Richardson v. City of Rutland

Decision Date03 November 1995
Docket NumberNo. 95-094,95-094
Citation671 A.2d 1245,164 Vt. 422
PartiesEarl W. and Pauline L. RICHARDSON v. CITY OF RUTLAND, McDonald's Corp. and John Kollmer.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

William E. Roper of Neuse, Smith, Roper & Venman, P.C., Middlebury, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Henry C. Brislin, Assistant City Attorney, Rutland, for defendants-appellees City of Rutland and Kollmer.

Allan R. Keyes of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for defendant-appellee McDonald's Corp.

Before ALLEN, C.J., GIBSON, DOOLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., and MALONEY, Superior Judge, Specially Assigned.

DOOLEY, Justice.

Plaintiffs Earl and Pauline Richardson appeal the Rutland Superior Court's dismissal of their mandamus action against the City of Rutland and its zoning administrator, and further appeal the terms of an injunction granted against McDonald's Corporation. The dispute centers around a McDonald's Restaurant parking lot, part of which is located in a residential zone, and the denial of a variance for the lot construction in the residential zone. Plaintiffs, who are neighbors, sought to have the offending portion of the parking lot returned to its original condition and were only partially successful below. We affirm the mandamus dismissal and the scope of the injunction as reasonable and within the court's discretion.

On December 11, 1981, McDonald's sought a zoning permit from the City of Rutland to build a restaurant in a commercial zone. It also applied for a variance of twenty-five feet to use the part of its lot that fell in a residential zone for parking. This litigation deals with the twenty-five-foot residential strip. Prior to any construction, the strip was a swampy wetland lying approximately five feet below the surrounding grade.

On February 17, 1982, the zoning permit was approved and the variance granted by the Rutland Board of Zoning Adjustment. Plaintiffs, owners of land 450 feet from the McDonald's Restaurant, appealed to superior court. Meanwhile, McDonald's sought and obtained a building permit and built the restaurant and the parking lot as proposed. It added earth fill to the variance area to bring it up to the elevation of the surrounding grade and poured concrete over it. It installed lights, dry well pipes for a stormwater drainage system, and trees and dense hedges for landscaping.

On April 15, 1987, the superior court denied the variance, and we affirmed in In re McDonald's Corp., 151 Vt. 346, 560 A.2d 362 (1989). McDonald's did not, however, discontinue use of the residential strip for parking. On April 23, 1989, plaintiffs wrote to the Rutland Zoning Administrator requesting he take action to require that McDonald's restore the strip to its original condition. On March 12, 1990, the zoning administrator sent a letter to McDonald's regarding the twenty-five-foot strip. Thereafter, the local manager of the Rutland McDonald's Restaurant met with the zoning administrator at the site, measured the zoning boundary, and erected a barrier to block any further use of the parking area in the residential strip. The zoning administrator approved the barrier as complying with Residence A zoning, although this decision was not communicated to plaintiffs.

On June 8, 1990, plaintiffs filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the City of Rutland and the zoning administrator to bring suit against McDonald's for removal of the parking lot from the twenty-five-foot variance area. The City filed a motion to dismiss. On May 24, 1991, the court granted the motion and dismissed the mandamus action.

Plaintiffs also sought an injunction requiring McDonald's to restore the variance area to its original condition. Although the court ordered injunctive relief, the scope was less than plaintiffs requested. The court ordered McDonald's to remove the concrete and lights from the variance area, to remove or fill the drainage pipes, and to place topsoil or other fill over the pavement. McDonald's complied with the injunction.

Plaintiffs first argue they properly sought enforcement of a ministerial duty of the zoning administrator, and therefore, the dismissal of the mandamus action was in error. In contrast, the City maintains that plaintiffs do not have a right to issuance of a writ of mandamus because the administrator's actions were discretionary, not ministerial.

