Richardson v. Mabus

Decision Date24 August 2016
Docket Number2:14-cv-00139-JAW
Citation203 F.Supp.3d 86
Parties Craig D. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. Ray MABUS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

John F. Lambert, Jr., Abigail C. Varga, Lambert Coffin, Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.

John G. Osborn, U.S. Attorney's Office, Portland, ME, for Defendant.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Craig Richardson worked as a driver and served as a union steward at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Shipyard) in Kittery, Maine. His relationship with his supervisors was at times contentious, which Mr. Richardson attributes to his work on Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, his help in organizing an affinity group for deaf employees at the Shipyard, and various forms of impermissible discrimination on the part of his supervisors. Mr. Richardson has diabetes

and narcolepsy, and because of the narcolepsy, the Shipyard physician disqualified him from driving commercial vehicles. Navy management later determined that he could not retain his position. He left the Shipyard, ultimately finding work as a railroad repairer at another Navy facility.

In this lawsuit, Mr. Richardson alleges disability discrimination on the basis of diabetes and narcolepsy

, age discrimination on account of his supervisors' remarks about his retirement and their selection of a younger applicant for promotion, retaliation for his EEO complaints and affinity group activities, and failure to accommodate. Mr. Richardson moves for partial summary judgment on the narcolepsy discrimination count, and the Navy moves for summary judgment on all counts.

After parsing the voluminous, hotly contested record, the Court determines that Mr. Richardson has failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact as regards the diabetes- and age-based discrimination claims, as the facts are too thin for a reasonable jury to conclude there was severe, pervasive harassment giving rise to a hostile work environment on either of these bases. Although Mr. Richardson can make out a prima facie case that the Navy failed to promote him on account of his age, he cannot overcome the Navy's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason with a showing of pretext. Mr. Richardson does, however, produce sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his supervisors retaliated against him for his protected conduct: the EEO complaints and the affinity group. Especially revealing is Mr. Richardson's account, which the Court accepts for the purposes of summary judgment, of his supervisors berating him in no uncertain terms at a meeting convened to discuss his protected conduct.

As a matter of law, the Court finds that the Navy was justified in disqualifying Mr. Richardson from driving commercial vehicles due to his narcolepsy

diagnosis. Both Mr. Richardson and the Navy advanced cogent arguments supported by considerable authority on this point, and after due consideration, the Court reads the relevant First Circuit caselaw together with long-standing and recently reiterated agency guidance to arrive at its determination that the Navy acted permissibly in treating narcolepsy as a categorically disqualifying condition. Because the two claims are legally intertwined, this leaves no genuine dispute of material fact as to the narcolepsy-based disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims.

In sum, what remains of this lawsuit is Mr. Richardson's retaliation claim.

I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On April 3, 2014, Plaintiff Craig Richardson brought suit against Defendant and Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, Compl. and Demand for Trial by Jury (ECF No. 1), and the Navy filed its Answer on June 20, 2014. Answer (ECF No. 6). The parties subsequently agreed to seventy stipulated facts. Joint Stipulations (ECF No. 47) (Stip. ).

A. Craig Richardson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

On September 17, 2015, Mr. Richardson moved for summary judgment as to Count I, adverse action constituting disability discrimination, with a supporting statement of material facts. Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. with Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 49) (Pl.'s Mot. ); id. Attach. 1 Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of his Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (PSMF). On October 8, 2015, the Navy opposed Mr. Richardson's motion. Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (ECF No. 64) (Def.'s Resp. ). That same day, it filed a reply to Mr. Richardson's statement of material facts, Def.'s Local Rule 56(c) Opposing Statement of Material Facts and Statement of Additional Facts at 1-7 (ECF No. 65) (DRPSMF), as well as a statement of additional material facts. Id. at 7-13 (DSAMF). Mr. Richardson replied to the Navy's opposition on October 22, 2015. Pl.'s Reply in Supp. of his Mot. for Summ J. (ECF No. 74) (Pl.'s Reply ). He also filed a reply to the Navy's statement of additional material facts. Pl.'s Reply to Def.'s Opposing Statement of Material Facts and Pl.'s Reply to Def.'s Statement of Additional Material Facts (ECF No. 75) (PRDSAMF).1

