Richards v. Crown Point Community School Corp., 570S105
| Decision Date | 03 May 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 570S105,570S105 |
| Citation | 256 Ind. 347,269 N.E.2d 5 |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | Nicholas R. RICHARDS and Agnes B. Richards, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. CROWN POINT COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION et al., Relators, Appellees. |
This matter comes before us on a petition for rehearing of a direct appeal to this court from a granting of a motion for a summary judgment.
Appellants Richards were the holders in fee of certain real estate situated in Lake County, Indiana. In 1953 the land was appropriated by proper procedure to the use of the School City of Crown Point and appellants were compensated accordingly. In 1969 the school corporation sold the land to appellee Schmal when it was determined that the property was no longer needed for school purposes. Appellants filed an action claiming that appellee school corporation had taken what amounted to a determinable fee and that the property should revert to them if it was no longer needed for educational purposes. Also challenged was the manner in which the sale to appellee Schmal was conducted and other matters not pertinent here.
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. The content of the ruling was as follows:
A motion to correct errors was not filed in the trial court.
Appellant then brought the matter before this court on a direct appeal. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the matter here on the ground that since the trial court order constituted a final judgment as to the fee to the real estate a motion to correct errors should have been filed and an appeal taken to the Appellate Court. Appellant, on the other hand, contended that since the order of the trial court was interlocutory that no motion to correct errors was necessary under the procedural rules and a direct appeal before this court would lie.
We granted the motion to dismiss without opinion.
To apprise the parties more fully of the basis of our holding we take the occasion of the filing of the petition for rehearing to clarify our previous ruling.
The issue here presented may be resolved by reference to earlier decisions with regard to what constitutes an interlocutory order.
An interlocutory order is one made before the final hearing on the merits. It requires something to be done or observed but does not determine the entire controversy. Bahar v. Tadros (1954), 234 Ind. 302, 123 N.E.2d 189.
In Smith v. Zumpfe (1940), 217 Ind. 431, 27 N.E.2d 878 an order for the sale of real estate had been made with the trial court reserving the jurisdiction to refuse to confirm a transfer made pursuant thereto. On motion to dismiss an appeal from that ruling this court held the order there was interlocutory and not final. The reason for the holding was the retention of the power in the court to deny validity to a resulting sale. The opinion goes on to note that it is the character of an order that determines its classification as final or interlocutory.
In Smith v. Zumpfe, supra, the case of Zumpfe v. Piccadilly Realty Company (1938), 214 Ind. 282, 13 N.E.2d 715 is distinguished. It was noted that in the latter holding a motion for an order to direct a trustee to sell assets of a trust was denied after a hearing. Such a denial, it was held, was properly regarded a final order in that the matter ruled upon was put to rest. The court had reserved no jurisdiction as to some feature of the subject ruled upon. It determined the controversy there in issue and denied the cross petition.
We need go no further to indicate that it is a putting to rest of an issue that renders it appealable as a final order. The question then becomes one of whether such action was taken in the present case. We find the appellant's words as used in their brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss as expressive as any:
(our emphasis)
Having made, as appellants concede, a final determination of the question of the ownership of the fee by means of the summary judgment, an appeal under the interlocutory procedure was improper. A motion to correct errors was the proper avenue to appellate review. TR. 59(G).
Appellants rely in part upon the fact that their challenge to the manner in which the land was sold has not been determined to support their position that the order below was interlocutory and not final. However, as expressed in Guthrie v. Blakely (1955), 234 Ind. 167, 125 N.E.2d 437
'* * * a judgment may be final and appealable even if it does not dispose of all the issues as to all the parties in the trial court, provided it disposes of 'a distinct and definite branch' of the litigation.' 234 Ind. at 170, 125 N.E.2d at 438.
In the case at hand the separate and distinct issue of who has the...
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City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron
...denial of its motion for summary judgment, pursuant to ch. 191, § 1, (1969) Ind.Acts Rule 72(b). See Richards v. Crown Point Community School Corp. (1971), 256 Ind. 347, 269 N.E.2d 5; Pitts v. Woolridge (1974), Ind.App., 315 N.E.2d The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial co......
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Will of Scheele, In re
...judgment is a final order. Carson v. City of Indianapolis (1982), Ind.App., 430 N.E.2d 788, 790 (citing Richards v. Crown Point Community School Corp. (1971) 256 Ind. 347, 269 N.E.2d 5). Relief from a summary judgment therefore is governed by T.R. 60(B)(2). As a final order, a party may be ......
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Thompson v. Thompson
...Court (1966), 248 Ind. 130, 224 N.E.2d 55; Von Behren v. Von Behren (1969), 252 Ind. 542, 251 N.E.2d 35; Richards v. Crown Point Community School Corp. (1971), Ind., 269 N.E.2d 5. A final judgment reserves no further question or direction for future determination. Seaney v. Ayres (1958), 23......
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Burks v. Bolerjack, 1181S318
...the parties. Coghill v. Badger, supra; Thompson v. Thompson, (1972) 259 Ind. 266, 286 N.E.2d 657; Richards v. Crown Point Community School Corp., (1971) 256 Ind. 347, 269 N.E.2d 5; Seaney v. Ayres, (1958) 238 Ind. 493, 151 N.E.2d 295. Consequently, under the plain meaning of Ind. Code § 34-......