Richards v. School Dist. of City of Birmingham

Decision Date03 June 1957
Docket NumberNo. 64,64
PartiesMaurice RICHARDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Martin & Martin, Saginaw, Cole, Mead & Wilson, Ferndale, for plaintiff and appellant.

Howlett, Hartman & Beier, Pontiac, for defendant and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench, except BOYLES, J.

CARR, Justice.

Plaintiff herein is, and for a number of years past has been, a practicing dentist in the City of Royal Oak. On November 25, 1948, which was Thanksgiving Day, he attended a football game between teams representing the high schools of Royal Oak and Birmingham, the game being played on the athletic field of the latter district. In preparation for the game said defendant had leased from a copartnership doing business as the Atlas Portable Bleacher Company several bleachers to be used at the game in conjunction with other bleachers previously erected. At the time in question the athletic field was surrounded by a fence, with ticket offices on the west side and at the southeast. Plaintiff, and friends who accompanied him, procured tickets shortly before the scheduled time for the game and entered the field. They took their places on one of the leased Atlas bleachers which was located on the east side of the field at or in proximity to the north 30-yard line, if extended, of the playing field.

A few minutes before the starting of the game the bleacher on which plaintiff was seated, with other bleachers adjacent thereto, collapsed, as a consequence of which plaintiff sustained serious physical injuries. This action was instituted against the Birmingham School District and the copartners doing business as the Atlas Bleacher Company, George B. Post and Georgiana Stringham, to recover damages. The declaration filed charged that the copartners were guilty of negligence in that the bleachers which they rented to the school district were improperly and negligently constructed. It was further alleged that the district, which by the leasing contract had assumed responsibility for the erection of the bleachers, was negligent in so doing in that due care was not exercised in the process. It was plaintiff's theory as evidenced by his pleadings and proofs that the injuries sustained by him were the proximate result of the concurrent negligence of the defendants.

A motion to dismiss the declaration was made by defendant school district on the ground that under the facts alleged in the pleading there was no liability on its part. The other defendants presented a motion of like character, claiming that there was a misjoinder of parties. Both motions were denied, but without prejudice. Defendants filed answers to plaintiff's declaration, denying liability, and the parties proceeded to trial before a jury. In support of his claims as set forth in the declaration, proofs were offered on behalf of plaintiff with reference to the construction of the so-called Atlas bleachers and the manner in which they were erected by the school district. Witnesses, including plaintiff, testified as to the condition of the ground beneath said bleachers, indicating that it was wet, possibly to the extent of being muddy, at the time of the game, and that proper planking or other base support was not placed beneath the bleachers in order to prevent tilting. A mechanical engineer, called as an expert, gave testimony with reference to the construction of the Atlas bleachers, with particular reference to the ability thereof to withstand strees and strain, and the possible results of improper erection. Proofs were also introduced as to the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries.

After plaintiff had rested his case defendants moved for directed verdicts. The record indicates that said motions were based, at least in part, on the same grounds as were the previous motions that were denied without prejudice. Said motions for directed verdicts were taken under advisements by the trial judge, whereupon defendants proceeded with their proofs. Several witnesses testified, in substance, that to the north of the Atlas bleachers, on one of which plaintiff was seated, were other bleachers referred to in the record as 'Leavitt bleachers', that the trouble originated in the latter bleachers, which collapsed toward the south causing the Atlas bleachers to likewise collapse. The movement was compared by one witness to a 'slow motion' picture, and by others likened to a row of dominoes falling in succession. It was also described as a 'wave', progressing toward the south.

A detailed discussion of the testimony given by each witness would serve no useful purpose. It was the theory and claim of the defendant school district that the collapse of the bleacher on which plaintiff was seated, and his consequent injuries, resulted directly from the failure of the Leavitt bleachers. Testimony was further introduced that the people on the bleachers, particularly on the Leavitt bleachers, started a rhythmic moving or swaying in keeping with calisthenics in which the players on one of the football teams were engaged, and that this movement resulted in the collapse of said bleachers.

In submitting the case to the jury the trial judge carefully set forth in detail the claims of the parties with reference to the reasons for the occurrence in which plaintiff suffered his injuries. The term 'proximate cause' was defined and explained. The jury was told that:

'It is the plaintiff's claim in this case that the proximate cause of his injury was lack of ordinary care on the part of the agents of the Birmingham School District either in the erection of the Atlas Bleacher on which the plaintiff was sitting or in the inspection or in both such erection and inspection. Thus, if you should find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the bleacher on which Doctor Richards was sitting went down not because of faulty erection or inspection but because of a lateral force applied to it from the side by the falling of other adjoining bleachers which in turn were forced down by the failure of an entirely different make of bleacher, to-wit, a Leavitt Bleacher, then the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury would not be the negligence claimed by the plaintiff in the its declaration and your verdict would be one of 'no cause for action.'

At the request of defendant school district the following special question was submitted with questions, not material at this time, presented by the other defendants:

'Do you find that the proximate cause of the fall of the bleacher section in which Dr. Richards, the Plaintiff, was sitting was a sideward thrust or lateral force applied thereto by a sideward movement of the adjoining bleacher sections, which sideward thrust or lateral force resulted from a sideward movement of one or more Leavitt Bleacher sections at the north end of the east side of the football field?'

The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $45,000 against the defendant school district, finding that the other defendants were not liable. The special question above quoted was answered in the affirmative. Thereupon defendant school district moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming, 1st, that the answer to the special question was inconsistent with the general verdict; 2nd, that the verdict in plaintiff's favor was based on speculation and conjecture; and, 3rd, that the School District of the City of Birmingham, as a quasi municipal corporation, was immune from liability. The trial court concluded that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case by his proofs, and that the 2nd reason urged in support of the motion was not well-founded, but that the defendant district was entitled to judgment on the basis of the 1st and 3rd reasons advanced, that is, inconsistency between the answer to the special question and the general verdict and immunity from liability for damages under the facts in the case. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant district. From such judgment plaintiff had appealed.

The submission of special questions to a jury in the trial of cases of the character here involved is provided for by C.L.1948, § 618.39 (Stat.Ann. § 27.1019), which reads as follows:

'In all cases where an issue of facts is tried before any court of record, the court shall at the request in writing, of the counsel of either party, instruct the jury if they return a general verdict, also to find upon particular questions of facts, respecting which the issue is joined, to be stated in writing, and shall direct a written finding thereon: Provided, Such special questions shall not exceed 5 in number, and shall be each in single, short sentences, readily answered by yes or no. The special verdict, or finding, shall be filed with the clerk, and entered upon the minutes, and when any special finding of facts shall be inconsistent with a general verdict, the former shall control the latter, and the court give judgment accordingly.'

The object sought to be attained by the section quoted was stated in Mitchell v. Perkins, 334 Mich. 192, 206, 54 N.W.2d 293, 297, as follows:

'The purpose of special questions is to enable the court to learn what view the jury takes of the material issues and their ability to make correct inferences from existing facts. See Cole v. Boyd, 47 Mich. 98, 10 N.W. 124; Durfee v. Abbott, 50 Mich. 479, 15 N.W. 559; and Hartley v. A. I. Rodd Lumber Co., 282 Mich. 652, 276 N.W. 712.'

The language of the statute is clear and specific as to the effect to be given by an answer to a proper special question when such answer is at variance with the general verdict returned. As indicated in the above quotation from the Mitchell Case, the procedure furnishes a method by which the trial court may determine whether the verdict has been properly reached in accordance with the facts as found from the testimony. The scope of the...

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