Richardson v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 14 January 1892
• Docket Number: 15,222
• Parties: Richardson v. Coleman
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

29 N.E. 909

131 Ind. 210

Richardson v. Coleman

No. 15,222

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 14, 1892

Petition for a Rehearing Overruled April 9, 1892.

From the Marion Superior Court.

Judgment reversed, at costs of the appellee.

P. S Kennedy, S. Kennedy and H. J. Milligan, for appellant.

S. J Peelle and W. L. Taylor, for appellee.

Olds, J. Elliott, C. J., took no part in the decision in this case.

OPINION

Olds, J.

This was an action by the appellant against the appellee for damages received by the appellant while working in the heading factory of the appellee, alleged to have resulted by the negligent use of a belt, and from weak and insecure fastenings with which the same was put together.

There was a trial by jury and the jury was instructed and retired to deliberate. Afterwards the court called the jury into court and gave them instruction numbered eight, in the giving of which it is contended by the appellant that the court erred.

The evidence is not in the record, but all of the instructions are in the record, as provided by section 535, R. S. 1881.

It is suggested by counsel for appellee that the question must be presented as provided by section 630, R. S. 1881, for the presentation of reserved questions of law, but in this counsel are in error. There is no attempt to bring the case to this court under section 630, supra, and it was not necessary that it should be brought under the provisions of that section.

There was a verdict returned, a motion for a new trial filed and overruled, exceptions were reserved to the ruling and judgment rendered. The case is appealed in the ordinary way, but the record does not contain the evidence.

If the instruction complained of was competent under any phase of the evidence which might have been introduced, then the judgment must be affirmed, but the particular instruction complained of has no relation to the evidence; hence it would have only encumbered the record to have included it. The instruction reads as follows:

"Eighth. In addition to the instruction which I have heretofore given you, I now desire to say that you are to take the law as given you by the court, and not to be swayed by any speculations of your own as to what the law is or ought to be. You are, however, the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and should weigh and consider the evidence as I have heretofore indicated. It is important to the parties to have this case decided. You will, I trust, in your deliberations, be careful to avoid the influences of undue pride of personal opinion. The law which requires unanimity on the part of the jury to render a verdict, expects and will tolerate reasonable compromise and concessions. You will remember, gentlemen, that absolute certainty is not always attainable in human affairs, neither does the law require it. Whilst it is expected that there will be individual opinion, judgment and conscience, it is also expected that it will not go to the extent of unreasonable obstinacy. You will return to your room and again confer together, calmly and deliberately reviewing the case under the instructions I have given you."

The main portion of this instruction we do not deem objectionable. As to the propriety of having the jury brought into court after they had deliberated for nearly twenty-four hours and giving the instruction, we need not speak, and there is only a portion of the instruction that we deem it necessary to consider.

By one clause of the instruction the jury are told that "The law which requires unanimity on the part of the jury to render a verdict, expects and will tolerate reasonable compromise and fair concessions." We can not give our sanction to this statement of the law. By it the jury are told that the law "expects and tolerates reasonable compromise." The law does not expect any compromise on the part of jurors. It expects every juror to exercise his individual judgment, and that when a verdict is agreed to it will be the verdict of each individual juror. In arriving at a verdict a juror should not indulge in any undue pride of personal opinion, and he should not be unreasonable or obstinate, and he should give due consideration to the views and opinions of other jurors, and...