Richards v. Kailua Auto Mach. Service

• Citation: 880 P.2d 1233,10 Haw.App. 613
• Decision Date: 19 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 15957,15957
• Parties: Deborah L. RICHARDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KAILUA AUTO MACHINE SERVICE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Hawai'i

Page 1233

880 P.2d 1233

10 Haw.App. 613

Deborah L. RICHARDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KAILUA AUTO MACHINE SERVICE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15957.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.

Sept. 19, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1. On their faces District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rules 52(a) and (c) are similar to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 52(a) and manifestly, the purposes of findings of fact under the DCRCP and HRCP are the same. One purpose of requiring findings of fact is to aid the appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of the ground or basis of the decision of the trial court. Another purpose is to make definite just what is decided by the case in order to apply the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata in future cases. Finally, and possibly most important, the requirement that findings of fact be made is intended to evoke care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts.

2. While HRCP Rule 52(a) should be strictly followed, findings of fact by the circuit court are not jurisdictional and the appellate court may proceed where the record is clear and findings are unnecessary. It follows, then, that the appellate court may also waive the district court findings required under DCRCP Rules 52(a) and (c) where the record is clear and such findings are unnecessary to a determination of the issues on appeal.

3. The general rule in measuring damages is to give a sum of money to the person wronged which, as nearly as possible, will restore him or her to the position he or she would be in if the wrong had not been committed.

4. When personal property is damaged rather than destroyed, the traditional starting point in measuring damages is the depreciation rule, which gives the injured party the difference between the value of the chattel immediately before damage and the value immediately after, that is, the depreciation in value caused by the damage.

5. All of the different measures for damages to personal property are merely guides to common sense. The question in each case is ultimately a question of fully compensating the injured party. Thus, the various measures should be adjusted as required to meet the goal of compensation. It follows then that no mechanical rule can be applied with exactitude in the assessment of property damage and each case must rest on its own facts and circumstances as supported by the proof in the record.

6. When a judgment is modified or reversed, the notice of entry of judgment on appeal should specify whether interest is to run from the date of entry of the appellate judgment or from the date on which the judgment would have been entered in the lower court but for the erroneous ruling corrected on the appeal.

7. When the judgment is affirmed in part, the portion of the judgment that is affirmed accrues interest from the date the judgment was originally entered in the court below.

Howard J. Gravelle, Peterson & Gravelle, on the brief, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Melvin Y. Agena (Emlyn H. Higa, with him on the brief), Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HEEN, WATANABE and ACOBA, JJ.

ACOBA, Judge.

On January 2, 1991, the Plaintiff Deborah L. Richards (hereafter Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Kailua Auto Machine Service (hereafter Defendant) for damages to her 1984 Pontiac Fiero automobile (hereafter vehicle) allegedly caused by Defendant's negligent repair of her vehicle in January 1990. Plaintiff's complaint also claimed breach of contract and of warranties based upon the same allegations.

Defendant entered a "general denial" on January 17, 1991.

Trial before the district court began on April 25, 1991. At trial, the following evidence was adduced, and Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were received in evidence. On January 25, 1990, the vehicle stalled. This occurred after Defendant's work on Plaintiff's vehicle. Mileage on the vehicle was 56,000 miles. It was towed at a cost of $31.20 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) to Mike Salta Pontiac (hereafter MSP). A mechanic at MSP indicated that a metal nut had passed through the carburetor into the vehicle's number three cylinder. The cost of the mechanic's examination was $170.83 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). Plaintiff removed the nut from the engine. ¹ She purchased a General Motors engine which was supposed to be "compatible" with her vehicle at a cost of $624.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). When her friends were unable to install the engine for her, Plaintiff had the vehicle towed to MSP. The cost of towing the vehicle back to MSP and for its inspection was $153.64 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). Apparently, MSP's quoted cost to install the new engine was not satisfactory and the Plaintiff took the vehicle to Bob Sato's Auto Repair Shop (hereafter BSARS). It was in the shop "for approximately three weeks." The cost of BSARS's repair work was $671.30 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Of the $671.30, $69.70 was attributable to a battery, $128.46 was attributable to a catalytic convertor, and $12.01 was attributable to a rear brake spring.

