Richards v. Stark Cnty.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1899
• Citation: 8 N.D. 392,79 N.W. 863
• Parties: RICHARDS v. STARK COUNTY.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

8 N.D. 392

79 N.W. 863

RICHARDS

v.STARK COUNTY.¹

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

May 18, 1899.

Syllabus by the Court.

Chapter 25, Laws 1895, is entitled “An act to increase the revenues of the state by changing and increasing the boundaries of the counties of Billings, Stark and Mercer.” The body of the act simply increases the boundaries of such counties. Held, that the act is unconstitutional, because the subject of the act is not expressed in the title, as required by section 61 of the constitution of this state.

Appeal from district court, Stark county; W. H. Winchester, Judge.

Action by Wilson L. Richards against Stark county. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.John Burke and Burke Corbet, for appellant. L. A. Simpson, for respondent.

BARTHOLOMEW, C. J.

Plaintiff brought this action against Stark county to procure by a civil action relief formerly recoverable by information in the nature of quo warranto. There was a general demurrer to the complaint, under which, of course, no question as to parties plaintiff or form of action could be raised. The demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff appeals from the order. It is conceded that the case turns exclusively upon the constitutionality of chapter 25, Laws 1895. Plaintiff brings this action upon the theory that such act is unconstitutional. If he is in error, he must fail. The act is attacked as violating a number of the provisions of the constitution, but we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of section 61, which reads: “No bill shall embrace more than one subject. which shall be expressed in its title, but a bill which violates this provision shall be invalidated thereby only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.” This section has on three different occasions been brought directly before this court. The first case was State v. Woodmansee, 1 N. D. 246, 46 N. W. 970, in which we held that an act entitled “An act to provide for the organization and government of state banks” might properly include a provision providing a punishment for doing a banking business in this state contrary to the provisions of the act. In that case we recognized and indorsed the principle that this constitutional provision must receive a reasonable and liberal construction, and that it was never intended to impede or embarrass legislation, and that provisions for the enforcement of an act are germane to the act itself. The second case was State v. Haas, 2 N. D. 202, 50 N. W. 254, which was an attack upon what is known as the “Prohibition Law.” It was urged that both the act and the title embraced two subjects,-first, the penalties for the unlawful sale, etc., of intoxicating liquors; and, second, the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors for medicinal and other purposes. We held that the one subject was the regulation of the liquor traffic, that this was done by prohibiting in part and restricting in part, that all regulation of the traffic was to some extent prohibitory, and that the extent of the prohibition did not affect the regulating character of the act. The third case was State v. Nomland, 3 N. D. 427, 57 N. W. 85. In that case we held the act unconstitutional on the ground that the subject of the act was not expressed in the title. But in that case, as in the preceding cases, the court recognized to the fullest extent the necessity for a liberal construction of this particular provision, and recognized the fact that it is never necessary that the instrumentalities by or through which the object of an act is to be accomplished should be expressed in the title, and that it was sufficient if the real subject of the act was expressed even in the most general terms in the title. But in this last case the court held that where the title to the act simply provided for the creation of an instrumentality, and in no manner mentioned the subject upon which, by the body of the act, that instrumentality was to act for the accomplishment of a certain purpose, the defect was fatal, and the act unconstitutional, not because it embraced more than one subject, but because the real subject was not expressed in the title. A reading of the provision discloses that it may be violated in two ways: First. The act must not embrace more than one subject. If it embrace two subjects, and both are fully expressed in the title, still the provision is clearly violated. Black, Const. Law, 288; Cooley, Const. Law, 178. Second. If it embraces but one subject, and that subject be not expressed in the title, the provision is equally violated. This is the clear language of the provision. “But if the act relates to one subject-matter, which is properly expressed in the title, and also embraces provisions not related to such subject, which are not mentioned in the title, then the foreign or unrelated matters will be separated from the rest of the statute, if possible, and rejected, while the main body of the act will be sustained.” People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Cooley, Const. Law, 148. We have already seen that the means and instrumentalities by which the purposes of an act are to be accomplished need never be expressed in the title. If the subject be expressed, that is sufficient. Adding the means or instrumentalities neither adds to nor detracts from its sufficiency. Black, Const. Law, 287; Cooley, Const. Law, 170.

With this statement of general principles. we may proceed with an examination of the statute in question. It is entitled “An act to...