Richards v. Siddoway

• Decision Date: 11 June 1970
• Docket Number: No. 11800,11800
• Citation: 24 Utah 2d 314,471 P.2d 143
• Parties: d 314 Elaine Siddoway RICHARDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Henry Ralph SIDDOWAY, Mary Siddoway and Ben Morrison, Defendants andRespondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 143

471 P.2d 143

24 Utah 2d 314

Elaine Siddoway RICHARDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Henry Ralph SIDDOWAY, Mary Siddoway and Ben Morrison Defendants andRespondents.

No. 11800.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 11, 1970.

William G. Gibbs, of Clyde, Mecham & Pratt, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Hugh W. Colton, of Colton & Hammond, Vernal, for respondents.

ELLETT, Justice.

This is an action to determine ownership of 20 acres of land. The plaintiff, appellant, hereafter referred to as Elaine, claims title by reason of a judgment rendered March 3, 1959, whith awarded her the fee after a life estate in her father, now deceased. That decree resulted from a stipulation signed by seven of the eight children ¹ of one William H. Siddoway, deceased, not all of whom were involved in a lawsuit for the partition of the land of inheritance. That suit was numbered 3652 and hereafter will be referred to by that number.

The stipulation provided that the four male children would take the range land as tenants in common, three of them to receive the fee, the fourth--father of Elaine--would take a life estate with remainder over to Elaine, who was his only child.

There was an 80-acre tract of land known as the McCarrell place, which according to the stipulation was to be decreed 'as the interests may appear in the male heirs.' ² There was a considerable amount of other property involved in the stipulation. The decree of the court gave to Elaine's father only a life estate in all of the realty with remainder over in fee to Elaine.

The decree was filed in the office of the county recorder on May 27, 1959, and thereafter all the world was put on notice that the father had only a life estate in the land. ³ Subsequently, on September 1, 1959, the decree was amended to correct a description in the 20 acres apportioned to Elaine's father.

On January 8, 1961, Elaine's father and her stepmother gave the land in question to Ben Morrison for a debt owing to him, and on January 19, 1962, her father died. This action was commenced September 16, 1963. A default judgment was granted and then set aside, and finally an amended answer was filed on December 31, 1968, wherein the defendants claimed that the judgment in case No. 3652 contained a clerical error in that the decree should have given the fee to Elaine's father. At the same time, a motion in this matter was made to correct the so-called clerical error in the other case.

The trial court herein granted the motion to amend the judgment in case No. 3652 under the assumption that he was correcting a clerical error, and by doing so he deprived Elaine of the fee to the 20 acres of land involved in this case, and the only issue before us on this appeal is one of law, to wit: Is the order purporting to reform the judgment in case 3652 valid?

Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provides as follows:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) * * * (3) * * * (4) * * * (5) * * * (6) * * * (7) * * * The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. * * * This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

This rule was based upon Section 104--14--4, U.C.A.1943, reading:

The court may, * * * upon such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; and when, for any reason satisfactory to the court or the judge thereof, the party aggrieved has failed to apply for a new trial or other relief sought during the term at which such judgment, order or proceeding complained of was taken, the court, or judge thereof in vacation, may grant the relief upon application made within a reasonable time, not exceeding ninety days after the making or occurrence of the judgment, order or other proceeding sought to be relieved from. * * *

Prior to 1939 the reasonable time was stated to be not exceeding six months. Since 1939 under both the statute and the Rules of Civil Procedure, one wishing to amend a judgment valid upon its face must move to do so within three months except for correction of clerical errors. The general rule is found in 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 238:

After expiration of the term at which it was rendered, or of the statutory period of limitation, in cases governed by statute, a judgments is no longer open to any amendment, revision, modification, or correction which involves the exercise of the judgment or discretion of the court on the merits or on matters of substance. The only amendment then permissible is one which is intended to make the judgment speak the truth by showing what the judicial action really was, and not one which corrects judicial errors or remedies the effects of judicial nonaction; the court has no power at such time to revise and amend a judgment by correcting judicial errors, and making it express something which the court did not pronounce, and did not intend to pronounce, in the first instance. Judicial errors in judgments are to be corrected by appeal or writ of error, or by certiorari, or by awarding a new trial, or by any means specially provided by statute, and not by amendment, unless the statute permits such amendment.

The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 202.

In case No. 3652 the court may have erred in giving Elaine the remainder of the land in question, but there was no clerical error involved. It resulted from the failure of the judge to follow the written agreement signed by seven of the eight heirs of William H. Siddoway but not by Elaine, although she was a party to the partition suit wherein the judgment was rendered. Only Elaine and her father knew whether the decree entered by the court was according to their wishes and intentions. Neither of them ever appealed, and the judgment became final some nine years before an answer was filed in the instant matter. The record does not show that the judgment did not follow the findings of fact. Such an error must be corrected by a timely motion for a new trial, by timely appealing the matter, or by an independent action wherein all of the parties to the original proceeding are made parties to a new suit in equity.

The question posed on this appeal has been answered several times by this court. In the early case of Elliott v. Bastian, 11 Utah 452, 40 P. 713 (1895), a judgment of no cause of action was taken against a deceased plaintiff. Since the death of the party did not appear of record, this court held that the judgment was not void. Substituted plaintiffs moved to set aside and vacate the judgment after the six months' period had run. The trial court denied the motion, and in affirming the ruling this court said:

'* * * And it is clear that the reasonable time mentioned is the six-months limit prescribed by the statute. 'The time within which such an order could be vacated must be held to be limited by section 473. * * * The court had no jurisdiction after the expiration of six months to vacate the order made on a mere motion for that purpose, the order not being void on its face.' Moore v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. (495) 496, 25 P. 22. We are of the opinion that the lower court has no authority to vacate the judgment rendered in this case upon the application made. * * *

Another case in point is Benson v. Anderson, 14 Utah 334, 47 P. 142 (1896). Here a judgment was entered December 15, 1894. More than six months later (July 8, 1895) the defendants moved to amend the judgment by striking therefrom the provision that costs be rendered against them. The court on December 9, 1895, granted the motion. On January 21, 1896, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order of December 9, 1895. This motion was granted, and the order purporting to amend the judgment was set aside. The defendants appealed from the last order. In affirming the ruling striking the amendment, this court said:

The term of the court at which the final decree adjudging the costs against the defendants was made had expired months before the motion to strike out was made. In fact, another term intervened. It was not a void decree,--merely a decree in form,--nor was it a decree pro confesso, or by...