Richardson v. Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 15 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-2876,15-2876 |
| Citation | 829 F.3d 273 |
| Parties | Sebastian Richardson, Appellant v. Director Federal Bureau of Prisons; Bryan A. Bledsoe; David Young, Associate Warden at USP Lewisburg; Donald C. Hudson, Jr., Associate Warden; Captain Bradley Trate; Sean Snider, Deputy Captain; Lt. James Fleming; Lt. Pedro Carrasquillo; Lt. Chris Mattingly; Lt. Matthew Saylor; Lt. Aaron Sassaman; Lt. Jason Seeba; Roger Miller; Lt. Thomas Johnson; Lt. Camden Scampone; Lt. Kyle Whittaker. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Alexandra Morgan-Kurtz [ARGUED], Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, 429 Forbes Avenue, Suite 800, Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Su Ming Yeh, Esq., Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, 718 Arch Street, Suite 304S, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Counsel for Appellant
Michael J. Butler [ARGUED], Office of United States Attorney, 228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754, 220 Federal Building and Courthouse, Harrisburg, PA 17108, Counsel for Appellee
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
Plaintiff Sebastian Richardson, a former inmate at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, is seeking both individual monetary damages for alleged violations of his constitutional rights at USP Lewisburg and class-wide injunctive relief to prevent future constitutional violations at the penitentiary. While the procedural history of this case is complex, we are presented with a single issue on appeal. We must determine whether Richardson's class-wide claims for injunctive relief are moot because Richardson was transferred out of USP Lewisburg after he filed an amended class action complaint but before he moved for class certification.
We conclude that Richardson's class claims are not moot. As we have previously held, when individual claims for relief are acutely susceptible to mootness, a would-be class representative may, in some circumstances, continue to seek class certification after losing his personal stake in the case. Additionally, even though Richardson never filed a motion for class certification, we hold that the class certification issue was clearly presented to the District Court both in Defendants' motion to dismiss Richardson's amended class complaint and in Richardson's response to that motion. Richardson's claims, therefore, relate back to the date on which he filed his amended class action complaint. Accordingly, he may continue to seek class certification in this case. We will therefore remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Sebastian Richardson arrived at USP Lewisburg in March 2010 and was immediately placed in the Special Management Unit program (SMU program). The SMU program was created to house inmates with special security concerns, namely individuals with past histories of violence and individuals who “participated in or had leadership roles in geographical groups/gang related activity.” U.S. Dep't of Justice, Program Statement: Special Management Units , P5217.01, § 1 (Nov. 19, 2008), available at https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5217_001.pdf. Upon entering the SMU program, inmates are interviewed to determine their “separation needs and known enemies” so that they are not placed with incompatible individuals. Richardson v. Kane , No. 3:CV–11–2266, 2013 WL 1452962, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2013). Once in the program, inmates are rotated between cells every twenty-one days, sometimes receiving new cellmates as they rotate. Id.
Richardson's amended complaint alleges that through a “pattern, practice or policy,” Pl.'s Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 21, officials at USP Lewisburg frequently placed inmates in cells with hostile cellmates, unnecessarily increasing the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence. Id. at 10-11. He further alleges that if an inmate refused to accept a hostile cellmate, he would be placed in painful restraints as a form of punishment. Id. at 12. Richardson claims that he was subjected to this policy and that it violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights.
In support of this claim, Richardson explains how—after seven months of living with a compatible cellmate—corrections staff asked him to “cuff up” on the cell door so that a new inmate could be transferred into his cell. Id. at 19. Richardson alleges that this inmate, known among the prison population as “the Prophet,” had attacked over twenty former cellmates. Id.
Richardson refused to “cuff up” because he did not want to be placed with “the Prophet.” Corrections staff then asked if Richardson was refusing his new cellmate, and he replied that he was. Id. After taking “the Prophet” away, corrections staff returned thirty minutes later with a Use of Force team and asked Richardson if he would submit to the use of restraints. Richardson complied. Id.
