Richardson v. FCA U.S., LLC
| Decision Date | 07 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 7:19-CV-15 (HL) |
| Parties | WILLIAM RICHARDSON, individually and on behalf of Seanesee Richardson, as his legal guardian, and SEANESEE RICHARDSON, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Plaintiff William Richardson filed this lawsuit following an incident in which his son, Seanesee Richardson, was injured while changing the tire of his family's 2006 Dodge Caravan. There are several motions pending before the Court: Defendant Fiat Chrysler Automobiles US, LLC (FCA)'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 68), Defendant's motions to exclude the expert testimony of Pete Sullivan (Doc. 70) and Lila Laux (Doc. 71); Defendant's Motion to Seal (Doc 163) and Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' First Amended and Supplemental Statement of Disputed Facts and Opposition to FCA's Statement of Material Facts. (Doc. 167). The Court held a hearing on all five motions on August 12, 2021. For the reasons given herein, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; the Motion to Seal is GRANTED; the Motion to Strike is DENIED and the Daubert motions are DENIED.
On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff Seanesee Richardson (“Seanesee”), a minor, and his mother, Kimberly Richardson (“Mrs. Richardson”), discovered a bubble in the sidewall of the front passenger tire on their 2006 Dodge Grand Caravan. Seanesee was leaving for an Eagle Scout meeting, and he and Mrs. Richardson decided to change the tire before driving the vehicle to Valdosta. Seanesee was 16 years old at the time of the incident, did not have a driver's license, and had never changed a tire. He had been present with his father during two prior tire changes.
Seanesee retrieved the owner's manual from the vehicle and reviewed the instructions. Mrs. Richardson went to the driver's side of the vehicle to lower the spare tire to the ground. The spare tire in the 2006 Dodge Grand Caravan is located underneath the vehicle between the driver and passenger seats. Mrs. Richardson used the tools provided with the vehicle to lower the spare tire, by turning a cable winch mechanism located under the center console of the vehicle. The handle of this winch is also part of another tool that is designed to help retrieve the spare tire from underneath the vehicle.
After loosening the lug nuts on the front passenger side tire, Seanesee had to jack up the vehicle to remove the spare tire from underneath the vehicle. The underbody of the van had an exhaust pipe that prevented Seanesee from retrieving the tire without jacking the vehicle up. After jacking the vehicle up and ensuring the spare tire had been lowered, Seanesee attempted to retrieve the spare tire without the provided retrieval tool (which was still in Mrs. Richardson's possession).
During the attempted retrieval, the jack failed, and the van fell off the jack and hit the ground, crushing Seanesee, and causing an anoxic brain injury. No. witnesses saw the vehicle fall, and Seanesee is unable to testify as to exactly what happened at the moment the jack failed.
Plaintiffs brought suit against FCA US, LLC in the Superior Court of Lanier County on December 11, 2018. Plaintiffs' Complaint sets forth claims for manufacturing defects related to the location and installation of the exhaust pipe, which did not allow for appropriate ground clearance to retrieve the spare tire without jacking up the vehicle. Plaintiffs also allege claims of failure to warn and design defect, all related to the placement of the spare tire, the underbody of the vehicle, and the unclear directions for retrieving a spare tire. Defendant removed the case to this Court on January 22, 2019.
The Court will address the Daubert motions before turning to FCA's motion for summary judgment because whether the parties' proposed experts will be allowed to testify relates to the summary judgment analysis. A party wishing to have a witness testify as an expert bears the burden of laying, by a preponderance of the evidence, a foundation for the admission of its expert's testimony. McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999)). Whether certain opinions may be offered as expert testimony is determined by the standard set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
As the Supreme Court clarified in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, a trial court must act as a “gatekeeper” and test the reliability and relevancy of the proposed expert's opinions before determining whether they can be admitted as expert testimony. 509 U.S. 579, 589-93 (1993). The trial judge must undertake a “rigorous three-part inquiry” and decide whether: (1) a proposed expert is qualified to competently testify concerning his opinions; (2) his methodology is sufficiently reliable; and (3) his testimony would assist the jury, through the application of scientific, specialized, or technical expertise, to determine a fact in issue or understand the evidence. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). The Supreme Court has provided a non-exclusive list of factors that may be considered in weighing the reliability of an expert's theory or methodology, including “(1) whether it can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) what its known or potential rate of error is, and whether standards controlling its operation exist; and (4) whether it is generally accepted in the field.”[1] United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2005). The reliability test is flexible, and not all of the factors are applicable in every case. Id.
Defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Pete Sullivan (“Mr. Sullivan”), a senior technician of Sullivan's Advanced Fleet Service. Mr. Sullivan has worked with motor vehicle crashes, inspected, operated, diagnosed, and repaired thousands of motor vehicles, and has been in the industry for 39 years. Mr. Sullivan seeks to present testimony relating to Plaintiff's claim that the exhaust pipe was incorrectly installed due to a manufacturing defect. Defendant argues that Mr. Sullivan's methodology is not reliable, that he submitted untimely opinions, and that his opinions will not help a jury determine any issues in this case. Mr. Sullivan bases his opinions on extensive studies of an exemplar Dodge Caravan, in which he uses mathematics and testing to assess the height of the exhaust pipe under several different but possible vehicle conditions. He studied this exemplar vehicle, the depositions of other experts, and the various components of the spare tire system that accompanies the Dodge Grand Caravan. (See generally Doc. 88). Defendant also alleges that because Sullivan acknowledged during his testimony that the vehicle systems could sag over time, he has abandoned any opinion relating to a manufacturing defect. (Doc. 176 at p. 20).
The Court finds that Mr. Sullivan's methodology was reliable and that his opinions were not untimely. Therefore, Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of Pete Sullivan is DENIED. (Doc. 70).
Defendant filed a motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Lila Laux (“Dr. Laux”), a human factors expert. Defendant argues that Dr. Laux's methodology is not reliable because she only spent 10 hours preparing for the case while Defendant's human factors expert spent over 77 hours preparing. Defendant asserts that Dr. Laux did not even review the deposition of the expert she was hired to rebut, and therefore her testimony is deficient. Further, Defendant believes that Dr. Laux's opinions are cumulative and should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the probative value of her opinion is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice because it is needlessly time consuming or repetitive.
The Court finds that the testimony of Lila Laux does rely on reasonable methodology and that the opinions are not needlessly time consuming for a jury. Therefore, Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Lila Laux is DENIED. (Doc. 71).
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' warnings claims, arguing that they are barred (1) by the doctrine of product misuse; (2) because the danger was open and obvious; and (3) because Seanesee assumed the risk. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' manufacture and design claims are barred because they fall outside the statute of repose and because there is a lack of reliable evidence on these claims. Further, Defendant states that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy all five elements of their manufacturing defect claim specifically related to the exhaust pipe. Finally, Defendant believes judgment as a matter of law is warranted with respect to claims regarding the design of the jack, the location of the spare tire, and claims for attorney's fees.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery, and disclosure...
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