Richardson v. Cnty. of Shasta

• Decision Date: 28 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2:20-cv-00113 JAM CKD PS,2:20-cv-00113 JAM CKD PS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: JAMES FRAZIER RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SHASTA, et al., Defendants.

JAMES FRAZIER RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SHASTA, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00113 JAM CKD PS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 28, 2020

ORDER & FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff's motion to remand (ECF No. 5) and defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) came on regularly for hearing on February 26, 2020. Plaintiff appeared in pro per and Nathan Jackson appeared on behalf of defendants. Having considered the motion, opposition, and reply papers, and the record in this matter, the court will recommend denying the motion to remand, and granting the motion to dismiss.

II. Procedural History

On January 15, 2020, defendants removed this matter from Shasta County Superior Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (c) and federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.)

On January 22, 2020, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff filed an opposition (ECF No. 8), and defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 11).

On January 29, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion to remand his petition for writ of mandate, which was filed along with his complaint in superior court. (ECF No. 5.) Defendants filed an opposition (ECF No. 9), and plaintiff filed a reply (ECF No. 10).

III. Allegations in the First Amended Complaint

On September 30, 2019, plaintiff filed his original complaint in state court. (ECF No 1 at 5-15.) On December 6, 2019, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint and a petition for writ of mandate. (Id. at 17-31; and id. at 33-42.)

Plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC) alleges four claims against defendants: (1) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) right to due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) age discrimination under California Government Code section 12940(a); and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Government Code section 12940. (ECF No. 1 at 17 ("FAC").) Plaintiff alleges as follows in his first amended complaint.

Defendants hired plaintiff on December 6, 2004; and he was wrongfully terminated on September 7, 2018 "in contravention to his permanent employment status." (FAC at ¶¶ 1, 15.) When plaintiff was terminated, he was a "permanent employee promoted to a position within the same department in the unclassified service." (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff "attained permanent classified status" around January 8, 2006 after passing probation, which he did again around March 1, 2009. (Id.)

Plaintiff performed his job competently and generally "met or exceeded standards in performance." (Id. at ¶ 18.)

"On or about April 2018, Plaintiff was informed by then-Public Defender Jeff Gorder that he was not an at will employee and would return to his previous status as a Deputy Public Defender III if he did not pass probation as a Senior Deputy Public Defender. Plaintiff relied on and took comfort in Mr. Gorder's words." (Id. at ¶ 20.) Defendant Bateman terminated plaintiffon September 7, 2018, stating plaintiff is an at will employee and he would not take questions. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Shasta County Chief Public Defender Investigator John Gates was present at the termination. (Id.) Plaintiff was 49 at the time of his termination. (Id. at ¶ 24.) "Defendants hired significantly younger and less experienced employees to replace Plaintiff and fill the remaining Senior Deputy Public Defender and other deputy public defender positions." (Id. at ¶ 25.)

"At no time prior to said termination did Plaintiff receive a hearing required pursuant to Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 194 in violation of Plaintiff's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments." (Id. at ¶ 26.) "Defendants failed to follow Shasta County Personnel Rules and procedures that protect the rights and benefits of an employee who attained permanent status." (Id. at ¶ 27.)

Regarding his right to due process of law claim, plaintiff alleges that he "had a legitimate expectation of continued employment as a Deputy Public Defender III of the County of Shasta" and he "has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment with the County of Shasta as a deputy public defender who had achieved permanent classified employment status." (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37.) Further, defendants owed plaintiff a duty to provide plaintiff "with a pre-termination hearing prior to terminating" his employment. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Defendants "are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct." (Id. at ¶ 41.)

Regarding his age discrimination claim, plaintiff "contends that the reasons given by Defendants, and each of them, were a pretext to mask their true reason(s) for taking the actions against him about which he has complained." (Id. at ¶ 62.) Rather, plaintiff alleges, "age was a substantial motivating factor in Defendants' decision to take action against him about which Plaintiff complains." (Id. at ¶ 63.)

IV. Plaintiff's Writ of Mandate

Along with the FAC, plaintiff/petitioner (hereinafter, "plaintiff) filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Procedure § 1085. (ECF No. 1 at 33-42.) The allegations in the petition are substantively the same allegations as in the FAC.

Plaintiff seeks a writ directing defendants/respondents to set aside their 2018 decision terminating plaintiff's employment, reinstate him as a Deputy Public Defender III, and pay himbackpay from September 7, 2018 to the date of reinstatement. Plaintiff also seeks an order directing that he receive any civil service protections or hearings required by California law or Shasta County Personnel Rules for the reinstated position. (Id. at 41-42.)

V. Motion to Remand

Plaintiff brings a motion to remand the petition for writ of mandate only, not the accompanying FAC. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff argues for remand of the petition on the following grounds: (1) the writ of mandate "raises novel or complex issues of state law;" and (2) issues of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of remanding the writ to state court. (ECF No. 5 at 2.)

a. Legal Standard

In relevant part, the federal removal statute provides:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). "The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction," id., and removal jurisdiction "must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance," Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

A federal district court generally has original jurisdiction over a civil action when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" or (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

With regard to federal question jurisdiction, federal courts have "jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action, or that the plaintiff's right to reliefnecessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. Of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. For S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983); see also Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). "[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d at 1091 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

b. Analysis

Under California law, "[a] writ of mandate may be issued . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office[.]" Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1085; California Hosp. Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 188 Cal. App. 4th 559, 570-71 (2010) (mandamus "will lie to force a particular action ... when the law clearly establishes the petitioner's right to such action") (internal quotation marks omitted). "There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty." Tulare Local Health Care District v. California Dept. of Health Care Servs., 328 F.Supp.3d 988, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2018), citing California Hospital Ass'n, 188 Cal. App. 4th at 558. "[A] writ of mandate is an appropriate method for enforcing a violation of federal law, even where the law creates no private right of action[.]" California Assn. for Health Servs. at Home v. State Dept. of Health Servs., 148 Cal. App. 4^th 696, 706 n.5 (2007) (citation omitted).

Here, the same allegations support both plaintiff's § 1983 claim in the FAC and his petition for writ of mandate. In his motion to remand the petition, plaintiff asks that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the petition and remand it (but not the FAC) to superior court.

Plaintiff first...