Richards v. Ernest W. Trusler & Trusler, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. DA 14–0766.,DA 14–0766.
• Citation: 381 Mont. 357,360 P.3d 1126,2015 MT 314
• Parties: In re the Marriage of Vanessa S. RICHARDS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Ernest W. TRUSLER and Trusler, Inc., Respondents and Appellees.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

381 Mont. 357

360 P.3d 1126

2015 MT 314

In re the Marriage of Vanessa S. RICHARDS, Petitioner and Appellant,

v.Ernest W. TRUSLER and Trusler, Inc., Respondents and Appellees.

No. DA 14–0766.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 19, 2015.

Decided Nov. 5, 2015.

For Appellant: Stephen C. Mackey, Towe, Ball, Mackey, Sommerfeld & Turner, P.L.L.P., Billings, Montana.

For Appellee: Daniel Z. Rice, Avon Whitworth, Lucas & Tonn, P.C., Miles City, Montana.

Opinion

Justice PATRICIA COTTERdelivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In December 2011, Vanessa S. Richards petitioned to dissolve her marriage with Ernest W. Trusler. The couple began their relationship in July 1991, had three children between 1992 and 2000, and formally engaged in a marriage ceremony in May 2008. Prior to 2008, under various circumstances and on multiple occasions, the couple held themselves out as married beginning with the birth of their first child in 1992. On August 8, 2014, the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Powder River County, issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution, dissolving the marriage of the parties and dividing the marital property. Richards appeals the District Court's allocation of assets, arguing it was grossly disproportionate and inequitable. We reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Richards and Trusler began their relationship in July 1991, at ages 20 and 21 respectively. Eater that summer, Richards moved in with Trusler on his family's ranch property, Trusler Ranch, in Ashland, Montana. Richards was working at a local grocery store at the time and Trusler was a ranch hand for Trusler Ranch. In April 1992, the couple had their first child, son TR. TR was born severely disabled and required near constant, full-time care until his death at age 22 on August 12, 2014. Richards and Trusler agreed that TR's care would be provided by Richards. In 1999, Richards gave birth to a healthy daughter, and in 2000, a healthy son was born.

¶ 3 From 1991 until 2003, Trusler, Richards, and the children lived on the Ranch in a home owned by the family corporation, Trusler, Inc. William and Jacqueline Trusler, Trusler's parents, incorporated Trusler, Inc. and controlled the majority of the stock during this time. Trusler, Inc.'s assets include, among other things, real property, coal leases, cattle, equipment and machinery. At the time of dissolution, Trusler, Inc. was valued at $7.2 million.

¶ 4 Trusler became a minority stockholder in 1992, an officer of the corporation in 1994 and a member of the board of directors in 1996. He remains both an officer and a director. In addition to these managerial positions, since at least 1990 Trusler has worked, and continues to work, as a Ranch hand. He is paid a salary, provided corporate housing and utilities, an insured company vehicle, health insurance for himself and his family, an annual $6,000 Costco account, and other benefits that the family utilized throughout the parties' relationship.

¶ 5 In 2003, Richards and the children moved from the Ranch to Broadus, Montana, and in 2004, the couple bought a home in Broadus, which became the primary residence for Richards and the children. Trusler stayed in Broadus some of the time and Richards stayed on the Ranch some of the time. At both home locations, Richards spent her time maintaining the household and providing care for their special needs child and the two other children. Richards testified that she moved the children to Broadus primarily to escape Trusler's then-ongoing alcohol and drug abuse. When circumstances allowed, she cleaned and prepared ranch cabins and bunkhouses for work crews and hunters, cooked meals for work crews, and cleaned Trusler's mother's home. She performed these tasks at times without compensation and at other times for an hourly wage.

¶ 6 On December 16, 2011, Richards filed a petition for dissolution against Trusler claiming the marriage was irretrievably broken. By agreement of all parties, Trusler, Inc. was named as a party to the dissolution in a later amended petition based upon its co-ownership of Ranch property and corporate stock with Trusler.¹The parties stipulated to a Final Parenting Plan in May 2014 and neither the parenting plan nor child support is at issue in this appeal.

¶ 7 In Richards' original petition, her amended petition, and her proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, Richards consistently sought maintenance from Trusler based upon the lack of sufficient income or assets to provide for her reasonable support. The District Court conducted a bench trial in May and July 2014. In August 2014, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution. The court valued the marital estate at $2,100,666. The court awarded Richards assets totaling $115,844, an equalization payment of $100,000, and liabilities of $8,200, for a net award of $207,644. It awarded Trusler total assets of $1,984,822, and liabilities of $94,500, for a net award of $1,890,322.

¶ 8 In September 2014, Richards filed a motion to amend the court's findings and judgment and for a new trial. The District Court denied the motion on October 31, 2014.

¶ 9 Richards appeals the District Court's apportionment of the marital estate.

ISSUE

¶ 10 A restatement of the issue on appeal is: Did the District Court err and/or abuse its discretion in apportioning the marital estate?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 The distribution of marital property in a dissolution proceeding is governed by § 40–4–202, MCA, under which a trial court is vested with broad discretion to distribute the marital property in a manner that is equitable to both parties. In re Marriage of Lee,282 Mont. 410, 421, 938 P.2d 650, 657 (1997). When dividing marital property, the trial court must reach an equitable distribution, not necessarily an equal distribution. In re Marriage of Walls,278 Mont. 413, 416, 925 P.2d 483, 485 (1996); In re Marriage of Kostelnik,2015 MT 283, ¶ 18, 381 Mont. 182, 357 P.3d 912. The district court's apportionment of the marital estate will stand unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion as manifested by a substantially inequitable division of the marital assets resulting in substantial injustice. In re Marriage of Larson,234 Mont. 400, 402, 763 P.2d 1109, 1110(1988).

¶ 12 We also review a district court's findings of fact regarding division of marital property, child support, and maintenance awards to ascertain whether they are clearly erroneous. Patton v. Patton,2015 MT 7, ¶ 18, 378 Mont. 22, 340 P.3d 1242(internal citation omitted). We apply a three-part test to determine if a finding is clearly erroneous. First, the Court will review the record to see if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Second, if the findings are supported by substantial evidence we will determine if the trial court has misapprehended the effect of evidence. Third, if substantial evidence exists and the effect of the evidence has not been misapprehended the Court may still find that “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, a review of the record leaves the [C]ourt with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. DeSaye,250 Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287 (1991). If the findings are not clearly erroneous, we will affirm the distribution of property unless the trial court abused its discretion. Patton,¶ 19. The standard of review for an abuse of discretion in a dissolution proceeding is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In re Marriage of Engen,1998 MT 153, ¶ 26, 289 Mont. 299, 961 P.2d 738, overruled on other grounds byIn re Funk,2012 MT 14, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 Did the District Court err and/or abuse its discretion in apportioning the marital estate?

¶ 14 Richards argues on appeal that the District Court inequitably apportioned the marital estate. She requests that we vacate the court's order and remand for a new trial to determine an equitable apportionment. Trusler responds that the court's award is appropriate, that there is no injustice to Richards, and that Richards did not make substantial contributions to the Ranch business.

¶ 15 Section 40–4–202(1), MCA, provides:

In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, ... the court, without regard to marital misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal separation may, finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired and whether the title to the property and assets is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In making apportionment, the court shall consider the duration of the marriage and prior marriage of either party, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of value of the respective estates and the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit. In dividing property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, the increased value of property acquired prior to marriage, and property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation, the court shall consider those contributions of the other spouse to the marriage, including:

(a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker;

(b) the extent to which the contributions have facilitated the

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