Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 17432

Citation763 P.2d 1153,1988 NMSC 84,107 N.M. 688
Decision Date18 October 1988
Docket NumberNo. 17432,17432
Parties, 78 A.L.R.4th 513, 57 USLW 2256 Gayle D. RICHARDSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Wade Fitzsimmons Richardson, Deceased, Petitioner, v. CARNEGIE LIBRARY RESTAURANT, INC. d/b/a The Country Connection, and Bennett- Cathey, Inc., Respondents.
CourtSupreme Court of New Mexico
OPINION

WALTERS, Justice.

Wade Fitzsimmons Richardson was killed when a two-ton dumptruck driven by Billibob Lewis collided with the car that Richardson was operating. Lewis had become intoxicated at a bar owned by Carnegie Library, Inc.; he subsequently stole the dumptruck from the lot behind Bennett- Cathey, Inc.; and he negligently drove and crashed the truck into Richardson's vehicle.

The decedent's personal representative, Gayle D. Richardson, brought a wrongful death action against Carnegie and Bennett-Cathey. Her complaint alleged that while Lewis was intoxicated, Carnegie served alcohol to him in violation of the Dramshop Act, NMSA 1978, Section 41-11-1 (Repl.Pamp.1986); that Bennett-Cathey negligently left the keys in the ignition of the unattended dumptruck; and that the negligent acts of both defendants proximately caused Richardson's death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bennett-Cathey, entered a default judgment against Carnegie (for failure to answer), and found that Richardson suffered damages for which he would be entitled to recover $250,000 from Carnegie. The court awarded only $50,000, however, finding itself limited by the maximum recovery allowable under the Dramshop Act.

Richardson appealed the district court's ruling to the court of appeals, claiming error in the grant of summary judgment to Bennett-Cathey, and attacking the cap on liability under the dramshop act as unconstitutional. Richardson enumerated several "special circumstances" that would justify the imposition of liability against Bennett-Cathey: Bennett-Cathey knew that the brakes on its truck were inoperative; the lot from which Lewis stole the truck was not fenced and was easily accessible; the area where the truck was parked was frequented by transients; the truck required special skills for safe operation; and the truck was large and bulky and more capable of causing serious injuries than an automobile. She asserted that the theft of the unattended vehicle, with keys left in the ignition, was not an independent, intervening, or superseding act that would exempt Bennett-Cathey from liability. The docketing statement also presented the issue that the damage limitation on dramshop liability violated the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. In her memorandum opposing summary affirmance, Richardson argued that the statute denied equal protection because the damage cap allowed victims of a tavernkeeper's negligence to be undercompensated although victims of other tortfeasors were entitled to obtain full recovery; and further, that the damage cap violated her right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by Article II, Section 12 of the New Mexico Constitution because the cap usurped the fundamental function of a jury to determine damages.

The court of appeals, by memorandum opinion, upheld the trial court on all issues. In its first calendar notice, the court proposed affirmance of the summary judgment on grounds that the theft was not foreseeable, but instead was an intervening, superseding, criminal act by a third person. Acknowledging that several jurisdictions look to special circumstances to determine foreseeability of the harm to be caused by the negligence of an owner leaving the keys in an unattended vehicle, and the liability which attends that foreseeability, the appellate court noted that it could not overrule our opinion in Bouldin v. Sategna, 71 N.M. 329, 378 P.2d 370 (1963), by which it felt itself bound. See Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973) (lower courts should not overrule precedents set by superior court).

Regarding the equal protection issue, the calendar notice considered that the damage cap concerned no fundamental rights and implicated no suspect classes. The court employed, therefore, the rational basis standard of review and looked to the purposes of the challenged statute. It then reasoned that the legislature had "created a cause of action" subsequent to this court's "creation" of a common-law cause of action for tavernkeeper negligence, and that its purpose was to limit dramshop liability in exchange for creating that new cause of action. Impressed that the damage cap applied equally to all persons seeking to recover under the dramshop act, the court's notice proposed affirmance on a determination that the statute did not unconstitutionally violate the equal protection clause.

In its second calendar notice, the court of appeals addressed the jury trial issue, and reiterated its conclusion that the legislature had transformed a common-law cause of action into a statutory one. It then concluded that Richardson had a right to a trial by jury on the question of liability, but that he had no right to have a jury determine the amount of his damages because the statutory action limited the amount of liability. The court of appeals, therefore, summarily dismissed Richardson's appeal and affirmed the trial court by memorandum opinion.

We granted Richardson's petition for writ of certiorari and gave leave to file amicus curiae briefs to the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association (NMTLA), the Defense Lawyers Association (DLA), Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD), and Students Against Drunk Drivers (SADD). The only issue addressed by all of the amici briefs in support of the petitioner's application for review is the constitutionality of the dramshop act.

MADD and SADD point out that New Mexico has one of the most severe drunk-driving problems in the United States and that every conceivable approach to resolve the drunk-driving menace is needed. They agree that dramshop liability is an effective measure in curbing drunken driving, but that the salutary impact of the dramshop act is diffused by the damage cap. Urging that the limit on recovery is inconsistent with the purpose for imposing liability, they emphasize that reinforcing dramshop liability and invalidating the damage cap would best serve the public interest.

NMTLA challenges the damage cap as unconstitutional violations of the due process and equal protection clauses, the right to trial by jury, and the doctrine of separation of powers. Regarding the separation of powers argument, NMTLA contends that the legislatively mandated damage cap prevents judges from exercising their historic procedural power to exercise discretion in reviewing the excessiveness of a jury's award upon a motion for a new trial under SCRA 1986, 1-059; and that it compels judges to order a remittitur, another discretionary act historically inherent in a trial judge's powers. Because procedural rules are within the sole domain of the supreme court, and because the statutory limitation on liability impinges upon the provisions of Rule 59, NMTLA insists with some logic that the damage cap constitutes a legislative usurpation of judicial power and thus violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

NMTLA proposes, too, that the damage cap violates the right to trial by jury, arguing that the legislature did not transform dramshop liability from an action at common law to a statutory cause of action but, rather, only narrowed and modified the judicially-created common-law liability that was established in Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982). Thus, because a plaintiff has a fundamental right to have a jury determine liability and damages in a common-law action, NMTLA argues that the damage cap unconstitutionally infringes on a party's right to trial by jury.

Amicus NMTLA contends that the damage cap also infringes the due process and equal protection clauses of the New Mexico Constitution because the rights to a jury trial and of access to the courts, being fundamental constitutional rights, are rendered meaningless if full and adequate recoveries are not available to all plaintiffs. NMTLA has traced these rights from their historic geneses in Spanish and Mexican laws, the Siete Partidas, the Fuero Juzgo, and the Kearney Code, and it concludes that all formed an integral part of the civil law in the days before statehood and were incorporated into the New Mexico Constitution. Accordingly, NMTLA argues that the damage cap is subject to strict scrutiny under which it surely must be invalidated, but that even under the minimal rational basis analysis, no justification exists to uphold a limitation on the award of damages.

DLA, from an opposing position, argues that Richardson has no standing to raise the jury trial issue because she never requested a jury trial. On the issue of recoverable damages, it takes the stance that the legislature changed dramshop liability to a statutory action from one at common law and, thus, because it created the liability, it can limit the amount of recovery. We are urged to disregard the separation of powers, due process, and right of access to the courts issues because they were not briefed or argued at trial and, therefore, are not properly before us for consideration. But DLA does respond to some of the amici arguments, urging that the separation of powers doctrine is inapplicable here because the...

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  • Excess Confidentiality: Must Bar Examiners Defy Administrative Law and Judicial Transparency?
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