Richards v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COBB
• Citation: Richards v. State, 114 Ga. 834, 40 S.E. 1001 (Ga. 1902)
• Decision Date: 11 March 1902
• Parties: RICHARDS v. STATE.

40 S.E. 1001

114 Ga. 834

RICHARDS

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 11, 1902.

CRIMINAL LAW—INSTRUCTIONS—HOMICIDE-EVIDENCE.

1. While the judge is not required to charge upon a theory of defense resting solely on the statement of the accused in the absence of an appropriate written request to that effect, still, when the judge, of his own motion, undertakesto so charge, the instruction given must be correct law, and applicable to the theory of the defense set up in the statement.

2. When the statement of the accused in a trial for murder required a finding against him of the higher grade of involuntary manslaughter, a charge that the accused relied on the defense of misfortune or accident was erroneous; and, unless the charge as a whole had the effect of an instruction to acquit the accused if the jury believed the statement, such an error required the granting of a new trial when the accused was convicted of murder.

3. The charge of the judge in the present case did not have the effect of an instruction of the character referred to in the preceding note, and therefore the error in the charge requires a reversal of the judgment refusing a new trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Chatham county; P. E. Seabrook, Judge.

Sherman Richards was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed.

John E. Myrick and Raiford Falligant, for plaintiff in error.

W. W. Osborne, Sol. Gen., and J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., for the State.

COBB, J. The accused was placed on trial, charged with the murder of his concubine, and was convicted and sentenced to be hanged. He assigns error upon the refusal of the court to grant him a new trial.

The evidence for the state authorized a conviction of murder. The evidence for the accused possibly authorized a verdict of acquittal on the ground that the killing was the result of accident or misfortune. The statement of the accused demanded a verdict finding him guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act. After having carefully read the statement of the accused more than once, we are satisfied that under no view of the statement if it had been credited by the jury, would they have been authorized to find any other verdict than one for involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act. The judge did not charge the law of manslaughter at all. In his charge, however, he referred to the contentions of the accused as set forth in his statement. There was no request to charge on the subject of manslaughter, and it is too well settled now to admit of any discussion that an omission to charge on a theory presented only by the statement of the accused is not error, in the absence of an appropriate written request to that effect Gay v. State, 111 Ga. 649, 36 S. E. 857, and cases cited; Baker v. State, 111 Ga. 141, 36 S. E. 607. It has been held, however, that when a given charge refers to a theory raised by the statement of the accused, "it should fully and distinctly cover the theory so raised." Ragland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. E. 682. In the case just cited, Mr. Justice Lit-'tle says: "When the judge, of his own motion,...