Richardson was then taken down to a laundry room where he was stripped, dressed in paper clothes, and put in “hard” restraints. Id. at 20. Next, he was locked in a cell with another prisoner (who was also in hard restraints) and left there for three days before being transferred yet again. Id. All told, Richardson alleges that he was held in hard restraints for nearly a month, was forced to sleep on the floor for much of that time, and frequently was refused both showers and bathroom breaks. Richardson also claims that there have been at least 272 reports of inmate-on-inmate violence at USP Lewisburg between January 2008 and July 2011 and that dozens of other inmates have suffered treatment similar to his as a result of this unwritten practice or policy. Id. at 10.
While still in the SMU program at USP Lewisburg, Richardson brought suit against a number of prison officials alleging that this unwritten policy violated his constitutional rights. Richardson's amended complaint seeks individual monetary damages and class-wide injunctive relief for “[a]ll persons who are currently or will be imprisoned in the SMU program at USP Lewisburg.” Id. at 33.
Richardson's amended complaint notes that he is seeking class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which generally provides for only injunctive relief.1 It also explains why such relief should be granted and discusses the specific Rule 23 factors courts must consider when determining whether to certify a class. Id. at 41-44. The District Court, however, found Richardson's class definition “untenable because it [wa]s not objectively, reasonably ascertainable.” Kane , 2013 WL 1452962, at *4. Certification was therefore denied. While this did not prevent Richardson from pursuing his individual claims for damages against the Defendants, the District Court eventually stayed Richardson's case in its entirety pending this Court's resolution of Shelton v. Bledsoe , 775 F.3d 554 (3d Cir. 2015). In Shelton, we granted a motion for interlocutory appeal of the same issue that was decided by the District Court here: the ascertainability of an identically defined class of prisoners at USP Lewisburg. We held that ascertainability is not required for Rule 23(b)(2) classes and therefore remanded the case to the District Court to “consider whether the properly-defined putative class meets the remaining Rule 23 requirements for class certification.” Id. at 565.
After we decided Shelton, Richardson sought leave to appeal the District Court's denial of class certification in his case. A motions panel of this Court granted the request. This case, then, raises substantive issues nearly identical to those we considered in Shelton. Indeed, Richardson argues that Shelton controls our decision in this case and that we should reverse the District Court's order denying class certification and remand for further proceedings consistent with Shelton.
Defendants disagree. While they admit that Shelton would control the outcome of Richardson's class action claims, they argue that these claims have become moot for two reasons. First, they argue that because Richardson's individual claims for injunctive relief are moot, he cannot represent a class seeking the same injunctive relief. Specifically, because Richardson was not housed in the SMU when the District Court denied class certification, they argue that he does “not have standing to represent a class of USP Lewisburg inmates housed in the SMU.” Appellees' Br. 10. Second, Defendants note that all the individuals Richardson named as defendants have since retired or changed jobs. Defendants argue that this moots Richardson's claims for injunctive relief because they read the amended complaint to allege harms resulting only from conduct that is personal to the individual defendants (as opposed to conduct that is systematic and institutional in nature). Accordingly, Defendants assert that Richardson's claims for injunctive relief are moot under Spomer v. Littleton , 414 U.S. 514, 94 S.Ct. 685, 38 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974), as there is no reason to believe the allegedly unconstitutional conduct will continue under the new prison administration. Appellees' Br. 11. We address these two arguments in turn.2
Defendants argue that Richardson's class action claims are moot because Richardson failed to move for class certification before he was transferred out of USP Lewisburg. While Richardson, of course, still has standing to seek damages for any past constitutional violations that occurred while he was housed in the SMU program at USP Lewisburg, he must have separate standing for forward-looking, injunctive relief. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (). To determine whether Richardson has standing to seek injunctive relief, we ask whether he can “show that he is likely to suffer future injury from the defendant's conduct.” McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc ., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Typically, “[i]n the...
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