Richardson v. Leeds Police Dept.

• Citation: 71 F.3d 801
• Decision Date: 15 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-6316,94-6316
• Parties: 69 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 795, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,793, 64 USLW 2447 Jerroll RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEEDS POLICE DEPARTMENT; Leeds, City of, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 801

71 F.3d 801

69 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 795,

67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,793, 64 USLW 2447

Jerroll RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEEDS POLICE DEPARTMENT; Leeds, City of, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-6316.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 15, 1995.

Gregory O. Wiggins, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins and Childs, Birmingham, AL, for Appellant.

James W. Porter, II, Birmingham, AL, for Leeds Police Dept. & City of Leeds.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Jerroll Richardson, a former police officer for the City of Leeds, Alabama ("City"), appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissing this action alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Richardson, an African American, was an officer of the Leeds Police Department ("Department") from January 1989 until he resigned in May 1991. A short time after leaving the Department he changed his mind and sought reinstatement. His efforts were unsuccessful. On July 29, 1991, he filed an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that he resigned because of disparate treatment in job assignments during his period of employment. He also accused the Department of refusing to rehire him because of his race. After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Richardson commenced this action in the district court against the City and the Chief of Police, Thomas W. McDonald. He alleged in deposition testimony that his resignation amounted to a constructive discharge because it stemmed from the denial of opportunities for advancement while employed by the City, as well as racial slurs directed at him by a fellow officer and general hostility within the Department toward black citizens. He also claimed that he was not restored to his former position with the Department on account of his race and because he complained that black citizens were treated more severely by the City's police officers than were white citizens. The complaint as amended included causes of action for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("1964 Act"), Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983. ¹ He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages and reinstatement to the position he would have held absent the purported discrimination. ²

The City subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on all charges against it. The district court granted the motion with respect to the claim for constructive discharge, finding that Richardson's reapplication for his old position foreclosed a conclusion that he resigned because of unbearable working conditions. See Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir.1993) (employee who involuntarily resigns to escape illegal discrimination must prove that his employment situation was so intolerable that a reasonable person his position would have felt compelled to leave), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2708, 129 L.Ed.2d 836 (1994). The court denied summary judgment on all other claims. The court then, on July 23, 1993, entered final judgment for the City on the constructive discharge issue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). ³ Richardson did not appeal.

A jury trial on the Sec. 1983 cause of action stemming from the alleged disparate treatment during the course of employment and in rehiring was held in 1994. At the conclusion of Richardson's case-in-chief, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The district court denied the motions and continued with the trial. After the close of all the evidence, the defendants renewed their Rule 50 motions. The court took the motions under advisement and submitted the case to the jury, which was instructed to respond to a set of interrogatories as part of its deliberations. By its answers the jury exonerated McDonald of all alleged wrongdoing. It also found that the City did not discriminate against Richardson during his tenure with the Department. It could not reach a verdict, however, on the question of whether Richardson's race played a part in the City's refusal to rehire him. The district court announced that it would enter orders on the partial verdict and released the jury.

Thereafter, in a memorandum opinion, the court granted the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the reinstatement claim. In arriving at this decision, the court found that Richardson failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination in the rehiring context because, unlike other white officers who were reemployed after they resigned, Richardson indicated when he left the Department that he was "burned out." The court consequently determined that Richardson was not similarly situated to the nonminority officers who were restored to their former positions. The court found further that, even assuming Richardson carried his initial burden of proof, he did not actually want the job for which he made application. In support of this finding the court relied on the jury's negative response to interrogatory number five, which inquired whether Richardson "presently" desired a position with the City as a police patrolman. ⁴ The court concluded that Richardson could not prevail on the claim for reinstatement under any theory of recovery given this circumstance. The court found additionally that, to the extent that the evidence presented an issue of credibility, Richardson's admission that he resigned because he was "burned out" was a legitimate reason for declining to rehire him which was not pretextual.

Pursuant to the jury's partial verdict and the ruling on the motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court dismissed the action in its entirety against both defendants. Richardson subsequently filed this appeal in which he challenges only the judgment rendered as a matter of law in favor of the City on the Sec. 1983 and Title VII causes of action arising from the failure to restore him to his former position.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a decision to grant a judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standards utilized by the district court. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2557, 132 L.Ed.2d 811 (1995). A judgment as a matter of law is warranted "[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). When evaluating a Rule 50 motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, Fla., 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir.1995). A judgment as a matter of law may be affirmed only when " 'the facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant ... that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.' " Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 739 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.1991)).

In a case such as this alleging disparate treatment, in which Sec. 1983 is employed as a remedy for the same conduct attacked under Title VII, " 'the elements of the two causes of action are the same.' " Cross v. State of Ala., 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 n. 16 (11th Cir.1982)). In both instances, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Hardin, 691 F.2d at 1369 n. 16.

Identical methods of proof, as described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), are also employed. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. ----, ---- n. 1, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746 n. 1, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 415 n. 1 (1993) (assuming that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies equally to Sec. 1983 and Title VII claims of discrimination). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which raises a presumption that the employer's decision was more likely than not based upon an impermissible factor. ⁵ McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 216 (1981). The defendant may rebut this presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 678; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d at 216. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then have the opportunity to persuade the trier of fact, through the presentation of his own case and by cross-examining the defendant's witnesses, that the reason proffered was not the real basis for the decision, but a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d at 679; St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d at 416.

The distinction between the Title VII and Sec. 1983 causes in the present case was in the availability of a jury trial and compensatory damages under Sec. 1983, but not with respect to the Title VII equitable claims, which were tried to the court. See supra note 2. When legal and equitable causes are joined in one action, the legal issues must be decided first. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479, 82 S.Ct. 894, 900-01, 8 L.Ed.2d 44, 52 (1962). To the extent...