Richards v. Sandusky Community Schools

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: Duggan
• Citation: Richards v. Sandusky Community Schools, 102 F.Supp.2d 753 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
• Decision Date: 18 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-CV-73757-DT.,99-CV-73757-DT.
• Parties: Barbara RICHARDS, Plaintiff, v. SANDUSKY COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, and James R. Nolan, Superintendent, Defendants.

102 F.Supp.2d 753

Barbara RICHARDS, Plaintiff, v. SANDUSKY COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, and James R. Nolan, Superintendent, Defendants.

No. 99-CV-73757-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

May 18, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Peter J. Kelley, Kelley & Cramer, Ann Arbor, MI, Stephen R. Estey, Cox, Hodgman, Troy, MI, Jean M. Rosella, Ann Arbor, MI, Peter J. Osetek, Ann Arbor, MI, for plaintiff.

Timothy J. Mullins, Stephen R. Estey, Cox, Hodgman, Troy, MI, for defendants.

OPINION

DUGGAN, District Judge.

On July 29, 1999, plaintiff Barbara Richards filed a three-count complaint against defendants, Sandusky Community Schools and its superintendent James R. Nolan, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon her First Amendment right to communicate violations of health and safety laws (Count I), violation of Michigan's Whistleblower Act (Count II), and defamation (Count III). This matter is currently before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Oral argument regarding defendants' motion was heard on May 11, 2000. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted.

Background

Plaintiff began working for defendant Sandusky Community Schools as a substitute bus driver on January 27, 1997, and was subsequently hired as a full-time bus driver on November 21, 1997. During the 1998-1999 school year, Tonya, a severely mentally impaired child, was assigned to plaintiff's bus. In conformance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq., an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") was developed for Tonya, under which Tonya was to ride a standard school bus with children in grades K-12. According to defendants, the IEP could not be changed without an additional evaluation by the Individual Evaluation Plan Committee ("IEPC").

Toward the end of January 1999, plaintiff began complaining that Tonya was "spitting" at her and the other children on the school bus. On January 27, 1999, plaintiff filed a "Bus Communication Report," indicating that Tonya had "spit right in [her] face" and that Tonya had been spitting on the bus for the last week. (Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 2). In response to plaintiff's report, the transportation supervisor, Sally Peterson, requested that an IEPC be held to determine whether Tonya should remain on a standard bus. (Id.). In her response, Peterson noted that "neither Barb or I feel [Tonya] should be transported on a Sandusky bus, we are not equip[p]ed to handle her." (Id.).

On the same day, defendant Nolan, who was out of town at the time, was notified by his secretary that plaintiff's husband had contacted his office regarding Tonya's behavior and "claiming that Tonya posed a health threat to the community." (Nolan Aff. at ¶ 6). Defendant Nolan then contacted plaintiff, who explained that she was concerned about Tonya's spitting on the bus. (Id. at ¶ 7). Defendant Nolan set up an IEPC meeting for February 3, 1999, to determine whether Tonya should remain on plaintiff's bus and whether Tonya posed any health threat to plaintiff or the other children on the bus.

At the IEPC meeting on February 3, which plaintiff herself attended, it was determined that Tonya posed no health risk to plaintiff or the other children and that no change in her transportation was necessary. (Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. H). On February 4, 1999, plaintiff submitted a "Bus Communication Report," dated February 1, 1999, complaining that "Tonya was spitting on the bus again this morning."¹ (Id., Ex. F).

To relieve plaintiff's concerns, defendant Nolan purchased baby wipes and other sanitization products for plaintiff to keep on her bus. Furthermore, on February 9, 1999, defendant Nolan received a letter from Tonya's physician indicating that Tonya did not have any communicable diseases and did not pose a health threat to plaintiff or the other children on the bus. (Id., Ex. B). Defendant Nolan gave this letter to plaintiff and her union representative.

After the IEPC meeting, plaintiff's husband began calling and writing defendant Nolan, requesting information regarding school policy. Plaintiff's husband also contacted the parents of other students who rode the bus with Tonya. Several of the parents then contacted the school regarding the husband's phone calls. According to some of these reports, plaintiff's husband told them that diseases, such as Hepatitis B and Aids, could be spread when Tonya spit.² (Id., Ex. I). According to one report, filed by one of the parents who happened to be a transport supervisor, when asked where he got their name and number, plaintiff's husband explained "that he had the bus list with names and numbers." (Id.).

Tonya's parents eventually filed a Title IX grievance with the school. In their grievance, Tonya's parents alleged that Tonya had been discriminated against by plaintiff's husband calling other parents and telling them that their children could catch a disease, by plaintiff failing to follow Tonya's IEP, and by plaintiff showing a total disregard for Tonya's handicap. (Id., Ex. J).

Defendant Nolan then met with plaintiff, her union representative, and the transportation director regarding plaintiff's conduct. According to defendants, "[p]laintiff did not deny that the telephone calls were made and that her husband was given access to confidential information." (Id. at 7). On February 18, 1999, plaintiff was suspended from work for three days for releasing, to her husband, the names and telephone numbers of the students that rode her bus, and a disciplinary letter was placed in her file.³ (Id., Ex. K). Plaintiff never contested her suspension, nor did plaintiff ever file a grievance with the union regarding the above incidents.

On March 8, 1999, plaintiff was assigned to another bus route. Plaintiff admits that the transfer was not a demotion and resulted in no reduction in pay; however, plaintiff asserts that her new bus route was less desirable because there were "difficult" children on her new route, and "because [she] really liked [her] route." (Richards Dep. at 100).

On March 29, 1999, plaintiff resigned from her position. Plaintiff's resignation letter stated the following:

As you know our family will be moving to Cadillac Michigan on April 10, 1999. Please consider this letter as my two week notice making my last day of work April 9, 1999. It has been a pleasure to work with you and the Sandusky Public School system. I remain,

      Sincerely Yours
                      /s/
                      Barbara A. Richards
                

(Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A).

On April 26, 1999, defendant Nolan received a request for verification regarding plaintiff's employment and an inquiry regarding her professional conduct from the Manton School District, where plaintiff applied for a job as a bus driver. Accompanying the request was an authorization for release signed by plaintiff. (Id., Ex. M). When responding to the request, defendant Nolan checked the line that stated "[h]as had unprofessional conduct while employed with our company." (Id.). Defendant Nolan also provided the Manton School District with a copy of plaintiff's disciplinary letter. (Nolan Aff. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff did not receive the bus driver position with the Manton School District. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant law suit against defendants.

Discussion

Defendants have filed a motion for summary. On a motion for summary judgment, the underlying facts "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); accord Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Therefore, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party has sustained his burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. The nonmoving party, however, "is required to do more than simply show that there is some `metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356). The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). "[T]here must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving] party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

1. § 1983 Claim

Plaintiff asserts that defendants have retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment right of freedom of speech in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must prove that "1) [s]he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) the deprivation was caused by someone acting under color of state law." Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir.2000). "[R]etaliation by a government employer against an individual who exercises his First Amendment rights constitutes a First Amendment violation." Id. at 604 (citing Zilich v. Longo, 34 F.3d 359, 365 (6th Cir.1994)). "This is the case even if the employee could have been terminated for any reason." Id. (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987)).

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must prove that "`(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would...