Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County, No. 2006-SC-000502-DG.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky) |
| Writing for the Court | Scott |
| Citation | 260 S.W.3d 777 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-SC-000502-DG. |
| Decision Date | 19 June 2008 |
| Parties | Christie RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT, Appellee. |
v.
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT, Appellee.
[260 S.W.3d 778]
J. Key Schoen, Sales, Tillman, Wallbaum, Catlett & Satterley, PLLC, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Appellant.
N. Scott Lilly, Louisville/Jefferson Metro Government, Second Assistant County Attorney, Susan P. Spickard, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Appellee.
Mark L. Miller, Priddy, Cutler, Miller & Meade PLLC, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Fraternal Order of Police Legal Plan, Inc. (Amicus Curiae), Kentucky State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (Amicus Curiae) and National Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (Amicus Curiae).
Opinion of the Court by Justice SCOTT.
This appeal concerns the interpretation of several provisions of the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA). KRS 65.200 to .2006. CALGA mandates that a local government provide for the defense of an employee in an action in tort arising out of acts or omissions occurring within the scope of his or her employment. KRS 65.2005(1). In this case of first impression, we are asked to determine whether the duty to defend under CALGA applies to former employees sued in tort for acts or omissions occurring within the scope of their employment. We hold that it does.
In March 2002, criminal charges were brought against Appellant, Christie Richardson, who had been a police officer with the Louisville Metro Narcotics Unit since 1997, and Detective Mark Watson. The indictment included 450 counts accusing Watson and Richardson of falsifying search warrant affidavits, forging signatures on search warrants, and tampering with drug evidence, among other allegations. Watson pled guilty to all charges. Richardson resigned on March 18, 2002, shortly after being indicted. She was ultimately convicted of first-degree official misconduct, second-degree possession of a forged instrument, and eighteen (18) counts of tampering with public records, and acquitted on all other charges.
After Richardson's resignation, the following five civil actions were filed against the various government entities, Watson, and Richardson: (1) Boyer v. City of Louisville; (2) Northington v. Watson; (3) Grigsby v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government; (4) Spencer v. City of
Louisville; and (5) Elliott v. City of Louisville. The allegations in the complaints against Richardson pertained to her performance as a police officer, involving incidents which occurred through the end of 2001. The plaintiffs allege that Richardson unlawfully entered and searched their residences, offered perjured testimony against them, and committed other acts of official misconduct.
When Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (Metro Government) denied Richardson a defense in the civil suits, she filed a declaratory judgment action in the Jefferson Circuit Court, seeking a ruling that Metro Government was obligated under CALGA to provide her a defense. The circuit court entered judgment in Richardson's favor, reasoning that because the five civil actions seek money damages for her tortious acts during her employment, CALGA provides entitlement to a legal defense.
The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, reversed and held that the duty to defend under CALGA does not apply to former employees. In denying Richardson a civil defense, the Court of Appeals found that Metro Government had no duty to defend since she had resigned before any of the civil suits were filed against her.
A. Statutory Construction
The resolution of this appeal depends upon the construction of several provisions of CALGA. As we have previously indicated, our goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Ky.2006). To determine legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 648-49. The statute must be read as a whole and in context with other parts of the law. Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky.2005).
Where a statute is unambiguous, we need not consider extrinsic evidence of legislative intent and public policy. Id. at 94. We presume, of course, that the General Assembly did not intend an absurd or manifestly unjust result. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Ky. 2004).
As a matter of application, all statutes are to be liberally construed to...
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PETITIONER F. v. Brown, No. 2008-SC-000213-DG.
...a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky.2008) (citing Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Ky.2006)). "To determine legislative intent, we look first to the language ......
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...for this possible interpretation. 96. Rappaport, supra note 92, at 1556. 97. Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 260 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. 2008) (citations omitted). 98. Chang v. County of Los Angeles, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 298 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Farmers Ins. Grp. v. ......
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PETITIONER F. v. Brown, No. 2008-SC-000213-DG.
...a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky.2008) (citing Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Ky.2006)). "To determine legislative intent, we look first to the lang......
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Beth Lewis Maze & Unknown Similarly Situated Purchasers Contracts v. Bd. of Dirs. for the Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund, 2017-SC-000233-DG
...of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning." Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky. 2008). That is, we construe a "statute only as written, and the intent of the Legislature must be deduced from the language it u......
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Beshear v. Acree, 2020-SC-0313-OA
...(Ky. 2005), and if that language is clear and unambiguous, we look no further. Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't , 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky. 2008).Here KRS 39A.100, in clear and unambiguous language, authorizes the Governor to declare a state of emergency "in the event......
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Ky. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Seven Counties Servs., Inc., 2018-SC-000461-CL
...language of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning." Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't , 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky. 2008). The plain language analysis of KRS 61.520 precludes any finding that the Governor was authorized to contract with any depar......
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Qualified Immunity and Federalism All the Way Down
...for this possible interpretation. 96. Rappaport, supra note 92, at 1556. 97. Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 260 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. 2008) (citations omitted). 98. Chang v. County of Los Angeles, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 298 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Farmers Ins. Grp. v. ......