Richardson v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen

Decision Date01 May 1930
Docket Number6 Div. 601.
Citation129 So. 574,221 Ala. 449
PartiesRICHARDSON v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1930.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County.

Action for libel by A. C. Richardson against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and others. From a judgment for defendants plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

W. A Denson, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Crampton Harris, of Birmingham, for appellees.

FOSTER J.

The facts upon which the libel is claimed in this case are substantially the same as those in the case of Weir v. B R. T., Sixth Division Two Hundred and Twenty-two, 129 So. 267. The plaintiff in this case claims that he suffered damages by reason of the same communication described in that one.

The court in that case concluded from the evidence that it did not show a publication of the alleged libelous matter in Jefferson county, Ala., as alleged in the complaint.

The same result follows in this case, for in that respect the evidence is substantially the same.

We therefore pretermit all other questions.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, C.J., and SAYRE, GARDNER, THOMAS, and BOULDIN, JJ., concur.

BROWN, J., not sitting.

On Rehearing.

FOSTER J.

Counsel for appellant contend that the opinion in the case of Weir v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen et al., 129 So. 267, upon which we relied in affirming the judgment in this case, did not give proper application to the principle long established at common law that "proof that the libel is in the handwriting of the party goes far in fixing him with his publication," and when the plaintiff has proved this [defendant's handwriting], he has, if the county is not material, made out such a prima facie case as entitles him to have the contents read in evidence." 2 Starkie on Evidence, pp. 619, 620; Regina v. Lovett, 9 Car. & Payne, 462, and supported by many other authorities.

But there is another rule which has application, and which this court has approved to the effect that defendant is not responsible for the repetition of a slander uttered by him, when such repetition is without the authority or request of defendant. Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Waterman, 188 Ala. 272-287, 288, 289, 66 So. 16, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 900; Hereford v. Combs, 126 Ala. 369, 28 So. 582; Donaldson v. Roberson, 15 Ala. App. 354, 73 So. 223. The authorities supporting this view are cited and discussed in those cases.

The question we have is whether there was a publication (a) in Jefferson county, Ala., and (b) by defendant.

The alleged libel consists of a letter alleged to have been written by Roy C. Smith, an officer or employee of defendant, to defendant's president. It purports to have been written in Atlanta, Ga., addressed to W. G. Lee, the president of defendant at Cleveland, Ohio. There is then what purports to be a letter from the latter to one Morey at Springfield, Mo. The latter is supposed to be a subordinate officer or employee of defendant. The letter to him refers to the Smith letter being forwarded in confidence, and gives the consent of the president to Morey, if he felt justified, to read to President Kurn or the general manager, of the Frisco, any part of the letter, with the understanding that the source of the information will be treated strictly confidential. After this, copies of the letter came to Birmingham by mail, some from Buffalo, N. Y., the home office of the Switchmen's Union, and others are in possession of Birmingham men, without evidence of how they were procured, and the original is brought to Birmingham from Buffalo by the president of the Switchmen's Union, and delivered to plaintiff's counsel.

Upon the principles of law we have stated, the jury could infer and perhaps presume, based upon a belief that Smith wrote the letter, and that Lee wrote the other to Morey, that it was published by Smith in sending it from Atlanta to Cleveland, and by Lee in sending it from Cleveland to Springfield, and that Lee's act in doing so, as he may have been found to be president of defendant, may be...

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