Richardson v. Cox

• Citation: 34 P.3d 828
• Decision Date: 15 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 19188-5-III.,19188-5-III.
• Parties: William E. RICHARDSON and Lila Mae Richardson, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Harold COX and Bonnie Cox, husband and wife; Robert M. Tippett and Jane Doe Tippett, husband and wife, individually and the marital community thereof, and as General Manager and partner of Thanksgiving Limited Partnership; John Does 1 through 10 and Jane Does 1 through 10, husbands and wives, and the marital communities thereof, individually and as Partners of Thanksgiving Limited Partnership; and Franklin County, Respondents.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington

34 P.3d 828

William E. RICHARDSON and Lila Mae Richardson, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Harold COX and Bonnie Cox, husband and wife; Robert M. Tippett and Jane Doe Tippett, husband and wife, individually and the marital community thereof, and as General Manager and partner of Thanksgiving Limited Partnership; John Does and Jane Does , husbands and wives, and the marital communities thereof, individually and as Partners of Thanksgiving Limited Partnership; and Franklin County, Respondents.

No. 19188-5-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

November 15, 2001.

Prior report: 108 Wash.App. 881, 26 P.3d 970.

ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

IT IS ORDERED that the opinion filed July 10, 2001 is amended as follows:

(1) The second paragraph of the opinion, which begins on page 2, [2nd column, first full paragraph on page 972 of 26 P.3d] shall now read:

William and Lila Mae Richardson purchased a residential five-acre lot. The deed reserved a 30-foot easement for ingress and egress. Adjoining landowners to the west, Harold and Bonnie Cox, nonetheless constructed a roadway along the easement with the approval of Franklin County. The question before us is whether original quitclaim deeds (which reserved the easement for ingress and egress) and a later filed "Declaration of Protective Covenants and Restrictions" (which provided for a roadway easement) amounted to a dedication of the easement for public purposes. We conclude that they do not and so reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for reinstatement of the trial court's initial memorandum decision. The trial court must award the Richardsons their attorney fees and costs at the trial level and apportion them between Mr. Cox and the County. The Richardsons' request for attorney fees and costs on appeal is granted subject to compliance with RAP 18.1.

(2) The Easement section of the opinion, which is on pages 12 and 13, [2nd column, three full paragraphs on page 976 of 26 P.3d] shall now read:

What the documents in this case evidence is an intent to reserve easements for ingress and egress to the other parcels contained in the residential subdivision as well as the properties located to the south of the surveyed subdivision. The Declaration clearly contemplated future residential development and, as such, reserved the easement for ingress and egress for other residential owners in the development to prevent the individual lots set forth in the survey from becoming landlocked.

The reservation of the easements in the survey and Declaration is general. As a result, the public's use of the easements is limited to that which is reasonable. Logan v. Brodrick, 29 Wash.App. 796, 800, 631 P.2d 429 (1981). The use of an easement can be expected to expand and grow only with the natural development of the dominant estate. Id. In its original memorandum decision the trial court

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