Richardson v. Green, 85-1352.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-1352.,85-1352.
• Citation: 528 A.2d 429
• Parties: T. Carlton RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. Robert J. GREEN, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

528 A.2d 429 T. Carlton RICHARDSON, Appellant,
v.
Robert J. GREEN, Appellee. No. 85-1352. District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Argued May 13, 1987. Decided July 6, 1987.

Page 430

T. Carlton Richardson, Washington, D.C., pro se.

Shelby D. Green, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and TERRY and ROGERS, Associate Judges.

PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This is an appeal from the trial court's ruling in favor of appellee Robert J. Green in a contract action by appellant for recovery of legal fees he charged for his attempt to non-judicially dispose of the estate of Lucille Green, appellee's mother. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court was correct in holding that the provisions of the District of Columbia Probate Reform Act of 1980 (D.C.Code §§ 20-101 et seq. (1981)) and, in particular, D.C.Code § 20-105 (1981) and D.C.Code § 19-301 (1981), cannot be interpreted so as to allow for the non-judicial disposition of an estate that comprises more property than contemplated by the express exception in D.C. Code § 20-357 (1981).

Appellant, an attorney, was hired by the family of Lucille Green, who died intestate on September 10, 1981,¹ to facilitate the disposition of her estate. He prepared a trust deed that purportedly transferred the heirs' (grantors') interests in the estate to Robert J. Green as trustee (grantee). No personal representative was appointed, and the trust deed was never executed. When the family refused to pay their bill for legal services, appellant brought suit. Appellee claimed that the Probate Reform Act of 1980, and specifically D.C.Code § 20-105 (1981), operates to vest legal title to all a decedent's property in the personal representative, and, therefore, appointment of a personal representative is a prerequisite to probate and distribution and precludes the possibility of non-judicial distribution. Appellant, in essence, argues that D.C.Code § 20-105 constitutes an instruction about what to do when a personal representative is appointed, but when, as here, no personal representative is appointed, non-judicial dispositions are still viable, as they were at common law.

The trial court correctly classified this issue as one of first impression, and following extensive analysis, concluded that "the plain language of § 20-105, the legislative history, the statutory scheme and construction, and Maryland law all point to the conclusion that any action respecting a decedent's property requires the appointment of a personal representative . . . and that nonjudicial dispositions are abolished." Memorandum Opinion, Appendix A, post at 437. The court then found that "because the purpose of the contract was to nonjudicially dispose of the decedent's estate which is not legally possible based on D.C.Code § 20-105, the contract is null and void, and the defendant is Under no duty to pay the legal service fees." Id. at 21.

This case is not simply a case of statutory interpretation. It also raises a more general question: what does it take for a statute, here the Probate Reform Act, to abolish a common law doctrine. In a similarly structured case, this court held that "no statute is to be construed as altering the common law further than its words import. It is not to be construed as making

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any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express." Martin v. Johnson, 512 A.2d 1017, 1021 (D.C. 1986), citing Dell v. Department of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 102, 107 (D.C. 1985) (quoting Shaw v. Merchants' National Bank, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565, 25 L.Ed. 892 (1879)). We agree with the trial court that the Probate Reform Act can be read as fairly expressing legislative intent to abolish the common law doctrine allowing non-judicial disposition of a decedent's estate.

Appellant also argues that construction of D.C.Code § 20-105 should be in light of other provisions dealing with decedents' property, especially D.C.Code § 19-301 (1981). Our further review of the legislative history reveals that the Council of the District of Columbia consciously decided to repeal the common law procedures permitting private disposition of real property and to require the appointment of a personal representative where D.C.Code § 19-301 had previously operated outside of probate. That history not only reveals the care and thoroughness with which the new probate law was developed; it states that real property is to be included "in the probate estate for the first time." See Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on Bill 3-91 at 51 (March 12, 1980). Contrary to appellant's contention, this demonstrates that a clear policy decision was made by the Council. Accordingly, the failure to repeal § 19-301, an action apparently deemed unnecessary, see id. at 83, does not support appellant's position.

In arriving at its various conclusions, the trial court issued a well-reasoned, comprehensive memorandum opinion which we find to be fully dispositive of this matter on appeal, and which we adopt. (See Appendix A.)

Affirmed.

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Notes:

1. The Probate Reform Act applies to this estate because Mrs. Green passed away after the effective date of the statute, January 1, 1981. D.C. Code § 20-109 (1981).

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TERRY, Associate Judge, concurring:

With considerable reluctance, I join in the opinion and judgment of the court. I am very uncomfortable with the notion that private parties may not agree among themselves, without the involvement of a lawyer or the intervention of the probate court, to resolve their claims to an estate to which they are all heirs. This was entirely permissible at common law. When the estate is relatively small, as it is here, the financial burden of going through probate plainly outweighs the supposed benefits of the probate process. In this case, however, the legislative intent to repeal the common law rule is very clear. I therefore have no choice but to vote for affirmance. Appellant's only recourse for future cases is to try to persuade our legislature to enact a statute like the Florida statute which he has cited to us, FLA.STAT.ANN. § 733.815 (West 1976), or the uniform act on which it was based, UNIF.PROBATE CODE § 3-912, 8 U.L.A. 388 (1983).

APPENDIX A T. CARLTON RICHARDSON, PLAINTIFF, v. ROBERT J. GREEN and ROBERT L. GREEN, DEFENDANTS. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIVIL DIVISION CIVIL ACTION No. 7156-82 MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this breach of contract action, plaintiff T. Carlton Richardson, Esq. sues the defendants, Robert J. and Robert L. Green, for professional services rendered pursuant to an attorney's fee agreement.¹ On December

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9, 1981, the defendants engaged plaintiff to effect a non-judicial disposition of the Estate of Lucille G. Green, who died intestate September 10, 1981, which estate consisted of an apartment building allegedly worth $150,000. No personal representative of the estate was appointed. Plaintiff prepared a trust deed which purportedly transferred the interests of the heirs² of Lucille Green as grantors to Robert J. Green as grantee/trustee. The trust deed was not executed. Plaintiff submitted to defendants an invoice dated February 18, 1982 for services rendered totaling $3008.75, less a $180.00 credit for payments made. When defendants did not pay the balance of $2828.75, plaintiff sued and obtained a summary judgment³ against Robert L. Green in the amount of $2828.75 plus $424.21 in attorney fees. This Court heard the trial against Robert J. Green.

Plaintiff's complaint initially sounds in contract, i.e., that the defendants breached their contract to pay for plaintiff's services which he performed in drawing up a trust deed and attendant functions in an attempt to non-judicially⁴ dispose of Lucille Green's Estate.⁵ The defendant's defense is that plaintiff could not render the contracted for services (i.e., a non-judicial disposition of the estate) because D.C.Code § 20-105 (1981)⁶ operates to vest legal title to all of a decedent's property at death in the personal representative, making the appointment of a personal representative a prerequisite to the probate and...