Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 13 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16–cv–3027 |
| Citation | 292 F.Supp.3d 810 |
| Parties | Mark RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Sherrie E. Voyles, Taylor Elvidge Muzzy, Colin Joseph Burns, Jacobs, Burns, Orlove & Hernandez, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Christopher R. Jensen, Chicago Transit Authority Law Department, Joy Annette Roberts, Law Department, Chicago, IL, for
Plaintiff Mark Richardson brings this suit against his former employer the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. [1]. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether his obesity
constitutes a disability under the ADA. [83, 85]. Defendant CTA cross-moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish he was "regarded as" disabled by the CTA, as required to sustain his discrimination claim. [92]. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's motion is denied and Defendant's motion is granted.
In 2010, CTA instruction for bus operators generally included multiple categories of training, including return-to-work training and special assessments. PSOF ¶ 4. Return-to-work training was provided to bus operators who were off work for six to twelve months. Id. ¶ 5. Special assessments, also known as safety assessments, occurred upon the request of a manager or CTA's safety, legal, or medical departments, and required the bus operator to perform all standard operating procedures on all equipment that CTA operated that was then in service. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff contends that CTA had a practice of referring any driver weighing over 400 pounds to CTA's safety department to determine if he or she could safely drive a bus. Id. ¶¶ 11–14. Defendant disputes that this policy applied to all drivers weighing over 400 pounds, though it admits that some bus operators who weighed over 400 pounds were referred for evaluation to see if they could safely operate a bus. R. PSOF ¶¶ 11–14.
The CTA and the union representing its bus operators and instructors are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period from January 2007 through December 2011. PSOF ¶¶ 15–16. The CBA provides for "Area 605": an administrative holding area that allows full-time employees with a medical diagnosis that prevents them from working to be off work for a period specified in the CBA. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. CTA's Disability Review Committee (DRC) reviews management recommendations for transfers to Area 605 and determines whether an employee is eligible for transfer. Id. ¶ 19. To be reinstated from Area 605 to an employee's former position, the employee must receive a medical release from a doctor, complete a return-to-work package with CTA's Benefits Services Department, and report to CTA's medical services provider, who determines if the employee is fit to return to work. Id. ¶ 24.
Beginning in February 2010, Plaintiff was off work with the flu. Id. ¶ 32. In April 2010, the DRC transferred Plaintiff to Area 605. Id. ¶ 35. In September 2010, Advanced Occupational Medical Services (AOMS), CTA's third-party medical services provider, documented that Plaintiff was 71 inches tall, weighed 594 pounds, and was fit to return to work, subject to clearance by CTA's safety department. Id. ¶ 36.
Body Mass Index (BMI) is the ratio of a person's weight to height that is used to assess whether an individual is underweight, within the normal range, overweight, or obese. Id. ¶ 25. A BMI between 18.5 and 24.9 is within the normal range. Id. ¶ 27. At the time of the September 13, 2010 evaluation, Plaintiff had a BMI of 82.8, or 233% above top of end of the normal range for BMI. See [85] at 4.
On the same day as the AOMS evaluation, CTA transferred Plaintiff out of Area 605 and back to his full-time bus operator position. PSOF at ¶37. Plaintiff contends that Defendant required him to submit to a special assessment before returning to work solely because his weight exceeded 400 pounds. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. Defendant denies this and instead claims that Plaintiff underwent a special assessment based upon AOMS' referral and to ensure that he could safely operate a bus. R. PSOF ¶ 39.
Marie Stewart, CTA's Acting Manager II of Bus Instruction, assigned John Durnell and Elon McElroy to conduct Plaintiff's special assessment. PSOF ¶ 40. Plaintiff contends that the post-assessment reports Durnell and McElroy produced contained numerous references to Plaintiff's size and weight. Id. ¶ 41. McElroy documented that Plaintiff had to lean against the bus while performing the pre-trip inspection and that he was sweating because he "appeared to be unhealthy." Id. ¶ 44. McElroy testified that Plaintiff could not perform "hand-over-hand" turning because of his stomach. Id. ¶ 48. Durnell and McElroy testified that Plaintiff was unable to stop "cross-pedaling"—having part of his foot on the gas and brake pedals at the same time—because of Plaintiff's size. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. Cross-pedaling and not using hand-over-hand turning are violations of CTA's required standard operating procedures for bus operators. DSAF ¶ 6.
Relying on the special assessment conducted by Durnell and McElroy, Stewart drafted a memo that concluded: "Based on the Bus Instructors [sic] observations and findings, the limited space in the driver's area and the manufacturer [maximum allowable weight] requirements, it would unsafe for Bus Operator Richardson to operate any CTA bus at this time." PSOF ¶ 52. In September 2010, relying on Stewart's memo, Earl Swopes, CTA's Vice President of Bus Operations, initially instructed CTA's managers to start the process of terminating Plaintiff's employment, but later told CTA's managers to hold off pending a meeting among the managers. Id. ¶ 53. CTA did not allow Plaintiff to return to work in September 2010, or any time between then and his termination in February 2012. Id. ¶¶ 55, 63.
Plaintiff cites subsequent communications about his status between the manager of the garage where Plaintiff worked and Carla Jones, a member of the DRC.2 Id. ¶ 21. In January 2011, the manager emailed Jones, stating that Plaintiff had been referred for a safety evaluation due to his weight, which he failed, and requesting that Jones place Plaintiff back in Area 605 to give him time to lose weight. Id. ¶ 57. Jones responded that she needed the safety report in order to place Plaintiff back in Area 605. Id. ¶ 58. In March 2011, the manager emailed Jones asking for an update on Plaintiff's status, stating he "was supposed to be placed in 605 months ago due to being found medically unfit." Id. ¶ 59.
The DRC transferred Plaintiff back into Area 605 during its meeting on March 11, 2011. Id. ¶ 60. The research notes prepared for the DRC in advance of the meeting indicated that Plaintiff had "exceeded the weight requirement to operate the bus." Id. ¶ 61; see also [89] at 34. In October 2011, CTA informed Plaintiff that he could remain in Area 605 for an extra year if he provided medical documentation clearing him to return within that additional year. PSOF ¶ 62. In February 2012, CTA terminated Plaintiff's employment. Id. ¶ 63.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014).
The ADA provides that no "covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To prevail on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) his employer took an adverse job action against him on the basis of his disability. Basden v. Prof'l Transp., Inc. , 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, the CTA, as an employer of more than 15 employees, constitutes a "covered entity" subject to the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), (5). To prevail on his claim, Plaintiff must show that when CTA refused to let him return to work, it did so based upon a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
The ADA defines disability as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A–C). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to let him return to work because the CTA regarded him as too obese to work as a bus operator. [...
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