Richardson v. Dennison
| Decision Date | 17 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 16 C 7422 |
| Parties | Andre Richardson, Petitioner, v. Jeff Dennison, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Andre Richardson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his first-degree murder conviction in the death of his infant daughter. Respondent Warden Jeff Dennison now moves for summary judgment following Court-ordered discovery. R. 94. For the following reasons, Respondent's motion is granted, and Richardson's petition is denied.
The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts, which are set forth in summary form here, and in more detail in the Court's August 6, 2019 memorandum opinion and order, R 61 (“Equitable Tolling Order”).
On February 9, 2001, then-sixteen-year-old Richardson was investigated and arrested in connection with the death of his eleven-month-old daughter, Diamond. Richardson does not dispute that his actions resulted in his daughter's death, but argues that he did not act with the intent necessary for a first-degree murder conviction because he is mentally challenged.
The medical examiner who performed the autopsy determined that Diamond died from injuries she sustained due to an assault counting 61 injuries in total. Richardson was arrested for child abuse and taken to the Second District police station the afternoon of Diamond's death, where he was subsequently attacked by a police employee, causing a black eye and swollen face. Richardson told the youth investigator assigned to investigate Diamond's case and detectives that he had been struck by lockup personnel. The police department's Office of Professional Standards opened an investigation into the attack. It is unclear how that investigation was resolved.
Richardson was later interrogated three times in a thirteen-hour period that began the evening of his arrest and continued into the following morning. The first interrogation took place around 9:00 p.m. in a small, windowless room and lasted approximately 45 minutes. The youth investigator asked Richardson questions along with the detectives, and Richardson's mother was also present. Richardson made an inculpatory statement, the details of which are not reflected in the record. Shortly thereafter, the detectives summoned Assistant State's Attorney John Heil.
ASA Heil began interrogating Richardson in the same small room around 12:30 a.m. in the presence of Richardson's mother, the youth investigator and a detective. ASA Heil advised Richardson of his Miranda rights and informed him that Diamond had died. Richardson had been in custody for nine hours at this point, and had not slept or received medical attention for his injuries. He was not aware that he would be charged with murder, and confessed a second time, describing his interactions with Diamond the day of her death. According to ASA Heil, Richardson explained that he had picked her up from her mother's house the night before to babysit her, and that she fell and hit her head. He said he gave her cereal the next morning and hit her several times when she dropped it on the floor, poked at her stomach afterward causing her to vomit, struck her for vomiting, and struck her numerous times with a plastic hanger and then with a belt when she continued to vomit. He explained that he then put her in the corner and hit her when she turned to look at him because he had told her not to, and told her to go stand against the wall. When she fell, he picked her up and shook her hard, causing her to hit her head on the windowsill and on the window casing. Richardson said he asked a neighbor to call the police when she became unresponsive.
Afterwards, the youth investigator and detective were excused from the room and ASA Heil had an unrecorded discussion with Richardson. According to ASA Heil, Richardson told him that the earlier physical attack at the police station did not influence his confession, and that he had been treated fine since. ASA Heil thereafter explained to Richardson his options for memorializing his statements, and Richardson chose to give a videotaped statement.
Richardson's final interrogation and videotaped statement began around 9:30 a.m. the same morning. Richardson had slept 2 to 3 hours before that. Richardson's mother, the youth investigator, one of the detectives, and ASA Heil were all present, and Richardson was again advised of his Miranda rights. When asked if he knew what it meant to say that “anything you say can be used against you in a court of law, ” Richardson answered, “Whatever I say, I will tell and say it in court.” In response, ASA Heil repeated Richardson responded “yes, ” and Heil went on with the interrogation. Richardson confessed a third time on videotape.
Richardson's attorney moved to suppress Richardson's confession before trial, arguing among other things that Richardson's “physical, mental, educational and/or psychological state, capacity and condition” prevented him from fully understanding his Miranda rights. People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ill. 2009) (Richardson II). His counsel requested several extensions to have Richardson's mental capacity evaluated and questioned his mother at the suppression hearing about the physical attack on Richardson and interrogations. But counsel did not question Richardson's mother about Richardson's mental limitations at the hearing or otherwise present evidence related to any mental deficits. The trial court thereafter denied Richardson's motion to suppress, concluding that his confessions were given “freely and voluntarily” because he was advised of and acknowledged understanding his Miranda rights, and did not request medical assistance or a lawyer.
As a result, the prosecution played Richardson's videotaped confession to the jury, in which he stated that he: struck Diamond on the hand; bit her on the shoulder and stomach; “karate chopped” her ribs; “whooped” her on the butt with a plastic clothes hanger; hit her with a belt; smacked her in the face; and spanked her on her “pamper.” Richardson also said that his statement had nothing to do with the attack on him; that he was treated fairly and allowed time alone with his mother; that he ate, slept, and had access to a restroom; and that no threats or promises were made to him or his mother in exchange for his statement. Richardson testified during the defense's case. In that testimony, he indicated that the videotaped statement was accurate, except that he did not hit Diamond with a belt.
Richardson's main defense at trial was that he lacked the intent or knowledge to commit first-degree murder. The court denied his attorney's request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, concluding that there was no evidence of recklessness. During deliberations, the jury asked the court if it could convict Richardson of a lesser offense. But the court denied the request, and Richardson was found guilty of first-degree murder.
Richardson's Pre-Sentence Investigative Report (“PSIR”) revealed that he suffered from lifelong learning disabilities, was illiterate when he confessed, and was raised without a father. The PSIR also described his mother's history of alcohol and drug addiction, and that she beat Richardson with various objects.
The court ordered an examination to determine whether Richardson was fit for sentencing.[1] As part of that evaluation, Richardson scored 61 on an IQ test, ranking him in the 0.5th percentile, and falling within the extremely low range of intellectual functioning. Richardson was classified as being in the “upper echelon of mild mental retardation.” But the psychologist and court found him fit for sentencing, and he was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment.
Richardson appealed, arguing among other things that (1) his confessions should have been suppressed, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Richardson, 875 N.E.2d 1202, 1204 ( (Richardson I). The appellate court held that Richardson's confessions were coerced and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 1208. The state appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which reversed in part, concluding that Richardson's post-arrest injuries had no effect on his confessions, which were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Richardson II, 917 N.E.2d at 520-21. The court remanded the remaining contentions because the appellate court did not consider them. Id.
On remand, the appellate court declined to address whether Richardson's counsel had been ineffective for failing to offer expert testimony concerning his mental impairment in support of his motion to suppress, reasoning that the claim was based on extra-record matters better evaluated on collateral review. People v. Richardson, 929 N.E.2d 44, 48 ( (Richardson III). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision on Richardson's other contentions, including that the evidence did not warrant an involuntary manslaughter instruction. Id. at 50. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Richardson's petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”) concerning the trial court's failure to give an involuntary manslaughter instruction. People v. Richardson, 938 N.E.2d 528 (Ill. 2010) (Richardson IV).
Richardson then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Cook County arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of his mental...
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