Richardson v. Little

• Decision Date: 08 February 1923
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 420.
• Citation: 209 Ala. 351,96 So. 144
• Parties: RICHARDSON ET AL. v. LITTLE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

96 So. 144

209 Ala. 351

RICHARDSON ET AL. v. LITTLE.

8 Div. 420.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 8, 1923

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1923.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lauderdale County; Chas. P. Almon, Judge.

Bill of T. B. Little against Mrs. R. A. Richardson and others. Decree for complainant, and respondents appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Andrews & Peach and Clopper Almon, all of Sheffield, for appellants.

Geo. E Barnett, of Florence, for appellee.

McCLELLAN J.

Since a binding contract, express or implied, to pay for improvements made on real property, or an effectual subsequent ratification of such a contract, is essential to the creation or to the existence of a merchanic's or materialman's lien (Code, § 4754 et seq.), it is well decided that a minor cannot so contract as to afford the necessary basis for the perfection or imposition of such statutory lien upon the minor's real estate. Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, §§ 108, 109; Rockel on Mec. Liens, §§ 29; McCarty v Carter, 49 Ill. 53, 95 Am. Dec. 572; Hall v Acken, 47 N. J. Law, 340; 27 Cyc. p. 65. In Phillips' work, § 108, it is aptly said:

"As the mechanics' lien arises from work done and materials furnished under an obligatory contract, if the contract be not binding, the lien necessarily fails. An infant is not bound by his contract except in certain cases in which the erection of a building is not included. A conveyance or mortgage by him of his real estate would not be binding upon him; and Legislatures are certainly not to be presumed to have intended to allow him to encumber his property, indirectly, by a contract for its improvement, when he cannot do the same thing in a binding mode by an instrument executed expressly for the purpose. A minor who has nearly reached his majority may be as able, in fact, to protect his interests in a contract as a person who has passed that period. But the law must necessarily fix some precise age at which persons shall be held sui juris. It cannot measure the individual capacity in each case as it arises. It must hold the youth who has nearly reached his majority to be no more bound by his contract than a child of tender years; and neither in one case nor in the other can it permit a contractor to claim a lien against his property under the guise of a contract for improvement. This would expose minors to ruin at the hands of designing men. The mechanic who erects a building must take, like

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