Richardson v. County of Cook, 1-92-0818

• Decision Date: 27 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 1-92-0818,1-92-0818
• Citation: 621 N.E.2d 114,250 Ill.App.3d 544,190 Ill.Dec. 245
• Parties: , 190 Ill.Dec. 245 Zadie RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF COOK, Cook County Board of Commissioners, George Dunne as President of Commissioners, Oak Forest Hospital, James Brodie, Lt. Joseph Hale, Lt. L.J. DeWinters, Edmond Lawler, and Janet Parejko, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 114

621 N.E.2d 114

250 Ill.App.3d 544, 190 Ill.Dec. 245

Zadie RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF COOK, Cook County Board of Commissioners, George Dunne as President of Commissioners, Oak Forest Hospital James Brodie, Lt. Joseph Hale, Lt. L.J. DeWinters, Edmond Lawler, and Janet Parejko, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-92-0818.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Second Division.

July 27, 1993.

Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Karen A. Covy, Frank J. Oles, Thomas M. Davy and John Carreon, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Irving M. Friedman, Michael B. Erp, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, Chicago (David J. Kupets, Becker, Baiser & Rapoport, Highland Park, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Justice DiVITO delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Zadie Richardson, an employee at Oak Forest Hospital, brought suit to recover for injuries she allegedly suffered from intentional torts committed by her supervisor and other employees at the hospital and for violation of her civil rights. Her suit also included a claim for punitive damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 48, par. 138 et seq., now codified as 820 ILCS 305 et seq. (West 1992)) provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff, that no custom or policy established by defendants caused plaintiff's injuries, and that punitive damages were inappropriate. This appeal is from that ruling.

Plaintiff filed suit against Cook County (the County); the Cook County Board of Commissioners (the Board); George Dunne, the president of the Board at that time; Oak Forest Hospital (the hospital), which was owned and operated by the County; Edmond Lawler, the director of the hospital; James Brodie, the director of security at the hospital; security officers L.J. DeWinters and Joseph Hale; and Janet Parejko, plaintiff's supervisor at the hospital.

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that on November 8, 1985, as she was leaving her work area for her scheduled lunch break, Parejko shoved her back into the room, struck her in the chest repeatedly, blocked the exit, and verbally threatened her.

Shortly thereafter, she alleged, she attempted to file a complaint against Parejko with hospital security, but officers Hale and DeWinters refused to accept it. Then, in response to a complaint filed by Parejko, and without any independent investigation, Hale and DeWinters arrested her. Plaintiff began suffering chest pains, as a result of which, under Hale's direction, she was escorted to Health Services by male security officers. There, because of a suspected coronary condition, medical personnel instructed her to disrobe. Two male officers then accompanied her into the restroom and later remained with her during the examination.

The nine-count complaint stated that plaintiff was the victim of an unprovoked assault and battery, that she was falsely arrested, that she was falsely imprisoned, that defendants intentionally inflicted "severe emotional distress" upon her, and that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by adopting and implementing a policy of supporting supervisors in confrontations with subordinate employees, by failing to properly train supervisors to prevent employee abuse, and by failing to train hospital security officers in proper investigation procedures. She also alleged that the conduct of defendants was "willful, wanton and malicious," thus entitling her to punitive damages.

Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that plaintiff's action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act and that the policies she alleged did not exist. In response, plaintiff supplied excerpts of transcripts from a union grievance hearing involving a charge against Parejko before the Labor Relations Board. The transcripts indicated that Parejko called employees at home when they were absent from work due to illness in order to determine when they would return; that Parejko became hostile when she learned that she was unable to suspend plaintiff for an unrelated incident; that Parejko stated that she would not be challenged by the union regarding the setting of vacation days; that Parejko stated that the department would be run according to her wishes; and that Parejko challenged an employee to a fight in front of a union steward. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted defendants' summary judgment motion. This appeal followed.

