Mr. Richards filed a Verified Petition for Paternity and Related Matters. He requested that the court recognize that an unsolemnized marriage had occurred between him and Ms. Brown under Utah Code section 30–1–4.5; he also requested the award of an interest in Ms. Brown's home under any one of several equitable doctrines.

¶ 6 In response, Ms. Brown filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the unsolemnized marriage claim. She argued that when Mr. Richards moved out of her home in September 2005, he terminated the relationship and triggered the running of the one-year statute of repose. As a result, she argued, Mr. Richards' petition filed in December of 2006 was untimely.

¶ 7 The domestic relations commissioner agreed with Ms. Brown and recommended that “a relationship [for purposes of unsolemnized marriage] is terminated by cessation of [the required element of] cohabitation.” The district court adopted the commissioner's recommendation. It granted Ms. Brown's motion for partial summary judgment and held that “the latest possible date under which the parties ... cohabited ended in September 2005 when petitioner moved out,” therefore “as a matter of law, the Petition was untimely in that it was brought after the one year period from the termination of the common law marriage relationship.”

¶ 8 The remaining equitable claims went to trial. Ultimately, the trial court found that Ms. Brown had been unjustly enriched by Mr. Richards' contributions to home improvement and maintenance expenses. The trial court ordered Ms. Brown to pay Mr. Richards $10,136.

¶ 9 Ms. Brown paid Mr. Richards $10,136 as ordered by the court. Mr. Richards accepted payment but never filed an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58B, nor has Ms. Brown filed a motion to have the court enter a declaration of satisfaction under the rule.

¶ 10 After accepting payment on the judgment, Mr. Richards appealed. He argued that the district court erred when it held that his petition to establish an unsolemnized marriage was untimely because it was not filed within one year after the termination of cohabitation. Ms. Brown countered that Mr. Richards waived his right to appeal and rendered the controversy moot when he accepted payment in satisfaction of the judgment on the unjust enrichment claim.

¶ 11 The court of appeals rejected Ms. Brown's argument that Mr. Richards waived his right to appeal when he accepted payment on the unjust enrichment claim. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment on the unsolemnized marriage claim. It held that under Utah Code section 30–1–4.5(2), termination of cohabitation does not necessarily terminate the relationship so as to trigger the running of the statute of repose. Ms. Brown filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law.” ¹

ANALYSIS

I. AN APPELLANT DOES NOT WAIVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL A CLAIM WHEN THE APPELLANT ACCEPTS PAYMENT ON A JUDGMENT RESOLVING A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION

¶ 13 “[T]he general rule [is] that if a judgment is voluntarily paid, [and] is accepted, and a judgment [is thereby] satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal is waived.” ² Payment of a judgment in full acts as a satisfaction and discharge of the underlying claim.³ It is the “final act and end of a proceeding.” ⁴ Payment and its acceptance manifest the parties' expression of finality and resolution of all issues embraced by the particular claim.⁵ A party that accepts the benefits of a judgment impliedly acknowledges resolution of the underlying controversy and waives the right to appeal that judgment.⁶

¶ 14 On appeal, Ms. Brown argues that Mr. Richards waived his right to appeal when he accepted payment in satisfaction of the judgment on his unjust enrichment claim.⁷ The court of appeals rejected this argument. It reasoned that Mr. Richards did not waive his right to appeal because an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment had never been entered on the record under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58B.⁸ While we agree with the court of appeals' ultimate conclusion that Mr. Richards did not waive his right to appeal, we do so on other grounds.

¶ 15 An acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment filed under Rule 58B and the act of accepting payment in satisfaction of a judgment do not have the same consequences under the law.⁹ While an acknowledgment entered on the record is evidence that payment has been made,¹⁰ its absence does not preclude a determination that the asserted claim has been extinguished. In the absence of an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment, an appellate court may examine the record to ascertain whether a payment of the judgment has occurred that is deemed to resolve the controversy and render the appeal moot.

¶ 16 Waiver under this “acceptance-of-benefits doctrine” is very narrow. The right to appeal is waived only for the specific claims upon which payment is accepted.¹¹

If a judgment is entered as to one part of a controversy, which is separate and distinct from another part, and the disposition of the latter cannot affect the disposition of the former, a party may accept [payment in satisfaction of the judgment], and not be deemed to [have] waive[d] his right to appeal as to other independent claims which the court refused to grant.¹²

Thus, the right to appeal hinges on whether the claim appealed from is separate and independent from the claim upon which the appellant accepted payment in satisfaction of a judgment.

¶ 17 In Jensen v. Eddy, plaintiffs did not waive their right to appeal a separate and independent claim for costs incurred in preserving assets even though they had accepted payment in satisfaction of a judgment for breach of contract.¹³ Plaintiffs sued to recover damages for defendants' breach of a contract to purchase a mine and for the expenses plaintiffs incurred in preserving the mine and other assets.¹⁴ The district court found generally for the plaintiffs but denied the claim for expenses incurred to preserve assets.¹⁵ Defendants paid the judgment and plaintiffs accepted the payment.¹⁶ Plaintiffs then appealed the district court's denial of expenses they incurred in preserving the mine.¹⁷

¶ 18 Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal. They contended that plaintiffs had waived the right to appeal when they accepted payment in satisfaction of the judgment.¹⁸ We denied the motion. We reasoned that the breach of contract and the preservation of assets were separate and independent claims.¹⁹ We held that “the parts of the judgment on which the defendants claim the plaintiffs accepted payment [were] separate...