Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Writing for the Court: MORRISON C. ENGLAND
• Citation: Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, 821 F.Supp.2d 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
• Decision Date: 16 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2:09–cv–01235 MCE–DAD.,2:09–cv–01235 MCE–DAD.
• Parties: Adam RICHARDS et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF YOLO and Yolo County Sheriff Ed Prieto, Defendants.

821 F.Supp.2d 1169

Adam RICHARDS et al., Plaintiffs,

v.COUNTY OF YOLO and Yolo County Sheriff Ed Prieto, Defendants.

No. 2:09–cv–01235 MCE–DAD.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

May 16, 2011.

Alan Gura, Gura & Possessky, Alexandria, VA, Donald E. J. Kilmer, Jr., San Jose, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Serena Mercedes Sanders, Angelo, Kilday & Kilduff, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiffs Adam Richards, Brett Stewart, the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., and The Calguns Foundation, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek redress from Sheriff Ed Prieto and the County of Yolo (collectively, “Defendants”) after Plaintiffs Richards and Stewart were denied gun permits under Yolo County's, and by extension Sheriff Prieto's, concealed weapon licensing policy.

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed Motions for Summary Judgment. A hearing on the matter was held on March 10, 2011. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion is denied and Defendants' Motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

A. Concealed Weapon License Policy

California law generally prohibits individuals from carrying a concealed firearm in public.¹ See Cal.Penal Code §§ 12025(a)(2), 12027. With a permit and for self-defense purposes, one can obtain a license in California to carry a firearm “capable of being concealed upon the person.” Penal Code § 12050(a)(1)(A)(i). However, applicants for such a license must provide good cause for applying, and demonstrate they are of “good moral character.” Penal Code § 12050(a). Other requirements include a background check and completion of a training course. See id. Beyond these basic requirements, the state grants each municipal or county authority wide latitude to determine both the appropriate criteria for issuing a license and the need to impose any reasonable restrictions on the licensee. Penal Code § 12050(b). Plaintiffs are not challenging the California statute itself ², but instead challenge Yolo County's interpretation of their statutory authority, namely its Concealed Weapon License Policy.

Consistent with the regulations under California Penal Code, Yolo County and Defendant Prieto, as the Sheriff, have created a policy regulating the issuance of concealed weapon licenses to Yolo County residents. Sheriff Prieto retains “discretion to issue a license to carry a concealed firearm to residents within Yolo County.” ( See Policy, ECF No. 60–1, at 1.) The policy, accessible to the public, clearly enumerates the criteria for obtaining the license, and an applicant must, among other things, demonstrate that they have a valid reason to request the permit in the first place. ( Id.) Examples of valid reasons listed in the policy “include, but are not limited to:” credible threats of violence against the applicant, and being a business owner who carries large sums of cash. ( Id. at 1–2.) Examples of invalid reasons include hunting, fishing, or self-defense “without credible threats of violence.” ( Id. at 2.) The issuance of a license ultimately bears on whether the “Sheriff or his designee feels there is sufficient reason to grant the license.” ( Id.)

B. Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. and The Calguns Foundation, Inc. are non-profit organizations designed to promote the rights of firearm holders, and more generally anti-gun control advocates. ( SAC 2.) Both Plaintiffs Richards and Stewart are members and supporters of both organizations. ( Id. at 1.)

In March 2009, Plaintiff Richards contacted the Yolo County Sheriff's office to inquire about the procedure to obtain a permit to carry a handgun. Defendant was told that he could not obtain a concealed weapon license for self-defense purposes because that would not constitute good cause under the terms of the policy. ( Id. at 4.) In addition, since Plaintiff Richards resides in Davis, the Yolo County Sheriff's office informed him that he would first have to apply for a concealed weapon license from the Chief of Police in the City of Davis. ( Id.)

Similarly, in March 2010, Plaintiff Stewart applied for a concealed weapon license from Yolo County, after first being told that Davis police had discontinued issuing Carry Concealed Weapon permits. ( Id. at 5.) On April 27, 2010, Plaintiff Stewart was informed in writing that he was being denied a permit by Yolo County because his application did not “ ‘meet the criteria’ ” for granting a license, as outlined in the policy. ( Id.)

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ³ provide for summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56 by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Each party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630–631 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

ANALYSIS

A. Second Amendment

1. Heller and the Scope of Protection

Plaintiffs argue that, by maintaining a policy that deprives Plaintiffs Richards and Stewart of a concealed weapon license, Defendants are infringing on their Second Amendment right to bear arms, as the Yolo County license policy effectively acts as a complete ban on an individual's right to carry. They challenge the policy both on its face, and as applied. ( See Mot. Summ. J. Hr'g Tr. 9:15–17, March 10, 2011, ECF No. 70.) Defendants, on the other hand, believe that the Second Amendment has never been interpreted as granting citizens the right to carry a concealed weapon in public, and restrictions on firearm possession has been the status quo in the United States for many years. Further, Defendants contend that Yolo County's policy does not violate the Second Amendment, because it is not a total ban on the possession of handguns.

The Second Amendment protects an individual's right to “keep and bear arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Rights bestowed under the Second Amendment are “fundamental,” and apply “equally to the Federal Government and the States.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3050, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). Specifically, the Second Amendment “protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense in the home.” McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3044. See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (“the District's ban on handgun possession in the home [for self-defense purposes] violates the Second Amendment.”); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.2010) (explaining the scope of Heller was limited to the right to register and keep a loaded firearm in the home for self-defense).

However, as the Supreme Court of the United States recently clarified in a landmark case, the “right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. In fact, the Court was careful to explain that their decision did not, in any way, invalidate many of the longstanding state and federal prohibitions on firearm possession. Id. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783.⁴ Based upon this, Heller cannot be read to invalidate Yolo County's concealed weapon policy, as the Second Amendment does not create a fundamental right to carry a concealed weapon in public.

Furthermore, the policy does not create a total ban on carrying a firearm, such that the policy completely infringes on the rights protected by the Second Amendment. Since the Supreme Court has yet to articulate the appropriate standard of review, the Ninth Circuit has determined that only regulations that “substantially burden the right to keep and bear arms trigger heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment.” Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir.2011) (evaluating whether a restriction on gun sales substantially burdens Second Amendment rights). It then follows that if the regulation does not place a substantial burden to an individual's fundamental right, then rational basis review applies. Id. at 785–86 (In “a variety of contexts” the Supreme Court “applies mere rational basis scrutiny to laws that regulate, but do not significantly burden, fundamental rights.”).⁵

In determining whether government action “substantially burdens” a constitutionally-protected right, courts “typically ask whether the...