Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-T-568-N.
• Citation: 729 F. Supp. 806
• Parties: Alice RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. LAMAR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

729 F. Supp. 806

Alice RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. LAMAR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 87-T-568-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

November 30, 1989.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joe R. Whatley, Jr., Falkenberry & Whatley, Birmingham, Ala., and Donald V. Watkins, Watkins, Carter & Knight, Montgomery, Ala., for Alice Richardson, plaintiff.

Donald B. Sweeney, Jr., Rives & Paterson, Birmingham, Ala., and Ronald H. Strawbridge, Vernon, Ala., for Lamar County Bd. of Education, et al., defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Alice Richardson, an African-American, has brought this lawsuit claiming that defendant Lamar County Board of Education¹ wrongfully refused to renew her teaching contract in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.² Richardson charges the school board with two types of discrimination under Title VII. First, she asserts a claim of "disparate treatment":³ that the school board refused to renew her contract because of her race. Second, she asserts a claim of "disparate impact": that the board's stated reason for not renewing her contract — that she had failed to pass the Alabama Initial Teacher Certification Test — is impermissible because the test has had a disparate impact on African-American teachers. The court's jurisdiction has been properly invoked pursuant to 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Based on the evidence presented at a nonjury trial, the court concludes that Richardson may recover on her disparate impact claim but not on her disparate treatment claim. The court's disposition of Richardson's disparate treatment claim is simple and direct. The court simply applies the procedure set forth by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The court's disposition of her disparate impact claim is, however, much more difficult. The court first addresses and finds meritless two defenses raised by the school board: that Richardson's disparate impact claim is barred by principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata; and that under the framework set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), Richardson would not have been reemployed even if she had passed the state certification test. The court then goes through a lengthy application of the disparate impact analysis outlined by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989).

I. BACKGROUND

Richardson taught in the Lamar County School System for three years, from 1983 to 1986. She was, however, unable to obtain a permanent teaching certificate and therefore had to teach with temporary and provisional certificates. To obtain a permanent certificate, Richardson, like all other teachers in the state at that time, had to pass the Alabama Initial Teacher Certification Test, which consisted of a "core" examination and an examination aimed at the specific area in which the teacher sought to teach. Richardson wanted to teach in the areas of early childhood education and elementary education, and thus could meet the certification test's specific area requirement by passing the examination in either area. Between 1984 and 1986, Richardson failed the early childhood education examination twice and the elementary education examination three times.

In the spring of 1986, the Lamar County Board of Education decided that the elementary school where Richardson taught should be consolidated with another school. Because fewer teachers would be needed, the school board informed 15 nontenured teachers, including Richardson, that their contracts would not be renewed for the 1986-87 school year. Four of the 15 teachers were, however, rehired. Richardson, who would have acquired tenure if she had been rehired, was not one of the four.

Approximately a year later, in May 1987, this court enforced a consent decree requiring the State Board of Education to issue permanent teaching certificates to a court-defined class of black teachers who had failed the state teacher certification test.⁴ Richardson received her certification pursuant to the consent decree.

II. DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM

As stated, Richardson charges the Lamar County Board of Education with two types of racial discrimination: "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." With the former, an employee must prove intentional discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). With the latter, however, the employee challenges "practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation," Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2119, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971)); the employee need not prove intentional discrimination. Wards Cove, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2119.

In Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-95, the Supreme Court set out the procedure a trial court should follow in assessing a disparate treatment claim. An employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, which once established raises a presumption that the employer discriminated against the employee. If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer discriminated against the employee. This may be done by the employer articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, a reason which is clear, reasonably specific, and worthy of credence. The employer has a burden of production, not one of persuasion, and thus does not have to persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the reason advanced. Once the employer satisfies this burden of production, the employee then has the burden of persuading the court that the proffered reason for the employment decision is a pretext for intentional discrimination. The employee may satisfy this burden by persuading the court either directly that a discriminatory reason more than likely motivated the employer or indirectly that the proffered reason for the employment decision is not worthy of belief. By so persuading the court, the employee satisfies her ultimate burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of evidence that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.

Where, as here, however, a disparate treatment case has been fully tried, the court need not employ the full Burdine analysis, but may simply proceed directly to the ultimate issue of discrimination. United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Moore v. Alabama State University, 864 F.2d 103, 105 (11th Cir.1989). However, as this court recently stated in Dunning v. National Industries, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 924, 929 n. 7 (M.D.Ala.1989),

trial courts should nonetheless use the Burdine analysis in fully tried cases in which the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence. Such cases pose difficult and sensitive issues of subjective intent and objective action. The Burdine analysis provides an invaluable method of weighing and considering evidence. By focussing the court's inquiry on the prima facie case, the employer's justification, and the issue of pretext, Burdine helps to assure that the court arrives at its ultimate conclusion less through intuition and more through factual reasoning and analysis. See, e.g., Noble v. Alabama Dep't of Environmental Management, 872 F.2d 361, 365 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1989); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir.1984).

Of course, the Burdine analysis should not be applied too rigidly; nor should it be viewed as an end in itself. In other words, it should not be used by the court as a "substitute" for reaching the ultimate issue of whether the plaintiff has, in fact, been a victim of discrimination or retaliation. Moore, 864 F.2d at 105.

With these principles in mind, the court will now apply the Burdine analysis to Richardson's disparate treatment claim.

Richardson may establish a prima facie case by showing that she is a member of a protected class; that she was qualified for her job; that she was not rehired; and that a person outside the protected class with equal or lesser qualifications was rehired. Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir.1984); Lee v. Russell County Board of Education, 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982). Richardson has shown that she is African-American and thus a member of a protected class; that she was qualified for the position of a teacher in the Lamar County School System; that she was not rehired for the 1986-87 school year; and that numerous nontenured white teachers with qualifications equal to hers, in the broad sense that she and the white teachers were all qualified to teach in the Lamar County School System, were rehired for that school year.

The Lamar County Board of Education has, however, articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for treating Richardson differently from the nontenured white teachers: Richardson did not have a permanent teaching certificate. Richardson has not shown this reason to be a pretext for refusing to rehire her because of her race. If Richardson had been rehired, she would have been in her fourth year in the school system and would have acquired tenure under state law; she would have become a permanent teacher. The superintendent and school board reasonably concluded that they did not want a tenured, or permanent, teacher with only a provisional certificate. The nontenured white teachers who were rehired did not pose the same problem for the school...