Mandamus is a remedial tool which mandates the performance of a nondiscretionary duty. See State v. Forte, 159 Vt. 550, 555, 624 A.2d 352, 356 (1993). Mandamus will not lie for the review of acts that involve the exercise of judgment or discretion. See Bargman v. Brewer, 142 Vt. 367, 369, 454 A.2d 1253, 1255 (1983); Dobbs, Remedies § 2.10, at 112 (1973) ("[It] is used only to compel a specific kind of behavior--compliance with a ministerial duty of an office. It does not issue to compel action that is discretionary."). There is, however, an exception: "Where there appears, in some form, an arbitrary abuse of the power vested by law in an administrative officer ... which amounts to a virtual refusal to act or to perform a duty imposed by law, mandamus may be resorted to in the absence of other adequate legal remedy." Couture v. Selectmen of Berkshire, 121 Vt. 359, 361, 159 A.2d 78, 80 (1960); see also Roy v. Farr, 128 Vt. 30, 34-36, 258 A.2d 799, 802-03 (1969) (applying Couture standard to refusal to act by local health board and health officer).

Recently, we applied the Couture rule to affirm the grant of a writ of mandamus against a zoning administrator in In re Fairchild, 159 Vt. 125, 131, 616 A.2d 228, 231 (1992). Plaintiffs argue that Fairchild governs this case and demonstrates that dismissal of the mandamus action was error. Like this case, Fairchild involved a petition for mandamus to require a municipality to enforce its zoning ordinance against a property owner who the plaintiffs alleged was in violation of the zoning ordinance.

There is, however, a significant difference between this case and Fairchild. Here, although the zoning administrator was dilatory, he did act. He required McDonald's to comply with the ordinance and approved a remedy for the past noncompliance. The remedy, albeit unsatisfactory to plaintiffs, ended use of the residential strip for commercial purposes.

In contrast, the zoning administrator in Fairchild failed to respond directly to plaintiffs, despite their demand for enforcement and stated to others that he thought the property owners were in compliance with the zoning ordinance. He was, therefore, permitting noncompliance with the zoning ordinance, which he had no power to do. See 24 V.S.A. § 4442(a); In re Fairchild, 159 Vt. at 130, 616 A.2d at 231 (holding that administrative officer has no discretion as to whether to enforce zoning regulations). In the words of Couture, there was "a virtual refusal to act or to perform a duty imposed by law." 121 Vt. at 361, 159 A.2d at 80.

We find the difference to be determinative. A zoning administrator is statutorily bound to enforce a municipality's zoning bylaws, 24 V.S.A. § 4445, but the nature of the remedy sought is discretionary. Thus, an administrator has the discretion to initiate "any appropriate action, injunction or other proceeding to prevent, restrain, correct or abate" a violation. See id. Here, the zoning administrator pursued a remedy within his discretion, and it cannot be said that he failed to act or perform a duty imposed by law. The court acted properly in dismissing the mandamus claim. *

Plaintiffs' remaining claims relate to the scope of the injunction issued by the court. Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to an injunction that requires the variance area to be returned to its original state, without the fill and the drainage pipes. The trial court declined to go that far because removal of the fill would necessitate construction of a seven-foot retaining wall to provide support for the...

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  • In re Search Warrant, 10–479.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 14 Diciembre 2012
    ...the judicial officer's discretionary judgment in the context of a motion for extraordinary relief. See Richardson v. City of Rutland, 164 Vt. 422, 424, 671 A.2d 1245, 1247 (1995) (explaining that extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus is a limited remedy to correct “ ‘an arbitrary a......
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    ...the circumstances before it. See Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan), 503 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir.Conn.2007) ; Richardson v. City of Rutland, 164 Vt. 422, 427, 671 A.2d 1245 (1995).“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree ......
  • Alger v. Department of Labor & Industry
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 9 Noviembre 2006
    ...Roy, 128 Vt. at 34, 258 A.2d at 801. Mandamus "does not issue to compel action that is discretionary," Richardson v. City of Rutland, 164 Vt. 422, 424, 671 A.2d 1245, 1247 (1995) (quoting Dobbs, Remedies § 2.10, at 112 (1973)) (internal quotations omitted), except "`[w]here there appears, i......
  • In re Letourneau
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    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 24 Diciembre 1998
    ...administrator must enforce the zoning ordinance, the nature of the remedy sought is discretionary. See Richardson v. City of Rutland, 164 Vt. 422, 425, 671 A.2d 1245, 1248 (1995). Thus, we disagree with the premise of landowner's argument. In any event, we are unwilling to rely on variation......
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