B. The Navy's Motion for Summary Judgment

On September 17, 2015, the Navy moved for summary judgment with a supporting statement of material facts. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. with Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 50) (Def.'s Mot. ); Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 51) (DSMF). On October 7, 2015, Mr. Richardson opposed the Navy's motion. Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. with Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 63) (Pl.'s Opp'n ). That same day, he filed a reply to the Navy's statement of material facts, id. Attach. 1 Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Material Facts and Pl.'s Statement of Additional Material Facts at 1-43 (ECF No. 63) (PRDSMF), as well as a statement of additional material facts. Id. at 43-48 (PSAMF). The Navy replied to Mr. Richardson's opposition on October 22, 2015. Def.'s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 76) (Def.'s Reply ). It also filed a reply to Mr. Richardson's statement of additional material facts. Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Statement of Additional Material Facts (ECF No. 77) (DRPSAMF).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTS2

For coherence, the Court begins with the parties' stipulated facts as submitted. Next, it pieces together the facts submitted by the parties in their motions for summary judgment; the facts are copious and vigorously contested, and the Court has done its best to consolidate them into a single comprehensible volume. Where the parties have included stipulations in their statements of facts, the Court has kept them for context.

A. Stipulated Facts
1. Shipyard Command Structure and Mr. Richardson's Position

Multiple naval commands operate at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, including NAVSEA (which commands surface-based naval activities), NAVSUB (which commands subsurface naval activities), NAVFAC (which operates and controls naval facilities), and BUMED (Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center), along with various additional commands and other federal components, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, a sub-component of the Department of Defense. Stip. ¶ 1. The local component of NAVFAC, which operates the Shipyard, is the Public Works Department-Maine, which provides comprehensive shore facilities management, operations maintenance, construction, base operating support services, and environmental management for the Shipyard. Id. ¶ 2. The senior NAVFAC official at the Shipyard is the Public Works Officer ("PWO"), an active-duty naval position. Id. ¶ 3. The Base Support Vehicles and Equipment (BSVE) Branch of the Public Works Department-Maine, among other tasks, manages and operates the Navy's fleet of vehicles and construction equipment at the Shipyard. The BSVE Branch also provides base operating support in the form of material handling and transportation, snow removal, grounds maintenance, utility maintenance, and site construction. Id. ¶ 4.

Mr. Richardson worked as a WG-7 Motor Vehicle Operator (MVO-7) in the Base Support Vehicles and Equipment (BSVE) Branch of the Public Works Department at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Shipyard) from at least January 1, 2011, through May 3, 2014. Id. ¶ 5. From January 2011 through May 4, 2014, Mr. Richardson's chain of command was:

• First Line (or immediate) Supervisor (First-Level Transportation Supervisor): Thomas Gauthier 2011, Chris Palmer from October 2013 through May 4, 2014;
• Second Line Supervisor (Base Support Vehicles and Equipment (BSVE) Supervisor): Robert Landry 2011 until approximately December 2012; James Pickering from December 2012 through August 2013, Steve Cook from August 2013 thought May 4, 2014;
• Third Line (Production Division Director): Russell Gagner;
• Fourth Line (Deputy Public Works Officer): John Wyeth;
• Fifth Line (Public Works Officer): Commander Brian Weinstein.

Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Richardson was the only MVO-7 in the BSVE Branch. Id. ¶ 7.

2. Craig Richardson's Narcolepsy
Diagnosis and Informal Accommodation

Mr. Richardson's medical file maintained by Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (BUMED) at the Shipyard clinic contained a May 5, 2008 letter authored by a personal physician of Mr. Richardson's, Dr. Lewis Golden, stating that Mr. Richardson "carries an unequivocal diagnosis of narcolepsy

with cataplexy" and that he "represents no risk for his present work environment at the shipyard."Id. ¶¶ 8-9.

On March 28, 2011, Physician Assistant Renald Rouillard from the Shipyard clinic received a single page note from Dr. Donald Cvitkovich, Mr. Richardson's physician, discussing Mr. Richardson's narcolepsy

, the treatment, and suggesting that the bus detail and HAZMAT vehicle movement be avoided as his situation is reassessed over the next six to nine months. Id. ¶ 10. That same day, the Shipyard clinic issued a Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Limited Duty Recommendation with the restriction: "No busses or HAZMAT vehicles. Next Op License PE to be...

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