Richards v. Izzi

Decision Date12 October 2001
Citation819 So.2d 25
PartiesJason RICHARDS and Jeffrey Terrell v. Richard IZZI. Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority et al. v. Richard Izzi et al.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

William J. Baxley, Joel E. Dillard, Charles A. Dauphin, and David McKnight of Baxley, Dillard, Dauphin & McKnight, Birmingham, for appellants Jason Richards and Jeffrey Terrell.

Roger L. Bates and E. Shane Black of Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellants Jefferson State Community College and University of Alabama System, for and on behalf of its campus, the University of Alabama in Birmingham.

Thomas L. Stewart and Leslie M. Klasing of Gorham & Waldrep, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority.

E. Clayton Lowe, Jr., Peter A. Grammas, and Wilson F. Green of Burr & Forman, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellees Richard Izzi and Robert B. Sanford, Jr., on behalf on themselves and the members of the class certified under Rule 23(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.

Jeffrey M. Sewell, asst. county atty., Birmingham, for appellee Jefferson County.

STUART, Justice.

These appeals arise out of litigation related to Jefferson County's occupational tax. The issue presented in case number 1000150, Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority v. Izzi, is whether Act No. 2000-215, Ala. Acts 2000, is unconstitutional under § 105, § 104, § 106, § 45, § 71, and/or § 73 of the Constitution of Alabama. The trial judge held that it was unconstitutional. The issue presented in case number 1992027, Richards v. Izzi, is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a motion to intervene filed by Jason Richards and Jeffery Terrell.1

We conclude that Act No. 2000-215 is unconstitutional under § 106 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, and we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Richards and Terrell's motion to intervene. We also find that the grounds asserted by Richards and Terrell as the basis for their motion to intervene are now moot. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Introduction

At issue in these appeals is the constitutionality of legislation enacted to replace Ala. Acts 1967, Act No. 406 (Reg.Session) (not codified), and Jefferson County Ordinance No. 1120. Pursuant to Act No. 406 and Ordinance No. 1120, Jefferson County has, since 1988, imposed an occupational tax on persons working in that county. However, under Act No. 406 and Ordinance No. 1120, attorneys and certain other professionals were exempt from paying the occupational tax. In 1992, a group of persons who have been subject to the occupational tax since its enactment in 1988 filed an action against Jefferson County, alleging that the exemptions allowed by Act No. 406 and Ordinance No. 1120 were unconstitutional, for various reasons. See Richards v. Jefferson County, (Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-92-3191).

The trial judge in Richards v. Jefferson County, Judge John E. Rochester, held that the exemptions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that Act No. 406 and Ordinance No. 1120 were thus unconstitutional. He enjoined Jefferson County from collecting the occupational tax from any taxpayers unless and until it began collecting the occupational tax from the formerly exempt taxpayers. By virtue of this order, Jefferson County began collecting the occupational tax from the formerly exempt professionals.

Various appeals were taken to this Court, and earlier this year, this Court reversed the judgment entered by Judge Rochester in Richards v. Jefferson County. See Jefferson County v. Richards, 805 So.2d 690 (Ala.2001). In that opinion, we upheld the exemptions in Act No. 406 and Ordinance No. 1120 against constitutional challenges.

In the 2000 Regular Session, the Legislature enacted Act No. 2000-215, which, among other things, purported to:

(1) repeal Act No. 406;

(2) eliminate the County's "piggyback" license-tax scheme;

(3) impose an "occupational tax" on all natural persons who receive compensation from any occupation or profession conducted within the county, regardless of whether those persons were also subject to the state's general licensing statutes;

(4) make appropriations of almost one-third of the money collected under Act No. 2000-215 to one state agency and nearly a hundred non-state agencies;

(5) require employers to calculate the proper amount of the occupational tax due; calculate their employees' deductions from the tax; withhold that amount in a form and manner different from the withholding requirements of the federal income tax; make the employer's failure to do so subject to criminal and civil penalties based upon the employees' delinquent tax;

(6) lower the rate of taxation; and

(7) extend the $10 million pledge made by the Jefferson County Commission to the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority, which was due to expire in 2008, an additional 30 years.

