Richardson v. Locklyn
Decision Date | 15 November 2016 |
Docket Number | A16A0978 |
Citation | 793 S.E.2d 640,339 Ga.App. 457 |
Parties | RICHARDSON v. LOCKLYN. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Timothy James Gardner, Henrietta G. Brown, Atlanta, for Appellant.
Richard Nolan Blevins Jr., Marietta, Justin Tyler Crocker, for Appellee.
Freida Latrice Richardson appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for attorney fees under Georgia's "offer of settlement statute," OCGA § 9-11-68. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on the request for attorney fees pursuant to that Code section.
In May 2014, Quandra Nicole Locklyn sued Richardson for damages allegedly arising from a 2012 automobile collision. Specifically, Locklyn sought recovery for her medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. During discovery, Locklyn produced medical bills totaling $18,927.25. The bills covered ambulance services and hospital care that she received on the day of the collision, as well as further medical treatment that she sought later. In July 2014, Richardson sent Locklyn a formal offer under OCGA § 9-11-68 to settle her claims for $12,500.00. Locklyn rejected the offer.
At trial, Richardson stipulated to her liability, but she disputed the extent of Locklyn's injuries and whether those injuries were caused by the collision. Locklyn testified that she felt pain in her leg and head immediately after the collision, was given arm and neck braces in the emergency room, and subsequently followed up with specialists. She claimed that she had ongoing pain and numbness in her hands and feet as a result of the collision. Locklyn presented no evidence concerning any lost wages.
On cross-examination, Locklyn admitted that she had been "disabled" for the past five years for other reasons, that she had suffered a lower back injury in 2010, and that she had been in a single-car accident in 2013. Locklyn called no expert or lay witnesses to provide any further evidence about the nature or cause of her injuries. The jury returned a $6,948.25 verdict for Locklyn, which was the total amount of her bills for ambulance services and hospital treatment on the day of the collision.
After trial, Richardson filed a motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68, based on Locklyn's rejection of her settlement offer. Locklyn filed a response to the motion asserting that the offer was not made in good faith "based on medical expenses incurred and the liability of [Richardson]." Richardson did not respond to Locklyn's assertion that the offer of settlement was not made in good faith, and the trial court subsequently denied her motion for attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68, ruling as follows:
[A]t the time the Defendant made the settlement offer of $12 500 the Plaintiff's medical expenses were $18,927.25, exceeding the offer. This amount was known to the Defendant at the time of the offer and disclosed during the discovery period and was not a reasonable offer or a realistic assessment of liability. Additionally, the Defendant stipulated to liability at trial and thus there were no issues of liability in dispute. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the offer to settle made by the defendants [sic] was not in good faith based upon the overall record and evidence presented at trial.
Richardson appeals.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1). If the defendant provides proof to the court that the foregoing provision applies to the judgment, then the court "shall order the payment of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-68 (d) (1). The court, however, may disallow an award of otherwise eligible fees and expenses if it "determine[s] that an offer was not made in good faith in an order setting forth the basis for such a determination." OCGA § 9-11-68 (d) (2).2
It is undisputed that Richardson was entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (1), because Locklyn's jury verdict was less than 75 percent of the settlement offer. Nonetheless, the trial court declined to enter such an award because it concluded that Richardson's offer was not made in good faith based upon the relationship between the amount of the offer and Locklyn's medical expenses, as well as Richardson's admission of liability. Whether these objective factors are sufficient to support a finding of a lack of good faith is problematic given that good faith is not defined in the statute and there is a dearth of caselaw in Georgia interpreting its meaning.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Arrowood Idem. Co. v. Acosta, Inc. , 58 So.3d 286, 289 (Fla. Ct. App. 2011). See also Gawtrey v. Hayward , 50 So.3d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010) ; Gurney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. , 889 So.2d 97 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004). "Several types of objective evidence have been found relevant to a finding of good faith," Arrowood , supra, including (1) whether "the offer bore no reasonable relationship to the amount of damages or [ (2) ] a realistic assessment of liability, or [ (3) ] that [the offeror] lacked intent to settle the claim." See Allstate Ins. Co. v Manasse , 715 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998). Other examples of objective evidence include whether the offer was made prematurely based upon the amount of discovery completed, see Gawtr e y , supra, 50 So.3d at 743 (III), the plaintiff's medical records, independent medical examination reports, and the amount of property damage. See Gurney , supra, 889 So.2d at 100.
While Florida courts may consider objective evidence, they cannot base a ruling "exclusively on the objective factors." Arrowood , supra, 58 So.3d at 290. Instead, they are "required to consider [the offeror's] explanation and then determine whether, despite consideration of the objective factors ... [the offeror] had a subjectively reasonable belief on which to base its offer." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 289. "The fact that [an] offer was nominal in amount is not necessarily determinative of the issue of good faith." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gawtr e y , supra, 50 So.3d at 743 (II).
In determining whether a party is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the offer of settlement statute including whether an offer was made in good faith, a Florida appellate court has required a hearing on the issue. See Schapiro v. Rubinson , 784 So.2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005) ; compare Menchise v. Senterfitt , 532 F.3d 1146, 1153–1154 (III) (11th Cir. 2008) ( )5 See also Gawtr e y , supra, 50 So.3d at 742 (I);Gurney , supra, 889 So.2d at 100. Additionally, Florida courts have held that the burden is on the offeree , or the person seeking to avoid the payment of attorney fees, to prove the absence of good faith. Gawtr e y , supra, 50 So3d at 99–100 (II).
In Bell v. Waffle House, Inc. , 331 Ga.App. 443, 445, 771 S.E.2d 132 (2015), our court considered whether a hearing should be required where a party seeks attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68, but we did not decide the issue in light of the fee opponent's waiver. We now hold that a hearing is required for the trial court to determine whether fees will be awarded pursuant to that Code section.
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