Plaintiff obtained the car from BSARS in July 1990. Plaintiff testified that even with the repairs, the vehicle "did not run smoothly[,] ... [took] a full minute [to warm up,] ... and had a problem with ... overheating." In January 1991, she traded it in for another automobile and "received a thousand dollars" on the trade-in.

Plaintiff claimed loss of the vehicle's use for seven months. She used a taxicab "at a minimum of twice a week" and the bus. The taxi fare was "approximately $5 each way" for "20-22 weeks."

James M. Campbell, a consulting engineer, was Plaintiff's expert witness. He examined the parts involved and testified that the nut caused the engine's cylinder wall to crack. The expert testified that the engine could be repaired. He stated that "it depends on whether the owner ... would accept the types of repair that's [sic] possible. It's possible to repair it if you want to spend the money to do it."

Plaintiff offered Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 into evidence, papers from the "blue book," "to show the loss of value ... to establish some link between the blue book value and the trade-in value...." However, an objection to this exhibit was sustained. No cross-appeal was filed by Plaintiff on this ruling.

Bob Crivello, Defendant's owner who worked on the vehicle, testified that his work did not result in the nut entering the cylinder. On January 14, 1990, Defendant billed Plaintiff $60 for the tune-up, troubleshooting, and rear brake work and $60 for a "previous bill," for a total of $120.

In her post-trial memorandum filed August 22, 1991, Plaintiff requested a judgment "in Plaintiff's favor against Defendant in the amount of $11,310.00." Plaintiff claimed that $9,400 was for the difference in the purchase price of the vehicle ($10,400) and the resale price of the vehicle after it was damaged ($1,000). "Out-of-pocket expenses" totaled $1,710.97. Plaintiff asserted that this amount was "supported by exhibits introduced at trial," but never specified which exhibits provided such support, nor indicated how the sum of $1,710.97 was calculated. Lastly, Plaintiff claimed $220 for taxi fees incurred as a result of the loss of the vehicle's use.

The district court entered its judgment on January 30, 1992 for $5,000 on the "amount claimed by Plaintiff" only. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were not filed by the court. Interest and costs were not awarded.

I.

On appeal, Defendant does not contest its liability. Its sole contention is that there is "no evidence in this case to support a damage award in excess of $1,840.80." The $1,840.80 sum consists of the amounts represented by Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7, $461.13 based on Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, and an allowance of "$400 for taxi charges at $20.00 per week for ... twenty weeks." The $671.30 reflected on Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 was reduced by "$210.17 ... for parts unrelated to engine damage," thus leaving the balance of $461.13 agreed to by the Defendant.

Defendant conceded the expenditure for taxi fees was $400. Moreover, Plaintiff's testimony at trial was that she took the taxi "twice a week to and from work. That was approximately five dollars each way.... For seven months. 20 to 22 weeks." Based on this testimony, Plaintiff's expenditure would actually amount to between $400 and $440 rather than the $220 claimed by Plaintiff's counsel. As Defendant concedes to $400 and this amount is greater than the amount Plaintiff requested in her post-trial memorandum, $400 is acceptable for taxi costs.

But aside from conceding damages in the amount of $1,840.80, Defendant specifically argues that "the record is devoid of any evidence of loss of value" of the vehicle.

Plaintiff's only response on appeal is that Defendant failed to include all of the evidence below in the record on appeal because the "transcript of [Plaintiff's] testimony on the first day of trial was incomplete[,]" specifically that the testimony of Plaintiff that "she purchased her car for $10,400" was not recorded. Plaintiff relies on the statement in Union Bldg. Materials Corp. v. The Kakaako Corp., 5 Haw.App. 146, 151-52, 682 P.2d 82 87, reconsideration granted, 5 Haw.App. 683, 753 P.2d 253 (1984), that the defendant having failed to "include in the record all of the evidence on which the lower court might have based its findings[,] ... the lower court must be affirmed." However, the lower court here did not make any "findings."

In any event, in its reply brief, Defendant, relying on City & County of Honolulu v. Toyama, 61 Haw. 156, 158 n. 1, 598 P.2d 168, 170-171 n. 1 (1979), maintains that "a party must either ... [provide] ... an adequate record, or concede the disputed point in its briefs or at oral argument." Consequently, it concedes that "[e]vidence at trial showed that [Plaintiff] purchased her car in 1984 for $10,400.00." Defendant having conceded that there was evidence Pla...