Richards v. Jarvis

• Decision Date: 25 June 1927
• Docket Number: 4779
• Citation: 44 Idaho 403,258 P. 370
• Parties: DON C. RICHARDS, Respondent, v. SAMUEL M. JARVIS, ELLEN F. JARVIS, THE LEMHI VALLEY BANK, a Corporation, E. W. PORTER, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Finance of the State of Idaho, and LLOYD ADAMS, in His Official Capacity as Liquidating Agent of the Department of Finance of the State of Idaho, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

258 P. 370

44 Idaho 403

DON C. RICHARDS, Respondent, v. SAMUEL M. JARVIS, ELLEN F. JARVIS, THE LEMHI VALLEY BANK, a Corporation, E. W. PORTER, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Finance of the State of Idaho, and LLOYD ADAMS, in His Official Capacity as Liquidating Agent of the Department of Finance of the State of Idaho, Appellants

No. 4779

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 25, 1927

APPEAL AND ERROR-LAW OF CASE ON REMAND-TRIAL-FINDING OF RENTAL VALUE UNAUTHORIZED-JUDGMENT-EQUITY SUIT-OFFSET OF PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT PERMISSIBLE.

1. The conclusions of the appellate court on first appeal, when it remanded the cause with directions to the trial court to amend its finding and judgment in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion on appeal, in other respects affirming the judgment, established the law of the case for the guidance of the trial court.

2. A finding of $1,200 rental value is unauthorized; the only evidence being the testimony of one that a reasonable rental value was $2,000, and of another that it was $2,800.

3. Court, in suit in equity, can permit defendant bank to offset the judgment in favor of plaintiff against it with the judgment in favor of defendant J. against plaintiff, where J had already received credit from the bank for an amount in excess of his judgment against plaintiff.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, for Lemhi County. Hon. Ralph W. Adair, Judge.

Defendants appeal from judgment entered after decision on former appeal directing district court to amend its findings and judgment in certain particulars stated. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Judgment affirmed. No costs allowed either of the parties on this appeal.

E. H Casterlin and Whitcomb & Cowen, for Appellants.

"A decision of the supreme court on appeal established the law of the case for the guidance of the trial court, and for the purpose of a subsequent appeal." (Gerber v. Nampa &amp Meridian Irr. Dist., 19 Idaho 765, 116 P. 104; 4 C. J. 1213, notes 83-86.)

"A decision by the appellate court upon a point distinctly made and essential to its determination upon a previous appeal is in all subsequent proceedings in the same case a final adjudication from the consequences of which the court cannot depart." (Hall v. Blackman, 9 Idaho 555, 75 P. 608; Ryan v. Rogers, 14 Idaho 309, 94 P. 427; Brinton v. Johnson, 41 Idaho 583, 240 P. 859.)

"On remand the trial court was without authority to modify the findings and judgment in any way, except as directed by the appellate court." (2 R. C. L. 289; Cowdery v. London & S. F. Bank, 139 Cal. 298, 96 Am. St. 115, 73 P. 196; Mountain Home Lbr. Co. v. Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 197 P. 1027; 4 C. J. 1221, secs. 3271 and 3272.)

Under the mandate of the supreme court, the trial court was without authority and exceeded his jurisdiction in permitting plaintiff to file a supplemental complaint, and granting what, in effect, amounted to a rehearing, (4 C. J. 3273 and 3274.)

The allegations in the supplemental complaint are insufficient to permit plaintiff to recover a specific trust fund. (Roncelli v. Fugazi, 44 Cal.App. 240, 186 P. 373.)

"In order that the suit might be regarded as one in equity to recover a specific trust fund, it was necessary for the plaintiff to have alleged that the identical trust property, or its substituted new form, was traceable into the estate of Fugazi, and thus into the possession of his representatives." (Mix v. Yoakum (Cal. App.), 248 P. 705.)

