Richardson v. Inhabitants of Town of Danvers
Decision Date | 21 June 1900 |
Citation | 176 Mass. 413,57 N.E. 688 |
Parties | RICHARDSON v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF DANVERS. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H. P. Moulton, for plaintiff.
Daniel N. Crowley, for defendant.
The plaintiff, while riding a bicycle on a highway which the defendant was bound to keep in repair, encountered a depression in the way, and fell from her wheel and was injured. The jury returned a verdict in her favor, and the case comes before us on several exceptions to the exclusion of evidence, and to the refusal of the court to rule that a bicycle is not a carriage, within the meaning of Pub. St. c 52, § 1. The statute in question provides that highways and other ways named shall be kept in repair, at the expense of the town, city, or place where they are situated, 'so that the same may be reasonably safe and convenient for travelers, with their horses, teams, and carriages at all seasons of the year.' This statute was enacted in 1786 and has been in force ever since. St. 1786, c. 81, § 1; Rev St. c. 25, § 1; Gen. St. c. 44, § 1; St. 1877, c. 234. The question, then, is whether a bicycle is a carriage, within the meaning of this term in the statute. We have no doubt that for many purposes a bicycle may be considered a vehicle or a carriage. It may be lawfully used on the highway, and is subject to the law of the road. State v. Collins, 16 R.I. 371, 17 A. 131, 3 L. R. A 394; Myers v. Hinds, 110 Mich. 300, 68 N.W. 156, 33 L. R. A. 356; Taylor v. Traction Co., 184 Pa. St. 465, 40 A. 159; Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555, 60 N.W. 545, 28 L. R. A. 608. So, under a law prohibiting a person from riding or driving any sort of carriage furiously. Taylor v. Goodwin, 4 Q. B. Div. 228. So, under laws or ordinances prohibiting driving on the sidewalk. Reg. v. Justin, 24 Ont. 327; Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450, 20 N.E. 132, 3 L. R. A. 221; Com. v. Forrest, 170 Pa. St. 40, 32 A. 652, 29 L. R. A. 365. Under a law permitting the collection of tolls on a turnpike, a bicycle was held to be a carriage. Geiger v. Turnpike Road, 167 Pa. St. 583, 31 A. 918, 28 L. R. A. 458. The opposite was held in Williams v. Ellis, 5 Q. B. Div. 175, and in Murfin v. Plank-Road Co., 113 Mich. 675, 71 N.W. 1108, 38 L. R. A. 198. And in Scotland, in an action on a policy of insurance, it was held that a person riding a bicycle was not 'traveling as a passenger in an ordinary vehicle.' McMillan v. Insurance Co., 4 Scots L. T. 96. The statute in question was passed long before bicycles were invented, but although, of course, it is not to be confined to the same kind of vehicles then in use, we are of opinion that it should be confined to vehicles ejusdem generis, and that it does not extend to bicycles. This view is favored by the provision in Pub. St. c. 52, § 18, which provides that no damage shall be recovered 'by a person whose carriage and the load thereon exceeds the weight of six tons.' The words last quoted were first added by St. 1838, c. 104. It seems to us that the legislature, by the use of the word 'carriage,' had in view a vehicle which could carry passengers or inanimate matter, not to exceed, with its load, more than six tons. As was said in State v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 71 Mo.App. 385, 393: A bicycle is more...
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