Initially, we note that the Board and the hospital have been improperly named as defendants in this case. The Board is not a separate entity which can be sued. Rather, its powers are co-extensive with the County. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 34, par. 5-1004, now codified as 55 ILCS 5/5-1004 (West 1992) ("[t]he powers of the county * * * shall be exercised by a county board"); see also Mayes v. Elrod (N.D.Ill.1979), 470 F.Supp. 1188, 1192 (holding that the sheriff's office and the Board are indistinct from the County and therefore cannot be sued).) Similarly, the hospital is not subject to suit because it is owned and operated by the County, and is not itself a legal entity. See Jackson v. Village of Rosemont (1988), 180 Ill.App.3d 932, 937-38, 129 Ill.Dec. 670, 536 N.E.2d 720 (holding that Rosemont Horizon Stadium is merely a building operated by the Village of Rosemont and therefore is not a legal entity that can sue or be sued).

Plaintiff first contends that the circuit court erroneously concluded that the Act provided the exclusive remedy for her injuries. She asserts that because her injuries were intentional rather than accidental, they were not compensable under the Act. We disagree.

Under the Act, an employee has "[n]o common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer * * * or [its] agents or employees" for injuries incurred in the course of her employment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a), now 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 1992).) Instead, the Act provides the exclusive remedy for claims against an employer for accidental injuries in the work place by establishing liability without fault and by abrogating common law defenses. (Johnson v. Federal Reserve Bank (1990), 199 Ill.App.3d 427, 433, 145 Ill.Dec. 558, 557 N.E.2d 328, appeal denied (1990), 133 Ill.2d 558, 149 Ill.Dec. 323, 561 N.E.2d 693; Jablonski v. Multack (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 908, 910, 20 Ill.Dec. 715, 380 N.E.2d 924.) However, an employee's action against her employer will not be prohibited if the "employee-plaintiff proves: (1) that the injury was not accidental; (2) that the injury did not arise from his or her employment; (3) that the injury was not received during the course of employment; or (4) that the injury was not compensable under the Act." Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co. (1990), 139 Ill.2d 455, 463, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222.

In the instant case, plaintiff asserts that the Act does not prohibit her cause of action because her injuries were intentional rather than accidental, and because the injuries were not compensable under the Act since they were neither causally related to her job nor occurred as a result of the performance of her duties. Defendants respond that all work-related injuries are considered "accidental" under the Act unless the employer directed, encouraged, or committed the intentional tort, and that nothing in the record demonstrates that defendants acted with the specific intent to injure. Defendants also maintain that plaintiff's injuries are compensable under the Act because plaintiff's own allegations demonstrate that the events took place at the hospital and that each individual defendant was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment.

Illinois courts have repeatedly held that an injury which was intentionally inflicted upon an employee by another employee is considered "accidental" for purposes of the Act if it was "unexpected and unforeseeable from the injured employee's point of view." (Meerbrey, 139 Ill.2d at 463, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222; see also Jablonski, 63 Ill.App.3d at 910, 20 Ill.Dec. 715, 380 N.E.2d 924.) However, if the injuries were intentionally inflicted by the employer or its alter ego, or the injurious actions were commanded or expressly authorized by the employer, the exclusivity provisions of the Act will not apply and the employee may pursue a common law action against the employer. Meerbrey, 139 Ill.2d at 464, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222; Johnson v. Federal Reserve Bank (1990), 199 Ill.App.3d 427, 433-34, 145 Ill.Dec. 558, 557 N.E.2d 328 (holding that the Act did not bar the plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the injuries were inflicted "by persons acting * * * as the alter ego of the [employer]").

Furthermore, the fact that the employee sustained no physical injury or trauma is irrelevant to the applicability of the Act. (See Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1976), 62 Ill.2d 556, 563, 343 N.E.2d 913 (holding that an employee who suffered a sudden and severe emotional shock after observing injury to a co-worker could recover under the Act even though she sustained no physical injury).) Rather, an injury is compensable under the Act if it was sustained during the course of employment and arose from that employment. (Collier v. Wagner Castings Co. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 229, 237-38, 41 Ill.Dec. 776, 408 N.E.2d 198.) In Collier, the plaintiff sued his employer for the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the "extreme and outrageous" medical care he received from the company's medical attendant when he was suffering from cardiac arrest. The circuit court struck the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and the appellate court affirmed. The supreme court then affirmed the appellate court, holding that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act because emotional distress is compensable...