In March 2000, Richard Izzi and the other plaintiffs in case number 1000150, attorneys and other professionals licensed pursuant to the State's general licensing statutes who have historically been exempt from payment of Jefferson County's occupational tax, filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Act No. 2000-215. The plaintiffs asserted that Act No. 2000-215 was unconstitutional on numerous grounds. The plaintiffs also sought a refund of all occupational taxes collected pursuant to Act No. 2000-215. The case was assigned to Judge (now Justice) Thomas Woodall.

Jefferson County, although originally a defendant, was realigned as a plaintiff. Jefferson State Community College ("Jefferson State") and Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority ("BJCCA"), recipients of a substantial amount of the tax proceeds collected pursuant to Act No. 2000-215, filed a motion to intervene, in which they asserted that Act No. 2000-215 was constitutional. The plaintiffs' action was certified as a class action, maintainable under Rule 23(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.

Jason Richards and Jeffrey Terrell, the class representatives in Richards v. Jefferson County,2 filed a motion to intervene, asserting that Act No. 2000-215 was enacted as a direct response to the order issued in their favor by Judge Rochester in Richards v. Jefferson County. Richards and Terrell alleged that the Richards class thus had a vital and unrepresented interest in the outcome of Izzi v. Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority, i.e., in whether Act No. 2000-215 was declared unconstitutional. In their motion, Richards and Terrell asserted that they sought to intervene on behalf of the Richards class, for the purpose of retaining "every interest and benefit available to them in the Richards case, which is currently pending in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, and to prevent the diminishment in any respect of any relief or benefit or interest claimed by them therein." They sought intervention as of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., and permissive intervention, pursuant to Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Judge Woodall denied the motion to intervene; Richards and Terrell appeal. This appeal is case number 1992027.

The Izzi class action proceeded, and Judge Woodall entered an order declaring Act No. 2000-215 unconstitutional. Judge Woodall held that Act No. 2000-215 was a local law that imposed a privilege license tax upon all persons working in Jefferson County, including those persons subject to the State's general licensing statutes; Judge Woodall also held that Act No. 2000-215 directly conflicted with several general laws of this State, which provide that no license tax shall be paid to a county by those persons subject to the State's general licensing statutes. Thus, Judge Woodall concluded that Act No. 2000-215 violated § 105, art. IV, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Judge Woodall entered an order enjoining Jefferson County from enforcing or implementing Act No. 2000-215. BJCCA and Jefferson State appeal from this judgment; their appeal is case number 1000150.

Case Number 1000150

BJCCA and Jefferson State appeal Judge Woodall's order of September 7, 2000, in which he declared Alabama Act No. 2000-215 unconstitutional as violating § 105 of the Alabama Constitution. BJCCA and Jefferson State ask us to determine whether, under a de novo standard of review,3 Act No. 2000-215 is unconstitutional under any of the following sections of art. IV of the Alabama Constitution of 1901: § 105; § 104(9); § 104(15); § 106; § 45; § 71; or § 73. Because we conclude that the notice of proposed Act No. 2000-215 was inadequate, we conclude that Act No. 2000-215 violated § 106, art. IV, of the Alabama Constitution. Thus, although we conclude that Act No. 2000-215 is unconstitutional for a different reason than did Judge Woodall, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judge Woodall held that Act No. 2000-215 was a local law, which purported to repeal a general law of this State in violation of § 105 of the Alabama Constitution. In order to reach this conclusion, Judge Woodall was confronted with the thorny question whether a "license tax" is the equivalent, in all respects, of an "occupational tax." If it is, then Act No. 2000-215 was an attempt to repeal by a local law a general law of this State—a constitutionally prohibited event. However, if a license tax is not the same in all respects as an occupational tax, then Act No. 2000-215 did not necessarily attempt to repeal, modify, or vary the general licensing statutes of this State and, thus, did not run afoul of § 105 of the Alabama Constitution.

Judge Woodall concluded:

"The Alabama Legislature apparently interpreted Act No. 2000-215 to provide for a license tax. The published notice of the bill stated that the bill would levy `a license or privilege tax on the receipt of wages or earnings or other compensation by all natural persons from an occupation or profession conducted in
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