There are no allegations that the money was traced into the cash funds nor into any of the assets of the bank, and continuously remained there. (Board of Commissioners of Crawford Co. v. Strawn, 157 F. 49, 15 L. R. A., N. S., 1100; Shute v. Hinman, 34 Ore. 578, 56 P. 412, 58 P. 882, 47 L. R. A. 265.)

There is no allegation that the trust fund even came into the hands of the liquidating agent, or in any way increased or benefited the assets of the bank. (Burke v. Maguire, 154 Cal. 456, 98 P. 21.)

When fraud has been proven on the part of a trustee, a beneficiary must trace his fund without legal presumption, for fraud does not create equities superior to those of the general creditors. (Stilson v. First State Bank, 149 Iowa 662, 129 N.W. 70.)

L. E. Glennon, for Respondent.

"By the well-settled doctrines of equity, a constructive trust arises whenever one party has obtained money which does not equitably belong to him, and which he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it." (In re Northrup, 152 F. 763; Bank of Williston v. Alderman, 106 S.C. 386, 91 S.E. 296.)

Where property has been wrongfully appropriated or converted into a different from of property a constructive trust arises by operation of law for the benefit of the true owner. (Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., 4th ed., sec. 1051; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 372, 43 Eng. Reprint, 551; Bellevue State Bank v. Coffin, 22 Idaho 210, 125 P. 816.)

"The fact that improper procedure was followed to arrive at the correct result does not justify reversing the judgment." (Bowman v. Bohney, 36 Idaho 162, 210 P. 135.)

"Under contracts of sale the right to or accountability for rents and profits as between vendor and purchaser frequently depends so largely upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of other claims existing between the parties that it is difficult to lay down general rules upon the subject." (39 Cyc. 1628; Atchison Street R. Co. v. Chicago & W. R. Co., 162 Ill. 632, 44 N.E. 823, 35 L. R. A. 167; Williams v. Wilson, 4 Dana (Ky.), 507; Bartlett v. Blanton, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 426.)

It seems to be well settled that in an action at law the vendor is not entitled to recover rental. (Ankeny v. Clark, 148 U.S. 345, 13 S.Ct. 617, 37 L.Ed. 475.)

Another modification of the rule holding the purchaser for use and occupation has been made by some courts to the effect that, where he is not in default, the liability for rent does not begin to run until demand is made upon him for possession. (Kerns v. Dean, 77 Cal. 555, 19 P. 817; Hannan v. McNickle, 82 Cal. 122, 23 P. 272.)

BUDGE, J. Wm. E. Lee C. J., and Givens and T. Bailey Lee, JJ., concur, TAYLOR, J., Concuring Specially.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

This cause is here on appeal for the second time, and reported at 41 Idaho 237, 238 P. 887. Reference may be had to the former opinion for a complete statement of the facts and a determination of the issues there involved. The cause was remanded with directions to the trial court to amend its findings and judgment in accordance with the views expressed in the original opinion. In other respects the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. In the original opinion this court directed the trial court to amend its findings and judgment and enter judgment in favor of Richards against the Lemhi Valley Bank for the sum of $ 3,000; find the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the real and personal property during the period of use and occupation thereof by Richards, deducting from the amount so found interest on the $ 3,000, and add the difference to $ 1,040, allowed appellants Jarvis for personal property delivered to Richards but not returned, as judgment in favor of appellants Jarvis against Richards.

The conclusions of this court upon the first appeal established the law of the case for the guidance of the trial court and should have been followed. (Hall v. Blackman, 9 Idaho 555, 75 P. 608; Gerber v. Nampa etc. Irr. Dist., 19 Idaho 765, 116 P. 104; Mountain Home Lbr. Co. v. Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 197 P. 1027; Brinton v. Johnson, 41 Idaho 583, 240 P. 859.)

Upon the going down of the original opinion a further hearing was had, the parties stipulating that the Lemhi Valley Bank had become insolvent and was taken in charge by the commissioner of finance and a liquidating agent, and that said commissioner of finance and liquidating agent were necessary parties to the action. It was also stipulated that the entire record of the cause as furnished to this court on the first appeal, as well as all facts contained in the...